

ORIENS ALITER

Journal for Culture and History
of the Central and Eastern Europe

2/2015

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All contributions are reviewed. Unsolicited handwritings are not returned.

Periodicity: Two numbers per year

Web presentation: oa.ff.cuni.cz

Address of the publishing house: Pavel Mervart, P. O. Box 5, 549 41 Červený Kostelec

Graphic design: Vladimír Mačinskij

Print: H.R.G. spol. s r.o., Litomyšl

Distribution: Kosmas, s. r. o. (www.kosmas.cz) and Publishing house Pavel Mervart (www.pavelmervart.cz)

ISSN 2336-3959

MK ČRE 21650

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EDITORIAL

Dear readers,

the fourth number of the scientific journal *Oriens Aliter* brings five original professional studies in the field of history, cultural history, political science, and comprehensive conference report from the International Conference with the title *Identity in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe between the Regional and (Supra-) National Model*. The journal provides not only space for presentation of current research results but also helps to verify new methodological approaches and possibilities of involving the so far neglected source basis and secondary literature. The current issue of the journal *Oriens Aliter*, together with the previous issues, seeks to fulfil the goal of the founders of the periodical, i.e. to look at the complex region of Central and Eastern Europe both in the broader European (Western) context, and in the interrelationships between ethnic and cultural entities across the regions. The fourth issue of the periodical presents the work of not only established professionals but also novice authors.

The article by Galina Babak, a Ph.D. student at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University (*On the Question of the Ukrainian Reception of Russian Formalism: Dmytro Chyzhevsky versus Boris Eichenbaum*) presents comparative analysis of two earlier studies on the subject of Gogol's *Overcoat*. The factors complicating and slowing the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the 1990s are mapped by the article of Ihor Hurak, Associate Professor at the Precarpathian National University of Vasyl Stefanyk (*Ukraine and Poland: Challenges to Strategic Partnership*). Václav Ježek, a Ph.D. student at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, deals in his article (*Some Aspects of Russian Ecclesial and State Policy in Palestine with Particular Reference to the Nineteenth Century*) with the presence of the Russians in Palestine, primarily

in the 19th century, and analyses the contribution of the Russian Church in the fields of education and Orthodox Christianity in Palestine. The development and transformation of the conception analysing borders of the Tsarist power in the Muscovian Russian literature in the context of the events of the Time of Troubles period are examined in the article of a Ph.D. student at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Olga Leshkova (*The Conception of the Tsar's Divine Authority in Muscovian Historical Texts on the Time of Troubles*). Professor Volodymyr Okarynskyi, working at the Ternopil National Pedagogical University of Volodymyr Hnatyuk, devoted his text (*Rock Music in Everyday Life of Youth in Western Ukraine under the Soviet Regime /1960 – early 1980s/*) to a topic that has not yet come to the forefront of the scientific interest of historians or anthropologists. The conference report by Olga Leshkova maps the course of the international conference *Identity in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe between the Regional and (Supra-) National Model*, which took place at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, in December 2015 and was attended by around 20 professional historians and literary historians from the Czech Republic, Germany, Ukraine, Poland and Russia. During this conference the journal *Oriens Aliter* was also presented.

The editorial board of the journal believes that texts published in this number of *Oriens Aliter* will find their readers not only among Czech and foreign experts, but also the public interested in the issues of Central and Eastern Europe.

Anna Hausenblasová, Adriana Kokuňková

STUDIES

Galina Babak

ON THE QUESTION OF THE UKRAINIAN
RECEPTION OF RUSSIAN FORMALISM:
DMYTRO CHYZHEVSKY
VERSUS BORIS EICHENBAUM

Dmytro Chyzhevsky,¹ an Ukrainian Slavic, literary and cultural historian, wrote article *About Gogol's "Overcoat"*,² which appeared in 1938 in the Russian immigrant journal *Современные записки*.³ During his life, Chyzhevsky wrote three articles about Nikolai Gogol which were later combined into the paper *Gogol'-Studien*.⁴ The earliest of the above mentioned articles was *About Gogol's "Overcoat"*.⁵ According to the Ukrainian literary critic S. Matvienko, this study was written "at the time when

¹ Dmytro Chyzhevsky (1894–1977) was born in the Russian Empire, in Alexandria, Kherson Oblast (now it is a part of Ukraine). During the civil war he supported the Mensheviks and in 1921 he emigrated. Following these events, his scientific career was connected with teaching at Universities of the Czechoslovak Republic, Germany, and the United States. His most famous works were in the fields of history of philosophy and literature: *Hegel in Russia*, *The History of Philosophy in the Ukraine*, *Philosophy of G. S. Skovoroda*, *The History of Ukrainian literature* and others.

² Чижевский, Д. О., «Шинели» Гоголя, *Современные записки*, 1938, т. 67, 172–195.

³ *Современные записки* – a Russian literary immigrant journal which was published between 1920–1940 in Paris. The journal was created at the initiative of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and with the participation of Alexander Kerensky. It was supported by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk, who provided a "material assistance to the cause of Russian freedom and culture". (q. v. Вишняк, М., Воспоминания редактора, *Современные записки*, 1957, т. 7, 89–90.) The journal considered its main task the consolidation of creative forces of the Russian diaspora. It united almost all of the major writers of the first wave of Russian emigration. Among the regular contributors to the journal were N. Berdyaev, S. Bulgakov, N. Lossky, L. Shestov, L. Karsavin and others.

⁴ Tschizewskij, D., *Gogol'-Studien*, in: *Zur russischen Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts: Gogol' – Turgenew – Dostoevskij – Tolstoj*, München 1966, 57–125.

⁵ First article was published in the German journal *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie* entitled *Zur Komposition von Gogol's „Mantel“* with a note that it is based on the report of 4th May 1936,

Chyzhevsky was under the influence of formalism”.⁶ He was also influenced by theories of the *Prague Linguistic Circle*⁷ in which he participated during 1926–1932.

This paper is dedicated to the comparative analysis of two studies: *About Gogol's "Overcoat"* by D. Chyzhevsky and *How Gogol's "Overcoat" Was Made*⁸ by Boris Eichenbaum, who was a Russian literary critic and a prominent figure of OPOYAZ.⁹ B. Eichenbaum's article was published in 1919. D. Chyzhevsky in his analysis of Gogol story proceeds from the theoretical aspects of Eichenbaum's study, which thus serves as a pretext for Chyzhevsky's article. On the one hand, Chyzhevsky's study is an interesting case of Ukrainian reception of Russian Formalism,¹⁰ on the other hand, it represents an attempt to apply the structuralist approach to the analysis of the text. Besides, it is important to note that interpretation of the Gogol text

which was made in Berlin. See: Tschizewskij, D., Zur Komposition von Gogol's „Mantel“, *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie*, 1937, bd. 14, 63–94.

⁶ Матвієнко, С. Г., Дискурс формалізму: український контекст, in: *Соло триває... (Нові голоси): Лекції на пошану Соломії Павличко*, сост. С. Г. Матвієнко, Львів 2004, 32.

⁷ The *Prague Linguistic Circle* or the *Prague School* was one of the leading centres of linguistic structuralism. It was founded in Prague in 1926 by the Czech linguist Vilém Mathesius. The Circle united linguists who studied the problems of general linguistics. Czechoslovak philologists participated in the work of the circle, such as B. Mathesius, B. Trnka, B. Havránek, J. Mukařovský, etc. Also Russian linguists N. Trubetskoj, R. Jakobson and Ukrainian philologist D. Chyzhevsky were part of the group.

⁸ It was first published in the OPOYAZ collection «Поэтика». See: Эйхенбаум, Б., Как сделана «Шинель», in: *Поэтика. Сборник по теории поэтического языка*, Петроград 1919, 151–162.

⁹ OPOYAZ (*Society for the Study of Poetic Language*) – Russian acronym created from *Общество по изучению поэтического языка*, which along with the *Moscow Linguistic Circle* was one of the precursor groups to Russian Formalism. The group was formed in St Petersburg, Russia, in 1916, by a group of students and professors working in literary and language studies. Its members included Victor Shklovsky, Boris Eichenbaum, Jurij Tynyanov and Roman Jakobson. At different times OPOYAZ included E. Polivanov, L. Jakubinsky, O. Brik, V. Vinogradov, V. Zhyrmunsky etc. The group was interested in uncovering the working mechanisms of literary technique, or more precisely identifying the specific quality of language use that separated the literary text from the non-literary text. Subsequently, the Formalist method had a great influence on the theory of Structuralism and the movement of the so-called New Criticism.

¹⁰ Here and continuing in this article, Formalism refers to the theory of the Formalist method developed by OPOYAZ. At the heart of the Formalist method lies the idea of the immanence of literature and, as a consequence, an appeal to study the internal laws of its development. Formalists believed the main problem of literary criticism is the specificity in the form of the work, and all the elements of which it is composed are constructive elements. Formalists saw that the main task of literary criticism is in the analysis of separate devices that form a basis of the construction of the art work. See: Дмитриев, А. – Левченко, Я., Наука как прием: еще раз о методологическом наследии русского формализма, *НЛО*, 2001, № 50, 12–38.

made by Chyzhevsky is based on the tradition of Russian religious philosophy from the beginning of the 20th century.

At first, let's start from a few concepts taken from Boris Eichenbaum's article which had become almost classic by that time. His study, together with *Морфология волшебной сказки* by philologist-folklorist Vladimir Propp¹¹ and the research into narrative speech made by the linguist Victor Vinogradov,¹² is at the roof of modern narrative theory.

Rejecting the idea that literary text is determined by social and psychological factors directly, Eichenbaum views works of art as something that is always "made" and "fashioned", therefore highlighting the importance of the author's artistic techniques in a composition. He notes that structure of a short story depends largely on the role which the *author's personal tone* plays in it. Thus, the researcher distinguishes an adventurous novella with a dominant plot from a novella with *skaz-stylisation* in which "the plot plays an external importance and therefore in itself is static".¹³ According to the smart observation made by V. Vinogradov in his approval of the plotlessness of Gogol's short stories Eichenbaum follows the tradition coming from the philosopher Vasily Rozanov.¹⁴ From his perspective *skaz* can be of two types: the "chant-like" (declamatory style), which creates an impression of "author's even-tempered speech"; and "reproduced" (or "dramatic"), as if "an actor was hiding behind it".¹⁵ The latter has a tendency not just to narrate or just to

¹¹ Пропп, В., *Морфология волшебной сказки*, Москва, 1928.

¹² Here it could be mentioned such V. Vinogradov's works as *Гоголь и натуральная школа* (1925), *Проблема сказа в стилистике* (1926), *Этюды о стиле Гоголя* (1926), *О художественной прозе* (1930) etc.

¹³ Eichenbaum, B., How Gogol's "Overcoat" Was Made, in: *Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays*, ed. and transl. R. A. Maguire, Princeton 1974, 269.

¹⁴ V. Rozanov was one of the first who noted that Gogol's characters seem to be "still": "There are absolutely no real people in this picture: they are tiny wax figures, but they are all grimacing so artfully that we could even suspect that they started to move." See: Розанов, В., *Пушкин и Гоголь*. [online: <http://dugward.ru/library/gogol/rozanov_pushkin_i_gogol.html>, cit. 2016-02-27].

¹⁵ Eichenbaum, B., How Gogol's "Overcoat" Was Made, in: *Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays*, ed. and transl. R. A. Maguire, Princeton 1974, 269. In close connection to the Eichenbaum's article is Jurij Туньянов's article *Гоголь и Достоевский*. By analyzing the work of Gogol, Туньянов focuses on the *mask*-device, which is the basic technique of portraying people. The difference between *masks*, in his opinion, corresponds to the difference of styles, which is the high (tragic) and the low (comic). Thus, the researcher points out that there are two ways of portraying people in Gogol's works, which "go back to different linguistic elements: the high style is attributed to the Slavonic church whereas the simple style is to the dialectical one". See: Туньянов, Ю. Н., *Гоголь и Достоевский. К теории пародии*, Петроград 1921.

tell the story, but also “to reproduce words with an emphasis on mimetic and articulated sounds”.¹⁶ Taking into account the fact that Gogol loved to read aloud and perform his stories Eichenbaum indicates the basis for the Gogolian text as *skaz*, “that is made up of the actual elements of speech and verbalized emotions”: “The real dynamic force and therefore the structure of Gogol’s work depends on the way the *skaz* is constructed, on the play of language. His characters are only petrified poses. They are dominated by the mirthful and ever-playful spirit of the artist himself.”¹⁷

The next part of his article focuses on the analysis of the separate phonetic *skaz*-devices and the system by which they are linked. Thus, Eichenbaum highlights the “etymological kinds of puns”, the forms of “common speech”, “epic *skaz*” and the “sentimental and melodramatic declamation” in the overall style of the text. The last one is used by way of contrasting the purely anecdotal style of *The Overcoat*. According to Eichenbaum, it explains the emergence of the so-called “humane place” in the novella: “Leave me alone! Why do you offend me?”¹⁸ The criticism headed by the democratic revolutionary Alexander Belinsky saw in these words the central idea of the story: ideological pathos of the problem faced by a “little man” or “poor clerk”.¹⁹ Eichenbaum’s attention to the phonetic dominant of *skaz*, and his disregard to its structure and semantics were subsequently criticized by V. Vinogradov.²⁰ Opinion of the literary historian Aage A. Hansen-Lowe was that the general orientation of the Formalists on the analysis of the phonetic and gesture articulation

¹⁶ Eichenbaum, B., How Gogol’s “Overcoat” Was Made, in: *Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays*, ed. and transl. Robert A. Maguire, Princeton 1974, 269.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 270.

¹⁸ The whole passage is: “And there was something strange in these words and the tone of voice in which they were uttered. Something that aroused compassion could be heard in them, do that one young man, who had been recently appointed and who, following the example of others, had allowed himself to tease him, suddenly stopped as if cut to the heart, and from that moment on everything seemed to change and present itself to him in a different light. Some unseen force turned him away from his colleagues, with whom he had become acquainted because he had taken them for decent and well-bred people. And for a long time thereafter the humble little clerk with the bald patch atop his head would appear before him in his happiest moment, speaking the heart-rending words: ‘Leave me alone. Why do you offend me!’ In these heart-rending words, others could be heard: ‘I’m your brother!’ And a poor young man would bury his face in his hands, and many times in his life thereafter he would shudder on seeing how much inhumanity there is in man...” See: Chizhevsky, D., About Gogol’s “Overcoat”, in: *Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays*, ed. and transl. R. A. Maguire, Princeton 1974, 318.

¹⁹ *Гоголь в русской критике*, сост. С. Б. Бочаров, Москва 2008.

²⁰ Виноградов, В., *Гоголь и натуральная школа*, Ленинград 1925, 10.

of *skaz* (in the early stages of the theory of Formalism)²¹ is comparable to the theory of *zaum*²² and its “constructive realization in the plot”²³

In certain sense, D. Chyzhevsky tries to overcome Eichenbaum’s “one-way” understanding of artistic construction of *The Overcoat*, as Vinogradov emphasized.²⁴ Chyzhevsky refers to the analysis of the function of details in the story. Within such an approach, the methodological connection with the theoretical views of the *Prague School* could be noticed. One of its significant achievements was an idea of studying language elements in a system which made it possible to consider the text as organically whole: “The relationship between actualized and non-actualized components of the poetic text form a structure that is dynamic in its nature. It is also united as an artistic fact, because each of its elements obtains their meaning only in their relationship to the whole.”²⁵ Scientists of the *Prague School* were one of the first who started to consider the text as a whole structure, and thus defining the area of competence in poetics and linguistics. According to Roman Jakobson, poetics as a field of science dealing with the study of speech patterns can be defined as part of linguistics. The new element in his proposal was idea of studying the poetic function “in its connection to other language functions”²⁶

²¹ I speak here about ОРОУАЗ works from the second half of the 1910s to the early 1920s.

²² *Zaum*’ (also «заумный язык», “trans-sense language”) was the most radical expression of the new concept of poetry proclaimed by the Russian futurists in their manifestoes. It had to be treated and perceived as the “word as such”, a phonetic entity possessing its own ontology. *Zaum*’, therefore, is an experimental language which consists of neologism rich in sound, but devoid of any conventional meaning. The theorists of *zaum*’ were Aleksei Kruchenykh and Velimir Khlebnikov. See more: *Handbook of Russian Literature*, ed. V. Terras, Yale 1990, 530.

²³ According to the Austrian literary historian A. Hansen-Lowe, “Vinogradov’s merit lies in the fact that he was the first to have made an attempt to create a theory of *skaz* and narration from the point of ‘linguistic stylistics’, a theory striving for a unified functional examination of stylistic perspective and compositional factors.” See: Ханзен-Леве, О., *Русский формализм: Методологическая реконструкция развития на основе принципа остранения*, Москва 2001, 282.

²⁴ V. Vinogradov: “However, it should be noted that the concept of the ‘Overcoat’, as a grotesque ‘game’ of language, is revealed purely intuitively by Eichenbaum through the ‘critical instinct’ and the general premise of a futuristic aesthetic, outside the historical tradition of ‘bureaucratic’ stories of that time. Therefore, that way of understanding of the artistic construction of the ‘Overcoat’ proposed by him is one-sided and distorted.” See: Виноградов, В., *Гоголь и натуральная школа*, Ленинград 1925, 25.

²⁵ Мукарежовский, Я., *Литературный язык и поэтический язык*, in: *Пражский лингвистический кружок*, сост. Н. А. Кондрашова, Москва 1967, 413.

²⁶ Якобсон, Р., *Лингвистика и поэтика*, in: *Структурализм «за» и «против»*, Москва 1975, 193–230.

Chyzhevsky takes these concepts into account but also considers Eichenbaum's thesis that *trivial details* (such as stylistic convergence or the play of language) play a special role in the structure of composition. *The Overcoat* draws attention to the word *even* (rus. «даже»), which is found in the story 73 times. The following thought sequence appeals to the quazi-formalist thesis which states that "colloquial speech or *skaz*, as the modern literary historians say, is characterized by the repetition of the same word."²⁷ It is important to note two points: first of all, the presence or absence of repeated words is not main characteristic of *skaz* as author's narrative form; and secondly, it is necessary to draw attention to Chyzhevsky's terminology. Although using the concepts of the *Formalist School*, the author avoids any references to it, even stating: "as the modern literary historians say."²⁸ An interesting fact could be mentioned here: the first edition of the article was published in the German journal *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie*²⁹ and its content was almost identical to the Russian text published a year later in *Современные записки*. The only exception can be found in the first paragraph. The German article from 1937 begins with the following statement: "B. Eichenbaum dedicated a special study to Gogol's 'Overcoat'. He emphasized that there are, as elsewhere in Gogol's stories, 'small details' that play an important role, but he did not pay attention to all of the lexical details."³⁰ In the next edition we read: "We have all been familiar with this story since our schooldays; and if, in later life, we happen to read books and articles on Gogol, they would have told us the same old things, regardless of whether they have been the product of a 'social approach', or the work of the Formalists: that *The Overcoat* represents one stage in Gogol's development in the direction of realism."³¹ Firstly, the Formalists do not solve the problem of Gogol's realism. Secondly, it is obvious that such a difference between the two editions is not accidental. And we can assume it could be connected with the ideological position of *Современные записки*, which influenced

²⁷ Chizhevsky, D., About Gogol's "Overcoat", in: *Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays*, ed. and transl. R. A. Maguire, Princeton 1974, 295.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Tschizewskij, D., Zur Komposition von Gogol's „Mantel“, *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie*, 1937, bd. 14, 63–94.

³⁰ An original version: „B. Eichenbaum hat der Komposition des ‚Mantel‘ eine besondere Studie gewindet. Obwohl er darin richtig hervorhebt, das hier – wie auch sonst bei Gogol – die ‚Kleinigkeiten‘ eine grosse Rolle spielen, ist seiner Aufmerksamkeit doch eine wesentliche lexikalische Kleinigkeit entgangen.“ See: Tschizewskij, D., Gogol'-Studien, in: *Zur russischen Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts: Gogol' – Turgenew – Dostoevskij – Tolstoj*, München 1966, 99.

³¹ Chizhevsky, D., About Gogol's "Overcoat", in: *Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays*, ed. and transl. R. A. Maguire, Princeton 1974, 295.

the rejection of the entire revolutionary ideal. Since the *Formalist School* is, in some sense, a phenomenon of revolutionary Russia all the references to it were unwanted.

By following Eichenbaum's logic, Chyzhevsky brings the function of *even* into relationship with the *comic effects* of the story: "The repetition of *even* in, 'The Overcoat' is not only used for *skaz* stylisation. It is concerned with the features of Gogol's humour."³² At the same time it is important to note: unlike Eichenbaum, Chyzhevsky is not interested in the study of functions of separate *skaz*-devices in the whole composition of the story. He just notes that "the narrator is tongue-tied" and mentions the forms of "senseless speech", but does not go further to explain it. Thus, it seems that the "methodological net" of Eichenbaum's article was appropriated by him as a "readymade" thing. Chyzhevsky placed this net on the structure of Gogol's novella trying to prove that the word *even* actually has a special semantic and stylistic function. Chyzhevsky paraphrases Eichenbaum's thesis to state that *comic effects* are achieved by the "manner of narration" built on the "change of intensified intonation that forms periods"³³ and notes: "The comic side of Gogol's story is a kind of game of contrasts – meaningful and senseless – antitheses, a game in which they interchange with each other."³⁴ Further he writes: "The use of *even* is a part of this game; *even* emphasizes intensification, raises, marks intensive notes – and if there is no rise [...] we are disappointed, bewildered but Gogol has achieved a comic effect!"³⁵ This stylistic mismatch, according to Eichenbaum, is used by Gogol as a grotesque device, in which "the mimicry of laughter alternates with the mimicry of sorrow – both creating the impression of being a performance with a pre-established order of gestures and registers".³⁶ Thus, it becomes obvious that Gogol chose the anecdote as a fantastically small world "within whose narrow confines the artist has liberty to exaggerate details and violate the normal proportions of the world".³⁷ Eichenbaum notes that Akaky Akakievich's inner world is not insignificant, but is fantastically limited, "very insular", so "according to the laws of this world, a new overcoat proves to be a grand event".³⁸ If we continued to follow Eichenbaum's thesis, we would presume that *even* emphasizes what is unusual for this world. That is why Akaky Akakievich begins "even laughing", he is "even inattentive in his work", he "even notices a pretty lady" etc. However, Chyzhevsky paradoxically comes

³² Ibidem, 302.

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibidem, 302–303.

³⁶ Ibidem, 286.

³⁷ Ibidem, 288.

³⁸ Ibidem.

to the opposite conclusion. He also notes that Akaky Akakievich's small world is a big one for himself, because "it is full of objects that the poor clerk is looking down at".³⁹ The researcher concludes that *even* helps to reveal the matter of this world, which is "insignificant": "What comes after *even* proves to be nonentity, a trifle. This means that in this particular realm of living insignificance, 'nothingless' is represented as being significant and essential. So the matter and purpose of life prove to be insignificant, empty, and absurd."⁴⁰ Next Chyzhevsky proceeds directly to the interpretation of the text.

The last half of the article represents the inverse methodological intention. Eichenbaum proceeds from the position that "in a work of art not a single sentence can, in and of itself, be a mere 'reflection' of the author's personal feelings". Chyzhevsky treats text as a product of the author's will, thus trying to figure out "what the author wanted to say". He notes that the central idea of the story lies in Akaky Akakievich's words – "Leave me alone! Why do you offend me?" He states that "there is no doubt that this passage contains ideas which are fundamental to Gogol".⁴¹ Based on the fact that "Gogol solves difficult psychological issues in his literary works",⁴² Chyzhevsky sees in the figure of Bashmachkin not just a "poor clerk" but a man who sets out on the road of "accumulation" or "acquisition" which indicates his spiritual downfall. Thus, according to the researcher, Gogol depicts not just the overcoat but a fervour of the overcoat that has captured the soul of Akaky Akakievich and because of it he dies: "One can meet a tragic end not only from great passions that are directed at something grand, exalted, important, but also from passions that are directed at something trivial."⁴³ In his interpretation of the idea of the story Chyzhevsky refers to Gogol's correspondence in 1840–1842. In particular, the researcher notes that during this period one of the most important questions for him was whether a person could attach his life to things of the external world. In his letter dated 20th June 1843, to his close friend A. Danilevsky, Gogol wrote: "External life is outside God, internal life is in God."⁴⁴ In these words Chyzhevsky finds the confirmation of "insignificance" of the depicted world and concludes that Akaky Akakievich had lost his "inner Centre" (in other words, God) because he "went mad due to a useless object" of the external world: "The world and The Devil ensnare man not only

³⁹ Ibidem, 310.

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

⁴¹ Ibidem, 296.

⁴² Ibidem, 315.

⁴³ Ibidem, 319.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, 317.

with things that are grand, but also with the trivial.”⁴⁵ Chyzhevsky interprets the phantasmagorical end of the story from the perspective of Christian dualism: if there is no God in a human soul, then the soul is in the power of the devil. According to Chyzhevsky, Akaky Akakievich appears like a ghost because he did not find “peace beyond the grave, his soul is still attached to its trivial love”.⁴⁶ Chyzhevsky concludes that the devil is the main hero of all Gogol’s stories. In *The Overcoat* the devil is depicted through the figure of the tailor Petrovich, who gave Akaky Akakievich the idea of a new overcoat. In conclusion, Chyzhevsky writes: “Gogol’s story of a ‘poor clerk’ is not ridiculous, but frightening.”⁴⁷

In his designation of Gogol as “an artist of evil” who exposes the “godless, miserable world”, Chyzhevsky finds himself in the context of interpreting Gogol as a mystic, which was a characteristic trait of Russian religious philosophy of the early 20th century. In particular, we are interested in the views of Vasily Rozanov and Nikolai Berdyaev on Gogol’s works. It is known that V. Rozanov “fought” with Gogol throughout his life as a writer: “Through my entire literary career I am fighting with Gogol, and my soul has not been suffering for anyone as much as for him. No literature has a writer like Gogol. He is frightening. And over this ‘Fear’ I have been thinking and pondering for 24 years.”⁴⁸ During different periods, his attitude to Gogol changed⁴⁹ from complete rejection and blaming him for “manslaughter”⁵⁰ to acceptance and proclamation of Gogol as a prophet.⁵¹ Of particular importance in the evaluation of Gogol was the October Revolution, which, according to the philosopher, “justified” him: “The Revolution showed us the soul of the ‘plain people’ of Russia; uncle Mityaya and uncle Minyaya, and then Petrushku smelling

⁴⁵ Ibidem, 320.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Розанов, В., *Мимолетное. Собрание сочинений*, ред. А. Н. Николокина, Москва 1994, 466.

⁴⁹ This question has been considered by the literary critic A. Golubkova in her article: Голубкова, А. ... Вот почему я отрицаю Гоголя, *Октябрь*, 2006, № 6. [online: <<http://magazines.russ.ru/october/2006/6/go7.html>>, cit. 2016-02-27].

⁵⁰ Rozanov makes a remark about Gogol’s novel *Dead Souls*: “But we know that in the first volume he fulfilled only half of his task; it could be clear that it is no longer a narrowing, but the crippling of the human against what he really is, which we find here.” See: Розанов, В., *Как произошел тип Акакия Акакиевича*. [online: <http://dugward.ru/library/rozanov/rozanov_kak_proizochel_tip_akakiya.html>, cit. 2016-02-27].

⁵¹ Anna Golubkova notes that in the second half of the 1890s Rozanov had changed his attitude to Gogol, which was a result of his friendship with A. Merezhkovsky. See: Голубкова, А., ... Вот почему я отрицаю Гоголя, *Октябрь*, 2006, № 6. [online: <<http://magazines.russ.ru/october/2006/6/go7.html>>, cit. 2016-02-27].

of sweat and the ingenious Selifan. In general, only the Revolution justified Gogol.”⁵² Rozanov marks that it was the Revolution which was the power that made people unveil their true nature, so he writes bitterly: “Rus⁵³ faded in two days. At most – three. Even ‘Novoje vremja’ could not be closed as soon as Russia was closed. Amazingly, it all fell apart at once, down to the details, down to the particulars.”⁵⁴ As Rozanov, Berdyaev sees a great artist in Gogol who “was given to opening the negative aspects of the Russians, their dark spirits, all that was inhuman, distorting the image and likeness of God”.⁵⁵ And further he notes: “The Revolution revealed the same old, ever-Gogol Russia – the inhuman, animal-like Russia of mugs and muzzles.”⁵⁶ According to the philosopher Alexander Pyatigorsky, Berdyaev’s interpretation connects with his understanding of the content of the revolution: for Berdyaev, its fear was not in “what was felled and destroyed, but in what was found out”.⁵⁷ The Russian Revolution revealed only the “insignificant”, according to Chyzhevsky, world of Akaky Akakievich.

Thus, the second part of Chyzhevsky’s article is in some contrast to the first. The primary part shows his findings in the intellectual fields of “formalism” and “structuralism”; then he begins a reverse approach to the analysis of the text which raises the question of the author’s methodological intention. S. Matvienko, in her analysis of Chyzhevsky article, says that he, unlike Eichenbaum, is overcoming the boundaries of the work in and of itself, thus “raising the content of the story to ontological problems”.⁵⁸ This opinion rises some doubts. The example of Chyzhevsky’s article actually indicates a very interesting case in the reception of the Formalist method. On the one hand, we could mark his application and even his appropriation of terminological apparatus, and, moreover, his attempt to “fit into the way of formalist thinking”⁵⁹ and adopt individual ideas. On the other hand, a detailed analysis of

⁵² Розанов, В., *Гоголь и Петрарка*. [online: <http://dugward.ru/library/rozanov/rozanov_gogol_i_petrarka.html/>, cit. 2016-02-27].

⁵³ “Rus” – here the Russian Empire.

⁵⁴ Розанов, В., *Апокалипсис наших дней*. Мимолетное. Собрание сочинений, ред. А. Н. Николюкина, Москва 1994, 470.

⁵⁵ Бердяев, Н., *Гоголь и революция: в 2 томах.*, in: *Духи русской революции*, т. II, Москва 1990, 124.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Пятигорский, А., *Свободный философ Пятигорский: в 2 томах*, ред. А. Марков, т. II, Санкт-Петербург 2015, 49.

⁵⁸ Матвієнко, С. Г., *Дискурс формалізму: український контекст*, in: *Соло триває... (Нові голоси): Лекції на пошану Соломії Павличко*, сост. С. Г. Матвієнко, Львів 2004, 32.

⁵⁹ Грабович, Г., *Апорія українського формалізму*, in: *Соло триває... (Нові голоси): Лекції на пошану Соломії Павличко*, сост. С. Г. Матвієнко, Львів 2004, 90.

the article does not simply refer to the “methodological eclecticism”,⁶⁰ but to the pseudo-formalist (and pseudo-structuralist) approach to the analysis of the text. It is also obvious that the “inadequate” methods used reveal themselves in the “diffusion” of diverse methodological approaches resulting in the feeling of “confusion” in the recipient. In other words, it is not clear what “position” the researcher argues for. One would assume that Chyzhevsky speaks from a position of Russian religious philosophy, and at the same time tries to secure the assistance of the Formalist method.

ABSTRACT

On the Question of the Ukrainian Reception of Russian Formalism: Dmytro Chyzhevsky versus Boris Eichenbaum

Galina Babak

The study is devoted to the comparative analysis of the two articles, which are based on the using of Formal method. That are Boris Eichenbaum’s article *How Gogol’s “Overcoat” Was Made* (1918) and Dmytro Chyzhevsky’s article *About Gogol’s “Overcoat”* (1938). As D. Chyzhevsky took part in the work of *Prague Linguistic Circle* he was influenced by its ideas. His article shows an interesting attempt of application of the formalists approach to the analysis of the literary work. The study also rises the question of the theoretical views of D. Chyzhevsky in its connection to the ideas of Russian Formalist School.

Key words: Formalism, Ukrainian Formalism, Structuralism, Prague Linguistic Circle, D. Chyzhevsky

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⁶⁰ S. Matvienko marks such features that characterise the scientific approach of Chyzhevsky: “... the ease of transition during the analysis from the philological to the philosophical problematic and from the cultural to social issues in his work, and moreover, we can say that in general Chyzhevsky’s methodological eclecticism is not accidental.” See: Матвієнко, С. Г., Дискурс формалізму: український контекст, in: *Соло триває... (Нові голоси): Лекції на пошану Соломії Павличко*, сост. С. Г. Матвієнко, Львів 2004, 32.

Ihor Hurak

UKRAINE AND POLAND: CHALLENGES TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Throughout the 1990s, in the bilateral documents, official statements of Ukrainian politicians, and in the provisions of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine *The Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy*, nearly two dozen countries were called “strategic partners” of Ukraine.¹ At the turn of the 21st century, the former approach of the Ukrainian state leadership to such an important tool of foreign policy as “strategic partnership”, gave a way to a more balanced one. As a result, in the speeches of presidents and ministers of foreign affairs, only few countries were distinguished as strategic partners, mainly the United States of America, Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland.² In our opinion, such changes proved “maturation” of the Ukrainian diplomacy in outlining the true priorities of authorities in Kyiv in Ukraine’s foreign policy. The Ukrainian-Polish special partnership accurately corresponds with the definition of “strategic partnership” proposed by Ukrainian political analysts Vladimir Manzhola and Ihor Zhovkva.³

The Ukrainian-Polish partnership has often been the subject matter of research for both Ukrainian and Polish scholars. In Ukraine, Victoria Hevko, Oksana Znahorenko, Vitalii Motsok, Sergii Stoyetskyi and some others⁴ devoted their scientific works

¹ Стратегічне партнерство України з іншими державами: підходи та оцінки, *Національна безпека і оборона*, 2000, № 12, 3.

² Манжола, В. – Жовквa, І., Стратегічне партнерство у зовнішній політиці України, in: *Polska – Ukraina: więcej niż sąsiedztwo*, ред. М. S. Wolański – Ł. Leszczenko, Wrocław 2006, 178–179.

³ Ibidem, 172–173.

⁴ Гевко, В., Основні тенденції політичного українсько-польського співробітництва в 1993–1996 роках, in: *Наукові записки*, Серія: Історія, ред. М. М. Алексієвця, вип. 3, Тернопіль 2003, 364–369; Гевко, В., Історичні та геополітичні передумови формування нової моделі українсько-польських політичних відносин, in: *Науковий вісник Чернівецького університету: Збірник*

to this issue, focusing either on the subject as a whole or on some particular aspects. Among the Polish scientists, these issues have been thoroughly analysed by Katarzyna Yendraszczuk, Piotr Kuspys, Beata Surmacz, Krzysztof Fedorowicz and some others.⁵ We, in turn, in the framework of the proposed scientific research, tried to analyse factors complicating and slowing the evolution of the Ukrainian-Polish relations to the level of a strategic partnership.

It should be emphasized that the path passed by Kyiv and Warsaw politicians from establishing the first international contacts to acknowledging the relations as strategic partnership was quite long and not easy. This statement can be supported by the facts listed below. It is a well-known fact that on 2nd December 1991, the Republic of Poland was the first to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. A few months later, Ukraine and Poland signed the key document regulating bilateral relations between the two countries: *The Agreement on Safe Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation*.⁶ All in all, the first years of independent Ukraine were marked by intense contacts between authorities in Kyiv and Warsaw: systematic

наукових статей, Історія. Політичні науки. Міжнародні відносини, вип. 229–230, Чернівці 2004, 110–114; Знахоренко, О. М., Співпраця у галузі вищої освіти – складова українсько-польського стратегічного партнерства, in: *Проблеми розвитку та управління інтеграційними процесами на міжнародному ринку вищої освіти і науки. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції 15–17 жовтня 2003 року*, Ужгород 2004, 31–35; Знахоренко, О. М., Нова східна політика Польщі та українсько-польське стратегічне партнерство, in: *Вісник Львівського Університету*, Серія Міжнародні відносини, вип. 12, Львів 2004, 44–52; Моцок, В., Польський вектор зовнішньої політики України (деякі аспекти стратегічного партнерства), in: *Науковий вісник Чернівецького університету: Збірник наукових праць*, Історія, вип. 73–74, Чернівці 2000, 218–227; Моцок, В., Розширення НАТО та українсько-польські відносини: еволюція взаємодії, in: *Науковий вісник Чернівецького університету: Збірник наукових праць*, Історія. Політичні науки. Міжнародні відносини, вип. 123–124, Чернівці 2002, 252–261; Стоєцький, С. В., Польща і європейський вибір України: стратегічне партнерство в дії, in: *Дослідження світової політики: Зб. наук. пр.*, вип. 26, Київ 2004, 225–240; Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009.

⁵ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004; Jędraszczuk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010; Kuspys, P., *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2008. Polityka. Gospodarka. Wojsko. Sektor pozarządowy*, Kraków 2009; Surmacz, B., *Stosunki Ukrainy z Polską*, in: *Ukraina w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, red. M. Pietraś – T. Kapuśniak, Lublin 2007.

⁶ Договір між Україною і Республікою Польщею про добросусідство, дружні відносини і співробітництво, in: *Міждержавні відносини України та Республіки Польща: збірник документів*, ред. П. Сардачук, Київ 2011, 15.

high level contacts laid the ground for extensive institutional and legal cooperation.⁷ However, after the signing of the above mentioned document, it took four years to determine the relationship between the two countries as “strategic partnership”. Initially, the term “close partnership” was used in the bilateral documents.⁸ Yet, only in the framework of the *Joint Declaration* of 25th June 1996 the statement about the “strategic partnership” was added by the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland.⁹

Such situation seems somewhat strange at first glance. The following example may prove it. The term “strategic partnership” in relations between Ukraine and the USA was first used 19th September 1996 in a joint communiqué on the establishment of the *Intergovernmental commission on cooperation between Ukraine and the USA*. The similar formularization of relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was initially used in the basic *Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership* on 31st May 1997.¹⁰ However, the document was drafted in February 1995.¹¹ Despite the fact, the House was practically ignoring official Kyiv during the first years of Ukraine’s independence and the fact there were confrontational relations between Ukraine and Russian Federation,^{12, 13} Ukrainian-Polish relations as “strategic partnership” were recognized three months before similar Ukraine – USA statement and a year before the one with Russia.

⁷ Гурак, І., Початки формування інституційно-правових засад українсько-польського міждержавного діалогу, in: *Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу: Збірник наукових статей*, т. 29–30, Чернівці 2015, 233–234.

⁸ Such formulation, as well as assertion, that “existence of independent Ukraine has a strategic dimension for Poland” was stated in the *Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Poland about Principles for the Formation of Polish-Ukrainian Partnership* on 21st March 1994, see: Декларация міністрів закордонних справ України та Республіки Польща про принципи формування українсько-польського партнерства, in: *Міждержавні відносини України та Республіки Польща: збірник документів*, ред. П. Сардачук, Київ 2011, 41.

⁹ Спільна декларація Президента України і Президента Республіки Польща, in: *Міждержавні відносини України та Республіки Польща: збірник документів*, ред. П. Сардачук, Київ 2011, 45.

¹⁰ Парахонський, Б. – Яворська, Г., «Стратегічне партнерство України». Аналітична записка. [online: <<http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/600/>>, cit. 2011-10-28]; Стратегічне партнерство України з іншими державами: підходи та оцінки, *Національна безпека і оборона*, 2000, № 12, 3–4.

¹¹ Kapuśniak, T., *Ukraina jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie*, Lublin 2008, 235.

¹² Since 1992, in relationship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation has crystallized a number of controversial moments with a high degree of conflicts. Foremost among them, is the problem of belonging of Crimea and separate the city of Sevastopol, the Black Sea fleet, Ukrainian participation in the military cooperation within the CIS, etc.

¹³ Mironowicz, E., *Polityka zagraniczna Ukrainy 1990–2010*, Białystok 2012, 50–51; Gibas-Krzak, D., *Ukraina między Rosją a Polską*, Toruń 2006, 77–78, 80–81.

Defining the relations between Ukraine and Poland as “strategic partners” was postponed due to a number of factors, some of which find their roots in the times when the Ukrainian lands were the compliant part of the USSR.

The end of the epoch of bloc confrontation, stagnation and gradual disintegration of the “Eastern Bloc”, trends of decentralization in the Soviet Union cleared the way to a new geopolitical reality. It was the period when Ukraine and Poland gained the opportunity to enter the international arena hand in hand. Poland as a state, gradually getting free from comprehensive Soviet Union trusteeship and pursuing its own path, whereas Ukraine was making first steps on the international arena still as a Soviet republic.

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Poland’s foreign policy priorities were enhancing ties with democratic, economically developed Western countries and participation in establishing European security system, the key priority being improvement of the relations with the leading Western European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, as well as traditional Western partners.

Quite interesting was the approach of the Warsaw foreign policy representatives towards the Eastern countries. On the one hand, it was undoubtedly based on theoretical principles elaborated by the representatives of the *Kultura*¹⁴ and other supporters of Ukraine’s independence.¹⁵ However, at the same time, Polish scholar Piotr Kuspys noted the relationship with the Soviet Union was a determinant for Poland in 1990.¹⁶ His colleague Krzysztof Fedorowicz pointed out that during that period, the Soviet Union had no concept regarding Central and Eastern Europe; therefore, Poland along with Czechoslovakia and Hungary found themselves within “the dead field of the Soviet policy”.¹⁷ This statement can be interpreted in different ways, nevertheless, there is one thing for sure: the Kremlin officials had little interest in the region at that time. This offered the Polish people extensive opportunities for realization of their aspirations for independence in their foreign policy. However, it was utterly important for Warsaw that Moscow did not interfere with the growing rapprochement between Poland and the Western countries. Furthermore, the Soviet troops on

¹⁴ *Kultura* (*Paris Culture*) is a leading Polish-emigrant literary-political magazine, published from 1947 to 2000. *Kultura* played a major role in Poland’s reconciliation with Ukraine, as the first independent Polish intellectual circle openly advocated, in the 1950s, recognizing Poland’s postwar eastern borders.

¹⁵ Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 48–49.

¹⁶ Kuspys, P., *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2008. Polityka. Gospodarka. Wojsko. Sektor pozarządowy*, Kraków 2009, 86.

¹⁷ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 27.

the territory of the country could not be ignored by Poland while defining the Eastern policy.¹⁸ Possible risks coming from uncontrolled processes in some Soviet republics generated additional concern. According to the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of “independent” Poland, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Polish people were deeply worried following the decentralization trends in the Soviet Union and were aware of its collapse. Warsaw was concerned about the calamity for Central and Eastern Europe, especially for Poland, such a course of events might bring to.¹⁹

The international situation was totally different for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The leaders of the Soviet Ukraine, taking into consideration the Baltic and South Caucasian Soviet republics’ course for independence, decided to follow suit. Ukraine encountered quite a number of difficulties on its path which were mostly of geopolitical nature. For the United States and Western Europe, Mikhail Gorbachev was the only Soviet partner who deserved full support.²⁰ The statement of the US President George W. Bush during his visit to Kyiv in 1991, proved the “procentralization” sentiments of the West. Addressing the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 2nd August 1991, George Bush unambiguously expressed his disapproval of Ukraine’s independence.²¹

Representatives of German political elites also demonstrated their negative attitude towards decentralization processes in the Soviet Union. This might be explained by Mikhail Gorbachev’s favourable position towards the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany and withdrawal of Soviet troops from German states.²² Great Britain shared this view. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, during her visit to Ukraine in 1990, compared the relationship between the Soviet Union and Ukraine to that of the US and Texas.²³

Western countries adhered to this position till the end of 1991. Vivid is the fact that independence of Ukraine was recognized by officials in Washington only on the very day when Mikhail Gorbachev, the first and only Soviet President, announced

¹⁸ Kuspys, P., *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2008. Polityka. Gospodarka. Wojsko. Sektor pozarządowy*, Kraków 2009, 86–87.

¹⁹ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 26–27.

²⁰ Ibidem, 26–27.

²¹ As part of the notorious *Chicken Kyiv speech* Bush urged deputies to support the signing of a new union treaty and cautioned against the “suicidal nationalism”, see: Kapuśniak, T., *Ukraina jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie*, Lublin 2008, 169–170.

²² Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 111.

²³ Kapuśniak, T., *Ukraina jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie*, Lublin 2008, 202.

his resignation as the President of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.²⁴

Therefore, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, there was a fragile balance between factors which, on the one hand, enhanced Ukrainian-Polish relations, and on the other hand, were quite an obstacle to the dialogue between Kyiv and Warsaw. As a result, the so-called “double track” policy emerged. It was outlined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland under the direction of Krzysztof Skubiszewski in the early 1990.

The essence of the “double track” policy was to preserve somewhat transformed relationship with the Soviet Union while establishing and deepening contacts with the Soviet republics at the same time. In practice, this meant willingness to recognize the republics’ right to self-determination and assist them, however, only in such a that did not discontent a Kremlin leadership.²⁵ It should be noted that it was almost impossible to achieve this goal. For certain reasons, neither Moscow nor republics could accept it. Western countries also expressed their dissatisfaction with “double track” policy, reasoning that it weakened the position of Michael Gorbachev.²⁶ Polish politicians themselves viewed such policy as controversial,²⁷ nonetheless, it was carried out till the last days of the Soviet Union. Most resonantly it was manifested in December 1991.

The day after the referendum on the issue of Ukrainian independence, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Poland made a formal statement recognizing Ukraine as an independent state and agreed to establish diplomatic relations.²⁸ However, very soon, on 5th December, Polish President Lech Wałęsa, in the interview to the Moscow Ostankino, supported the concept of building a new Soviet state devised by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, which consequently caused the respond from the Ukrainian politicians. On this occasion, Foreign Minister of Ukraine Anatoliy Zlenko (1990–1994, 2000–2003) made an official statement in which he expressed the opinion that while recognizing Ukraine as an independent state, Poland should not concurrently favour Soviet reintegration.²⁹

After declaration of independence, both the leadership of Ukraine and the political elite of Poland were aware of the need to find new mechanisms for

²⁴ Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 114.

²⁵ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 28–29.

²⁶ Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 116.

²⁷ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 29.

²⁸ Gibas-Krzak, D., *Ukraina między Rosją a Polską*, Toruń 2006, 40.

²⁹ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 22.

protection from external threats and full implementation of strategy of national security. Geopolitical situation drastically affected the security strategy in the region, which was determined by the views of Western countries, the Russian Federation and international organization.

Additional impact on the vision, how to realize national security interests of both countries, had the configuration of political leaders of Ukraine and Poland. It should be emphasized that starting points for realization of opportunities were different in Warsaw and Kyiv. This was determined by the domestic political situation, as well as the world leaders' attitude towards them.

When the representatives of *Solidarity* came to power in Poland, compromise on the priority vector of the foreign policy was reached at the state level. Warsaw unambiguously regarded integration into the Western structures as the key objective. EU and NATO welcomed this policy, confirmed by signing the *European Agreement* by Poland and European Community in December 1991, which gave Poland status of associate membership.³⁰ As far as NATO is concerned, in December 1991, North Atlantic Cooperation Council was set up with the aim of developing cooperation between the Alliance and post-socialist countries. Poland was invited to participate in its activities. In October 1993, the NATO defence ministers met to discuss the issues on creating trust between NATO and European countries, and the perspectives for membership of the countries able to “promote the principles of the agreement and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area.”³¹ This statement encouraged Poland to apply for membership in NATO, and in the second half of 1992, Poland officials launched the course for NATO.³² Geopolitical conjuncture in relations with influential international players was favourable both for Poland and leading Western countries. In August 1991 Germany initiated the so-called *Weimar Triangle*, which united Poland, Germany and France.³³

The pro-Western course of Warsaw was accepted with understanding and support in the USA. The following facts showed the interest of the US leaders in Poland. In November 1989, the leader of *Solidarity*, Lech Wałęsa, visited Washington. During

³⁰ *Polityka zagraniczna 1989–2002*, red. R. Kuźniar – K. Szczepaniak, Warszawa 2006, 70.

³¹ Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 72–73; Zięba, R., *Implikacje stosunków polsko-amerykańskich dla polityki zagranicznej Polski, Przegląd Polityczny*, 2015, nr. 2, 11.

³² Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 71.

³³ Grodzki, R., *Polska Polityka Zagraniczna w XX i XXI wieku. Główne kierunki – Fakty – Ludzie – Wydarzenia*, Zakrzewo 2009, 215.

his visit on 5th November, he delivered a speech at the joint session of both houses of Congress. In this manner, Lech Wałęsa, not being the head of the state, became the third foreigner in American history who was given such an honour. The US position concerning Poland's debts to international creditors was vital for Warsaw. In 1991, Washington annulled 70 % of the Polish debt to the US, which was about 2,5 billion dollars. This step, in its turn, led to the reduction of the state debt of the Republic of Poland to the Paris and London Clubs.³⁴

Russia had little interest in Central and Eastern Europe during the short period of the Kremlin pro-Western policy.³⁵ It gave Poland a wide field for maneuvering in various spheres. In case of Ukraine, the situation was different. The referendum on the *Act of Declaration of Independence* was held in Ukraine on 1st December 1991. An overwhelming majority of 90 % voters approved the *Declaration*. Right after the referendum, Ukraine was globally recognized as an independent state and valuable player in the world community. However, all of a sudden, Ukraine found itself in an extremely difficult international situation. Unwilling to lose influence in the region, Russian Federation put fierce pressure on officials in Kyiv. Russian gas, oil and nuclear fuel were used for leverage. At the same time, at various levels in Russia, different issues were raised offending national interests of Ukraine: the issue of the legality of the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954; the affiliation of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine was questioned; statements about Sevastopol being a Russian city. In order to strengthen its position, Kremlin used the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.³⁶

At the same time, in the international arena, Kremlin tried to show Ukraine as a "seasonal" country that had no chance of continued existence because of its internal discord.³⁷ It should be mentioned that such an activity of the Russian Federation, along with other factors, led to the formation of unfavourable international conditions for Ukraine. In the early 1990s, the United States, a key global player in the international arena, viewed relations with Russia as a priority in relations with states of the former Soviet Union.³⁸ The European Community (European Union) was preoccupied with establishing the Common Market, introducing Economic

³⁴ Zięba, R., *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa 2010, 141.

³⁵ Surmacz, B., *Stosunki Ukrainy z Polską*, in: *Ukraina w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, red. M. Pietraś – T. Kapuśniak, Lublin 2007, 207.

³⁶ Orzechowski, M., *Stosunki Ukrainy z Federacją Rosyjską*, in: *Ukraina w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, red. M. Pietraś – T. Kapuśniak, Lublin 2007, 181–182.

³⁷ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 161.

³⁸ Kapuśniak, T., *Ukraina jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie*, Lublin 2008, 170.

and Monetary Union, preparing for a large-scale expansion eastward.³⁹ Under such circumstances, Brussels paid very little attention to post-Soviet countries. By and large, the countries of the united Europe viewed the whole post-Soviet space from “Moscow centralized” positions. As Central and Eastern European countries were afraid of negative reaction from the Russian Federation, they did not hurry to improve relations with Ukraine, either.⁴⁰

The difficult political situation, lack of reforms in Ukraine and the above mentioned factors were the reason why Ukraine found itself in isolation in the international arena. The situation for the authorities in Kyiv became even more dramatic with the case of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament. Increasing pressure from the Kremlin, the Western viewing Eastern Europe through the prism of interests of Russian Federation and the lack of even minimal guarantees caused a kind of defensive respond on the part of Ukrainian state leadership. From the second half of 1992 on, there was a positive change in the mindset of Ukrainian political elite regarding new trends and methods of security insurance – the initiative on suspension of the nuclear disarmament process.⁴¹ In July 1993, the Parliament of Ukraine did not ratify the Lisbon Treaty, signed by the Ukrainian government on 23rd May 1992.⁴² On 19th October 1993 Ukraine adopted the defensive doctrine in which Ukraine was positioned as a nuclear state.⁴³ This led to the increasing pressure on Ukraine. The Western countries tried to force the state to fulfil its commitments.⁴⁴

³⁹ Dumala, A., *Stosunki Ukrainy z Unią Europejską*, in: *Ukraina w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, red. M Pietras – T. Kapuśniak, Lublin 2007, 323.

⁴⁰ Kapuśniak, T., *Ukraina jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie*, Lublin 2008, 201, 228–229.

⁴¹ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 31–32.

⁴² The document anticipated that “Ukraine as a state – owner of nuclear weapons – will go to the non-nuclear status and will reduce gradually nuclear weapons located on its territory on the condition of obtaining reliable guarantees of its national security in which the nuclear weapons states commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine; do not use conventional forces against it and do not resort to the threat; respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine; refrain from economic pressure in order to resolve any disputes”. The Protocol was ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine only on 18th November 1993, in: *Постанова Верховної Ради України «Про ратифікацію Договору між Союзом Радянських Соціалістичних Республік і Сполученими Штатами Америки про скорочення і обмеження стратегічних наступальних озброєнь, підписаного у Москві 31 липня 1991 року, і Протоколу до нього, підписаного у Лісабоні від імені України 23 травня 1992 року»*.

⁴³ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 35.

⁴⁴ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 82–83.

In such geopolitical situation, the Ukrainian leadership struggled for finding the way out of stalemate the country found itself in. The true partner, the “door” hypothetically leading to Western countries could be Poland.

Among the circumstances that led to the rapprochement of the two neighbouring countries were the following: short-term pro-Western course of Russia, the result of which was little interest in relations with the countries of the former socialist camp; the immediate recognition of independence of Ukraine by Poland; the extended contacts at governmental levels and between oppositional political parties from both states; political deadlock in which Ukraine was in 1992 and Ukrainian leaders' search for external support; pro-Polish sentiments of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and his political advisers; disorientation of Western political environment and the lack of political tools and awareness, necessary to estimate the essence and level of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.⁴⁵

In practice, the above mentioned factors were transformed into a rather intense dialogue between Ukraine and Poland. The cooperation during 1992 and the first half of 1993 was one of the most fruitful periods in Ukrainian-Polish relations. During a short phase, series of official visits were paid to the partner countries, laying the grounds for the institutional and legal framework of Ukrainian-Polish intergovernmental relations.⁴⁶

Kyiv tried to use systematic contacts at the political level for further participation in the integration process in Central and Eastern Europe. An interesting initiative in this respect, became an idea of inviting the Ukrainian state to join the Visegrad Group. This issue was regularly raised by Ukrainian politicians at various meetings with Polish colleagues. However, unexpectedly for Ukraine, Warsaw authorities showed reluctance to strengthen cooperation with Ukraine in this format. Hungary and Czechoslovakia did not welcome the Visegrad Group expansion either,⁴⁷ as it was primarily established to coordinate steps of the member states in the process of European integration. According to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the accession of Ukraine, whose economic and political development was considerably lower, might change the very nature of the Group and slow down movement towards their strategic objective – integration with the EU.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 26–27.

⁴⁶ Гурак, І., Початки формування інституційно-правових засад українсько-польського міждержавного діалогу, in: *Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу: Збірник наукових статей*, т. 29–30, Чернівці 2015, 234.

⁴⁷ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 25, 29.

⁴⁸ Ibidem, 29; Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 124.

Ukraine, in its turn, made an attempt to develop the idea of non-alignment and created a “third way” of ensuring security.⁴⁹ Such initiatives were first put forward for consideration during the international forum *Ukraine’s Path to Europe* in Yadvisyn in February 1992 and were officially introduced by President Leonid Kravchuk during his visit to Poland in May 1992. The concept included mutual consultations and creation of anti-crisis headquarters with the participation of Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. In fact, the main objective of the committee was to create a regional security system in Central and Eastern Europe which would rely on the military alliance of Ukraine and Poland.⁵⁰

It should be noted that this idea was not new to Poland. During some period, Warsaw officials considered the possibility of creating an alternative collective security system, the proof of which might be the concept developed by Lech Wałęsa which included the creation of the so-called “NATO-bis”,⁵¹ a kind of regional security in Central and Eastern Europe, which would work closely with NATO.⁵²

On 28th April 1993, at the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* in Prague, Ukraine once again suggested considering the establishment of the collective security zone in Central and Eastern Europe with the participation of Eastern European countries excluding Russia. Such concept was called *Plan of Kravchuk* and was to be implemented as one of the principles of CSCE program. Individually, the corresponding draft was proposed to Poland during Lech Wałęsa’s official visit to Kyiv on 24th–26th May 1993. However, the Polish President rejected the proposition to participate in the *Plan of Kravchuk* implementation. In his speech, he stressed that it was more reasonable to use existing structures and systems of collective security as there was no need in creating new ones.⁵³ Unexpected and unfavourable position of the President of Poland towards Ukraine was provoked by changing the priorities of the Polish security and setting the course for NATO.⁵⁴ Consequently, any discussion on alternative NATO projects could be considered

⁴⁹ The way an alternative to NATO and Russia.

⁵⁰ Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 122.

⁵¹ Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 71.

⁵² Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 122.

⁵³ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 34.

⁵⁴ Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 71.

against strategic interests of Warsaw. Thus, controversial and disadvantageous idea of “NATO-bis” did not appeal to Poland at that period.

In this strained situation, Poland’s aspiration to join NATO became a new challenge in relations between Ukraine and Poland. Kyiv feared that with NATO expanding eastward, Ukraine would become a buffer country located between the Member States of the Alliance and signatories of the Tashkent Treaty. In perspective, it threatened Ukraine by increasing pressure from the Russian Federation.⁵⁵ Ukrainian leadership was cautious about NATO’s expansion eastward and Poland’s accession to the Alliance. The second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma (1994–2005) expressed his concern about the rapid pace of the expansion. In December 1994 in Budapest, at the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, L. Kuchma emphasized that revolutionary accession of Central and Eastern Europe to NATO was extremely dangerous as it could split Europe.

In order to prevent the growing uncertainty between countries, the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, several times throughout 1994–1995, addressed the colleagues from Poland urging to undertake joint discussions and develop a common position on the matter. Moreover, in spring 1995, Ukraine appealed to Poland with the initiative to start the conversation on the subject of “triangle of interests”, inviting Germany as well. The leadership of Ukraine was interested in participating in Weimar Triangle. However, the Polish leaders were rather interested in Russian Federation’s participation in such a talk format.⁵⁶ Therefore, at the beginning of 1995, in the relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the security sphere, problems seemed to be piling up and the solution was extremely difficult to be found.

The situation was aggravated by peculiarities of Poland’s internal political situation and Ukraine’s economic situation throughout 1993–1995. As a result, the left-wing political forces won in the parliamentary elections in Poland in September 1993. The representatives of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People’s Party played the key role in the Parliament of Poland. They criticized the previous governments for “neglecting contacts with Russia” and advocated the strengthening ties between Warsaw and Moscow.⁵⁷ On the whole, the new government, which was formed mainly by the “left” politicians, introduced disharmony and new trends

⁵⁵ Chojnowska, A., *Stosunki z Ukrainą*, in: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1996*, red. B. Wizimirski, Warszawa 1996, 136–137.

⁵⁶ Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 135–136.

⁵⁷ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 118.

in the Eastern policy. This was due to different views on priorities in the Eastern policy carried out by the “left-wing” Cabinet of Ministers, on the one hand, and the “presidential” Minister of Foreign Affairs, who together with Lech Wałęsa defended priority of relations with Ukraine, on the other.⁵⁸ Pro-Russian attitude of some “left” leaders could be clearly observed. Thus, in 1994, one of the leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance and Marshal of the Sejm Józef Oleksy,⁵⁹ turned to his Russian colleague with the proposition for the State Duma representatives to cooperate with MPs of Weimar Triangle Parliament. Later, as the Prime Minister of Poland, he actively promoted the idea of so-called “Warsaw Triangle”, which had to unite Moscow and Berlin through mediation of Warsaw.⁶⁰

Internal political situation prompted new trends in relations within the triangle Warsaw – Kyiv – Moscow, which emerged in mid-1993. The following events had a significant influence on the interaction within the triangle. During the official visit to Warsaw, Russian President Boris Yeltsin noted that Moscow appreciated aspiration of Poland to pursue NATO membership. He also stressed out that this did not jeopardize the interests of any state, including Russia.⁶¹ It is also worth mentioning that in September 1993, Russian troops were withdrawn from the territory of Poland.⁶² Moreover, in September, Poland and Russian Federation signed an agreement on building the gas pipeline Yamal – Frankfurt, bypassing Ukraine. Leonid Kuchma, the Prime Minister of Ukraine at that time, called the agreement, which was signed after the preceding approval of the route through the territory of Ukraine and the Czech Republic, an “anti-Ukrainian act”.⁶³ Hence, the second half of 1993 was marked by a number of positive aspects for Poland in the relations with Russia. When considering strained relations between Kyiv and Moscow, the situation contributed to Ukrainian growing distrust in Ukrainian-Polish relations.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, 140.

⁵⁹ During 1993–1995 he was the Speaker of the Sejm, 1995–1996 Prime Minister of Poland.

⁶⁰ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 140.

⁶¹ However, the Russian press and representatives of the Russian authorities quickly launched a campaign of reinterpreting the words of Boris Yeltsin. In particular, the Minister of Defence of RF Pavel Grachev noted that “the accession of countries of the former Warsaw Pact to NATO wouldn’t be a good step because it will push Russia to be in more isolated position”. Instead, according to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, NATO cooperation with Russia “is much more important for European security than the rapid increase in NATO by joining Poland or Hungary”.

⁶² Bartkiewicz, J., Stosunki z Rosją, Ukrainą i Białorusią, in: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1993–1994*, red. B. Wizimirski, Warszawa 1994, 127, 128–129; Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 132–133.

⁶³ Ibidem.

The trial over Ukraine Security Service officer Anatolii Lysenko became an additional irritant in relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. He was arrested in August 1993 on suspicion of espionage. Despite protests from Ukraine, there was a show trial. As a result, Anatolii Lysenko was found guilty: he had allegedly been reading Polish newspapers for intelligence purpose and trying to recruit Polish citizen. It should be noted that even the Polish researchers questioned Lysenko's guilt, and the interpretation of the case by Poland aroused a lot of questions. It goes without saying that for the countries maintaining friendly relations, such issues should be resolved without further publicity. In this particular case, everything was different. And Ukraine had every reason to suspect Poland in supporting Kremlin's concept *pax russica*,⁶⁴ in return of Russia's withdrawal of its troops from Poland and approval of Poland's joining NATO.⁶⁵

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, former republics encountered immense economic problems. They were caused by previous close ties within all-union manufacture. It was very difficult for independent states to maintain economic cooperation at former level. Ukraine was even more vulnerable in this case because of the dependence on Russian energy resources. Significant reduction of Ukrainian production, hyperinflation and growing arrears to Russia⁶⁶ demonstrated an internal weakness of Ukraine and generated doubts concerning the confirmation of its political independence. Economic crisis, lack of reforms and corruption did not show Ukraine as an attractive partner in economic sphere. The slow rate of market mechanisms development in the Ukrainian economy comparing to significant progress in the Polish economy demonstrated growing disproportion in the development of the two countries. Therefore, the economic sphere was the weak point of the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue. In 1993, the trade turnover between the countries made up only 400 million dollars.⁶⁷

Furthermore, the triangle Warsaw – Washington – Brussels was not favourable for the Ukrainian-Polish relations either. Apart from the above mentioned "Russian-centric" position of Western countries concerning the assessment of the events in the former Soviet Union countries, there were other negative aspects closely related to this problem. There was a discrepancy in the foreign policy orientations in both

⁶⁴ Foresaw the recognition by Russia for exceptional political influence in the space of the former Soviet Union.

⁶⁵ Kamiński, A. – Kozakiewicz, J., *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: raport*, Warszawa 1997, 38–39.

⁶⁶ Kuspys, P., *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2008. Polityka. Gospodarka. Wojsko. Sektor pozarządowy*, Kraków 2009, 209–210.

⁶⁷ Bartkiewicz, J., *Stosunki z Rosją, Ukrainą i Białorusią*, in: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1993–1994*, red. B. Wizimirska, Warszawa 1994, 133; Surmacz, B., *Stosunki Ukrainy z Polską*, in: *Ukraina w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, red. M. Pietraś – T. Kapuśniak, Lublin 2007, 207.

Poland and Ukraine. While Poland was actively moving towards Western structures,⁶⁸ Ukrainian leaders could not or did not have an opportunity to make distinct accents in the country's foreign policy orientation given burdensome geopolitical situation. In this regard, in key Ukrainian documents outlining foreign policy, the confirmation of the country's neutral status was declared.⁶⁹ In the second half of 1993, there was an increasing disharmony between Poland and Ukraine. Poland signed the *Association Agreement* with the European community in 1991, formed the Weimar Triangle⁷⁰ with Germany and France and clearly expressed its aspiration for joining NATO. As for Ukraine, the relations with the USA and Western European states remained frozen because of the suspension of the nuclear disarmament.⁷¹ Without any doubt, Poland striving to become an integral part of the EU and NATO, had to consider the disagreeable rhetoric of Washington and Brussels.

Therefore, in the mid-1990s, a great deal of problems accumulated between Kyiv and Warsaw. Their solution often did not depend on the will of both parties and seemed impossible to be found in the near future. However, positive trends in international relations emerged since 1994 which gave reasons for optimistic forecasts. First of all, they were mostly related to Ukraine. First and foremost, and to everybody's relief, the problem of the Ukrainian nuclear weapons was solved in 1994.⁷² It definitely enhanced the revitalization of relations between Ukraine and

⁶⁸ Skubiszewski, K., *Perspektywy polityki zagranicznej RP w Europie*, in: *Rocznik polskiej polityki zagranicznej 1993–1994*, Warszawa 1994, 25–27.

⁶⁹ Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 63.

⁷⁰ Grodzki, R., *Polska polityka zagraniczna w XX i XXI wieku: główne kierunki – fakty – ludzie – wydarzenia*, Zakrzewo 2009, 215.

⁷¹ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 161.

⁷² On 14th January 1994 in Moscow, the presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia signed trilateral statement. On 16th November 1994, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the *Law of Ukraine On Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons from 1st July 1968*. On 5th December, in Budapest, presidents of Ukraine, the USA, together with Russian and British Prime Ministers signed the *Memorandum of Security Assurances in Relation with Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. According to above mentioned documents, Ukraine pledged to get rid of all nuclear potential in the replacement of security guarantees from these three countries. The practical result of these documents was a removal of all nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine by 2nd June 1996 located in the territory of Ukraine from Soviet times, see: Єлєцьких, К., *Без'ядерний статус України – добровільний крок або результат міжнародного тиску*. [online: <<http://nato.pu.ifua/journal/2009/2009-14.pdf>>, cit. 2009-06-30]; *Ядерне роззброєння України*. [online: <<http://mfa.gov.ua/ua/about-ukraine/international-organizations/npt-participation>>, cit. 2013-05-17]; *Закон України «Про приєднання України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї від 1 липня 1968 року»*. [online:

the West. In June 1994, the *Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation* between Ukraine and the EU was signed in Luxembourg. The *Agreement* defined the legal norms of relations between Kyiv and Brussels.⁷³ In the same year, the Ukrainian state leadership began to take steps to improve the dialogue with NATO. On 8th February 1994, Ukraine was the first among post-Soviet countries to start cooperation with NATO within the framework of the program *Partnership for Peace*.⁷⁴ A year later, Ukraine became a member of the Council of Europe.⁷⁵ Then, the so-called *Temporary Agreement* was signed which regulated the relations between Ukraine and the EU prior to the *Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation* coming into force in 1998.⁷⁶

At the same time, the cooling in relations between the Western countries and the Russian Federation was observed. Russia's methods and tools concerning "near abroad" (post-Soviet states) and the Kremlin's increasing political and military dominance in the CIS area (Commonwealth of Independent States) were not acceptable and generated discontent.⁷⁷

At the same time, some positive trends were marked also in Ukraine. In October 1994, new President of Ukraine announced the new strategy of economic reforms, which included liberalization of prices, limiting of the state budget deficit, the implementation of free domestic and foreign trade, compliance with tight monetary policy, extensive large-scale privatization and realization of agrarian reform. In November 1994, Leonid Kuchma issued the *Decree*,⁷⁸ which foresaw solving three major provisions of land reform – privatization, evaluation and land market. The

<<http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/248/94-вр>>, cit. 1994-11-16]; Меморандум Про гарантії безпеки у зв'язку з приєднанням України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї. [online: <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158>, cit. 1994-12-05]; Трестороння заява Президентів України, США та Росії. [online: <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_300>, cit. 1994-01-14].

⁷³ Копійка, В., *Розширення Європейського Союзу та Україна: Монографія*, Київ 2008, 248–250.

⁷⁴ *Співробітництво Україна – НАТО у рамках програми «Партнерство заради миру та безпеки»*. [online: <<http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/ua/ukraine-nato/Partnership>>, cit. 2012-01-13]; Романчук, О., *Україна-НАТО: по кому подзвін*. [online: <<http://www.chasipodii.net/article/2322/>>, cit. 2007-06-12]

⁷⁵ *Співробітництво між Україною та Радю Європи*. [online: <<http://www.mfa.gov.ua/coe/ua/4544.htm>>, cit. 2015-05-11].

⁷⁶ Присяжнюк, Ю. – Галяс, А., *Історичний шлях співпраці України та ЄС. Основні перешкоди на шляху євроінтеграції України*, in: *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія міжнародні відносини*, вип. 12, Львів 2004, 6.

⁷⁷ Каруśniак, Т., *Україна jako obszar wpływów międzynarodowych po zimnej wojnie*, Lublin 2008, 172, 175.

⁷⁸ *On Urgent Measures to Accelerate Land Reform in Agricultural Production*. (November 1994)

first steps towards market reforms and privatization were welcomed by the leading Western countries, especially the United States. Within a short period of time, Ukraine ranked the third, following Israel and Egypt, among the countries that received financial assistance from the USA. Apart from that, Ukraine received assistance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Despite being managed ineffectively sometimes, foreign financial aid contributed to the financial revitalization of the country.⁷⁹

Thus, during 1994–1995, Ukraine managed to overcome international isolation and enlist the support of the Western countries due to a number of various factors. These changes, directly or indirectly, positively influenced the Ukrainian-Polish interstate relations.

In the second half of 1995, revitalization of Ukrainian-Polish relations was under way. In September, after a long break, the long-awaited Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland was held. The parties discussed the ways of utilizing the potential of the two countries and step up bilateral intergovernmental contacts. In December 1995, representative of Democratic Left Alliance Aleksander Kwaśniewski succeeded Lech Wałęsa as a President. The election of the “left-wing” candidate generated concern in Ukraine. There were fears that during his presidency, the dialogue between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation would intensify. However, it did not happen. International initiatives of the new President showed his commitment to Kyiv. In late May 1996, Ukraine became a member of the Central European Initiative thanks to its lobbying.⁸⁰ Poland supported the NATO-Ukraine bilateral agreement, similar to that of NATO-Russia, and proved to be Ukrainian best advocate in front of the West. Aleksander Kwaśniewski publicly initiated signing the *Charter Ukraine – NATO*⁸¹ in his speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in October 1996.

There were other changes in the leadership of Poland that appeared to be favourable for Ukraine. The scandal with Prime Minister Józef Oleksy who was accused of having links with Russian intelligence services, and the government crisis led to the election of the new head of Polish government, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

⁷⁹ Соціально-економічний та політичний розвиток України середини 1990-х – початку 2000-х років: стабілізація і реформи. [online: <<http://ubgd.lviv.ua/moodle/mod/page/view.php?id=7431&inpopup=1>>, cit. 2013-04-26].

⁸⁰ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 169–170, 173–174.

⁸¹ Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 79.

Together with newly elected Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, he was upholding President Kwaśniewski's Eastern policy.⁸²

It should be emphasized that officials in Kyiv reconsidered its position regarding NATO's enlargement. In December 1995, both Presidents of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Yevgen Marchuk demonstrated understanding of Poland's aspirations to enter the North Atlantic Alliance. In particular, Leonid Kuchma stated that NATO's enlargement eastward did not threaten the security of Ukraine, and the existence of the military-political bloc was in fact a stabilizing factor in Europe. For some time, the issue related to non-placement of nuclear weapons in new NATO countries, including Poland, remained unsolved. Yet, the case was settled when the North Atlantic Council announced that Alliance had no intention to place its nuclear arsenal in Central and Eastern Europe.⁸³

Military cooperation between Poland and Ukraine had another positive impact on intensifying interstate dialogue. On 5th October 1995, Ministers of Defence of Ukraine and Poland reached an agreement to create a Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion. Although the appropriate agreement was signed only in November 1997, the first joint training started in June and then in October 1996.⁸⁴ Aldona Chojnowska, the secretary of the Consultative Committee of Presidents of Ukraine and Poland emphasized that "it was the mutual military project that enhanced the political dialogue in the interstate relations".⁸⁵

Efforts in implementation of economic reforms, financial assistance from the Western states and international institutions contributed to improving the economic situation in Ukraine. This, in turn, enabled the increase in Ukrainian-Polish trade turnover. Although the Ukrainian-Polish trade met certain obstacles, in 1995, the trade turnover between the countries increased by more than twice compared to 1993 and amounted to 1 033 million dollars. Later in 1996, this figure rose to 1 396 million dollars.⁸⁶

Thus, the second half of 1995 brought positive dynamics in the Ukrainian-Polish relations. The results were immediately visible in several areas. This laid the foundation for the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership, which was confirmed

⁸² Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 172, 178.

⁸³ Стоєцький, С. В., *Україна в зовнішній політиці Республіки Польща: євроатлантичний та європейський інтеграційний виміри. (Історико-політологічне дослідження)*, Київ 2009, 80–81.

⁸⁴ Kuspys, P., *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1991–2008. Polityka. Gospodarka. Wojsko. Sektor pozarządowy*, Kraków 2009, 373.

⁸⁵ Chojnowska, A., *Stosunki z Ukrainą*, in: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1996*, red. B. Wizimirska, Warszawa 1996, 135.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 142–143.

in *Memorandum* and signed by representatives of *People's Movement of Ukraine* and the so-called *Movement Hundred*. The document was signed by Leonid Kravchuk, Lech Wałęsa, former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Anna Suchocka, former Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Zhulinski, chairman of People's Movement of Ukraine Viacheslav Chornovil and other influential politicians. The documents stated that the ultimate goal of the Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership should be close and continued cooperation between the two countries, contributing to the establishment of stable independent Ukraine, and Poland's international advocacy in favour of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the process of European integration.⁸⁷

A few days later, on 25th June 1996, during the visit of President Leonid Kuchma to Warsaw, both Presidents of Ukraine and Poland signed the *Joint Declaration* in which the leaders of both countries stated that "Ukraine and Poland confirmed their determination in pursuing the course for the development of strategic partnership".⁸⁸

To sum up, after a year and half of intensive dialogue between Kyiv and Warsaw, when the foundation of institutional and legal framework for interstate constructive dialogue was laid, there was stagnation in relations between Ukraine and Poland from the mid-1993. It was due to biased attitude of the Western powers towards Ukraine orienting themselves on Russia in their assessment of the processes in Eastern Europe till the mid-1990s. Authorities in Warsaw, whose key foreign policy goal throughout the 1990s was European and Euro-Atlantic integration, could not but take this factor into account. Furthermore, the leaders of Poland "inspected" the position of Moscow on that while conducting the dialogue with Kyiv in certain periods. Difficult financial and economic situation in Ukraine and increasing influence of the Polish left-wing forces on Poland's foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s were among other factors that slowed down the Ukrainian-Polish interstate dialogue.

The situation changed considerably in the mid-1990s. The settlement of the Ukrainian "nuclear" issue, non-acceptance of new trends in Russian foreign policy by the West, launching economic reforms by the new leadership in Ukraine and Ukrainian-minded politicians' coming to power in Poland – all this fuelled the Polish-Ukrainian interstate dialogue starting a new phase in the relations between the

⁸⁷ Fedorowicz, K., *Ukraina w polskiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1989–1999*, Poznań 2004, 180; Jędraszczyk, K., *Strategiczne partnerstwo ukraińsko-polskie. Polska w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy*, Poznań 2010, 153–154.

⁸⁸ Спільна декларація Президента України і Президента Республіки Польща, in: *Міждержавні відносини України та Республіки Польща: збірник документів*, ред. П. Сардачук, Київ 2011, 45.

two states. Due to this improving climate, the year of 1996 marked the beginning of a true strategic partnership for the two nations.

ABSTRACT

Ukraine and Poland: Challenges to Strategic Partnership

Ihor Hurak

The official Warsaw implemented the “policy of two ways” in the East *at the turn of the 1980s – 1990s*. However, already on 2nd December 1991, Republic of Poland recognized Ukraine as an independent state. A dynamic Ukrainian-Polish dialogue, initiated at a time when Ukraine was a part of the USSR yet, opened up opportunities for signing the *Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership* between the countries in May 1992. In subsequent years the diverse perceptions of Ukraine and Poland by the leading countries of the world; the different approaches of Warsaw and Kiev concerning foreign policy priorities; the miscellaneous ways of the ensuring security of two states, difficult economic situation in Ukraine, staying for a certain period of time in power of pro-Russian political forces in Poland and other factors led to stagnation in the bilateral dialogue. Since 1994, the situation has undergone the significant changes: the issue on Ukrainian nuclear weapons has been solved, the reforms in the Ukrainian state have been started, the dialogue between Ukraine and the EU, NATO, the USA has intensified, the relations between the Western countries and the Russian Federation has become complicated, Poland’s leadership has been changed. These and other reasons determined the signing of the *Joint Declaration of the Presidents of Ukraine and the President of the Republic of Poland* by the leaders of the two countries on 25th June 1996. In the document it was stressed that “Ukraine and Poland confirmed their determination in pursuing the course for the development of strategic partnership”.

Key words: Strategic Partnership, Ukraine, Poland, International Relations, Foreign Policy.

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Václav Ježek

SOME ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN ECCLESIAL
AND STATE POLICY IN PALESTINE
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE
TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Introduction

The study offers some glimpses into the complex problem of the Russian presence and interest in Palestine. By reference to policy statements from various contexts and individuals we attempt to highlight some important features of this Russian presence and interest in Palestine during the 19th century. We want to demonstrate that this area offers fascinating material for further study and we also attempt to argue for the necessity of rejecting often black and white perceptions of the issues involved which would lead to more objective understanding of the Russian involvement in Palestine and its features.

Greeks and Russians

The relationship between Russians and Greeks in terms of the Orthodox ecclesial context can be termed as a loving one, however, at the same time, extremely mistrustful relationship. The Russians always admired the Byzantine tradition and Greek culture and undoubtedly always realised they were the “younger brother”, in terms of the Church and culture in general. Historically, the Russians struggled to ascertain their place in cultural and religious history in relation to the Greeks. The relationship can be characterised as a younger brother-older brother one. This psychology remained even after the Florentine Union regardless of the emerging ecclesial independence of the Russian Church.

Historically, the Byzantines, for their part, did not make things easy for the Russians and often adopted a typical Byzantine cultural superiority stance. Even during the reign of the enlightened and missionary orientated Patriarch Photios (9th century), who realised the need for a policy of enculturation and wholeheartedly supported it, it was a given fact, that the Byzantine Church and culture will always be a superior force and guiding principle for all other Christian Churches.

Generally, the Russians did not and could not realise the difficulties and complexities of the Middle Eastern situation and this was due to many reasons. This misunderstanding on the part of the Russians often led to a simplification of the issues and the Greeks were often portrayed as unreliable, not sincere and ready to compromise, especially with the Western Church. A suspicion which seemed to have been confirmed by the Council of Florence in 1439 and by the role of the then Greek Metropolitan of Russia, Isidore, at this Council. The Fall of Byzantium appeared to confirm the loss of true direction by the Greeks and was seen by the Russians as a form of Divine intervention if not outright punishment of the Greeks. This was, by the way, also the case for many Western Roman-Catholic thinkers who also saw a Divine sanction of the Roman Catholic supremacy in the Christian world in this event (a notion which would appear in the 17th century during Unionist controversies).¹

However, the “ideology of a divinely sanctioned” Roman Empire (as solely represented by Byzantium and as already promulgated early on by such Christian authors, such as Eusebius of Cesarea) was not replaced by an ideology of the Russian Empire being a “heir” to this Roman Empire or by some other country being the heir, but by an ideology that, in fact, the Russian Empire “is” the new Roman Empire. Thus, the Roman Empire simply embodies itself in a new formation because the Roman idea cannot die. A Russian monk Philotheos, in a well-known account, formulates an idea of Russia assuming the “Roman responsibility”. Evidence of Philotheos ideas linking Russia’s pretensions to being the Third Rome are found, for example, in the letter to Grand Prince Basil III, (although its authorship is doubted). The Tsar is depicted by Philotheos as the “sole ruler of Christians and legitimate heir of the Roman Emperors”.² In 1523–1524, he wrote a letter to the

¹ See the activities, thought and historical context of such Roman Catholic figures as Peter Skarga. Bain, N. R., *Slavonic Europe, A Political History of Poland and Russia from 1447 to 1796*, Cambridge 1908.

² Zernov, N., *Moscow the Third Rome*, London 1937, 36. See also: Schaefer, H., *Moskau das Dritte Rom*, 2nd ed., Darmstadt 1957; Каптерев, Н. Ф., *Характер отношений России к православному Востоку в XVI и XVII столетиях*, 2-е изд., Сергиев Посад 1914.

scribe of the Grand *Prince*: In most manuscripts, the text reads: “You should know, Christ Lover and God Lover, that all Christian kingdoms had come to an end and resulted in one kingdom of our Lord the Ruler, in harmony with the books of the prophets, and this is the Roman Kingdom or Empire: Since two Romes fell and the third is standing and there will be no fourth.”³

The Greek cultural and intellectual representatives being obviously desperate and despondent on their part after the fall of Byzantium, also suggested that various rulers or states, both in the West and East, could assume the role of Rome. Some even (as George of Trebizond) suggested that the Ottoman Empire itself with the Sultan could become a new Rome. Thus, George of Trebizond wrote a letter to the Sultan Mehmed II in 1453 to this effect.⁴ The Greeks did not cease to believe in liberation after the fall of Byzantium, often expecting help from all possible sides, as for example from Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (died 1632).

Regardless of the captivity of the Greek Church under the Ottomans, lively ecclesial contacts continued between Russians and Greeks and the Russians respected the ecclesial position of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The respect for the Byzantine tradition is demonstrated by the fact that notable Greeks were invited to Russia, such as the well-known Maxim the Greek, to share in Russia’s theological and liturgical development.⁵ This respect stemmed from the knowledge that the Byzantine tradition is the basis for the Russian one.

After the Fall of Byzantium, Greeks offered their services as interpreters and generally assumed the role of middle men in Russian dealings with the Ottoman world. G. T. Stavrou writes: “This role of a Patriarch was important because at the time, Russian diplomatic agents in the Ottoman Empire did not carry the prestige they did in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Greek interpreter Anastasios, rendered great services in the relations of Russia and Turkey, and the Turkish representative to Russia, Ali Agas, was a personal friend of the Ecumenical Patriarch, Loukaris.”⁶ Further, the Russians regarded the opinions of the Eastern Patriarchs with high esteem which

³ Синицына, И. В., *Третий Рим: Истоки и эволюция русской средневековой концепции (XV–XVI вв.)*, Москва 1998.

⁴ See: Zoras, G., *George of Trebizond and His Efforts for Greco-Turkish Cooperation*, Athens 1954.

⁵ Geanakoplos, D. J., The Post Byzantine Athonite Monk Maximos the Greek: Reformer of Orthodoxy in 16th Century Muscovy, in: *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 1988, vol. 33, 445–468.

⁶ Stavrou, G. T., *Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882–1914*, Thessaloniki 1963, 11; See also a view on Loukaris, in: Kyriakos A. D., *Geschichte der Orientalischen Kirchen von 1453–1898*, Leipzig 1902, 97–103.

is testified by the life of the brilliant Patriarch Jeremias II of Constantinople (c. 1530–1595) who visited the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia and displayed influence in ecclesiastical affairs of the Russian Church. Russians made all possible effort to observe the Liturgical traditions of the Eastern Patriarchates.⁷

The role of Eastern Patriarchs in Russian affairs is also exemplified by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Theophanes who already visited Moscow as a priest in 1603 and who received an invitation to come after the Time of Troubles (1604–1613). He visited Moscow again after becoming a Patriarch and after an adventurous journey. His authority was highly regarded by the Russians and he attended the Council of 1619 acting as its president and ordained the father of Tsar Michael as the Patriarch Philaret of Moscow. The oath exemplifying respect for Eastern Patriarchs taken by Philaret was possibly written by Theophanes and included the words: “Whatever they (the Patriarchs) accept, I also accept and maintain, whatever they reject I do reject too.”⁸ Theophanes was also involved in the ecclesiastical problems of the Kiev context.⁹ The intense relationship was also dominated during the patriarchates of Joachim (1674–1690) and Dositheos (1690–1707).

The Eastern Patriarchs were more and more aware of the pressure emerging not only from the dominating Ottomans, but also from the increasingly aggressive Protestant and Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Places; not to speak of the economic hardships of the Patriarchates. Thus, Dositheos (1690–1707), for example, needed Russian help to win back the Holy Places which from the Sultan in 1689 were given to the Catholics by a *ferman*.¹⁰ Dositheos also sought Russian support for printing of Greek works (such as the *Panoplia Dogmatike* by Euthimios Zygabenos).¹¹ According to Kapterev, Dositheos was serving the interest of Russia for decades.¹²

⁷ See: Medlin, W. K. – Patrinelis, C. G., *Renaissance Influences, and Religious Reforms in Russia, Western and Post-Byzantine Impacts on Culture and Education (16th–17th Centuries)*, Geneve 1971.

⁸ *Ibidem*, 38.

⁹ See: Παπαδόπουλος, Ch., *Οἱ Πατριάρχαι Ἱεροσολύμων ὡς πνευματικοὶ χειραγωγοὶ τῆς Ρωσσίας κατὰ τὸν 17ον αἰῶνα (The Patriarchs of Jerusalem as Spiritual Leaders of Russia during the 17th century)*, Jerusalem 1907, 47; Каптерев, Н. Ф., Сношения Иерусалимских патриархов с Русским правительством с половины XVI до конца XVIII столетия, in: *Православный Палестинский Сборник*, т. XLIII, Санкт-Петербург 1895, 32.

¹⁰ Stavrou, G. T., *Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882–1914*, Thessaloniki 1963, 13.

¹¹ See: Miladinova, N., *The Panoplia Dogmatike by Euthymios Zygadenos. A Study on the First Edition Published in Greek in 1710*, Leiden 2014.

¹² Каптерев, Н. Ф., *Характер отношений России к православному Востоку в XVI и XVII столетиях*, 2-е изд., Сергиев Посад 1914, 300.

The relationship between Russians and Greeks took a new dimension later on (it is difficult to specify the exact dates – more research needs to be done in this area), undoubtedly due to the increasingly larger numbers of Russians arriving in Palestine and the corresponding rise of economic strength of Russians. The number of Russians willing to travel to Palestine had dramatically risen in the 19th century just as conditions of travel improved. This new intensive contact seems to have brought into the fore a latent cultural antagonism between Russians and Greeks (which was there even before in this regard, but not to such extent). In terms of mentality, there was a rift between the Russians and Greeks, since the Greeks viewed the Russian Church with respect due to its strict observance of fasts and other rules, emphasis on long prayer etc., however, criticised the lack of education and depth in the piety and substance in the rituals. The Russians, on the other hand, viewed the Greeks as superficial and undisciplined.¹³ The mutual criticisms were surely indicative of a superficial mutual understanding than of a more substantial character, but they did increase antagonism. The Greeks (understandably given their dire economic situation) saw wealthy patrons and customers in the Russians. This had projected itself into the business of relic selling and unsurprisingly relic fabrication and falsification by some merchants and others all along the pilgrim route.

The 19th century was a turning period for the developments in Palestine. Aggressive Roman Catholic and Protestant activities in the Holy Land provided a new challenge to the Orthodox. The Orthodox could no longer afford to pursue things as they did previously. The Russians soon realised the dangers facing the Orthodox presence in the Holy Land. There was also a traditional tension in the relationship between Greeks and Christian Arabs in the Middle East which could have resulted in loss of Christian Arabs from the Orthodox Church. The Uniate missionaries utilised these traditional problems to gain ground, however, in some instances, they lost ground themselves, like for example, thanks to the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar into the Uniate Church in 1858, which was met with a widespread rejection among the Uniate believers. Even the Uniate Patriarch Clement exiled himself into a monastery and received petitions from congregations that if the Gregorian Calendar is introduced into the Churches Old Style, priests will be brought into the Churches by force.¹⁴ There were conversions from the Uniates to the

¹³ Ibidem, 431.

¹⁴ Архив Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме (further АДМ), дело № 1015, Переписка по делу воссоединения униатов. Cited by Архимандрит Никодим (Ротов), История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме, in: *Богословские Труды. Сборник Двадцатый*.

Orthodox Church and the Russians played a key role in the successful conclusions of these conversions since the Arabs did not trust the Greeks.

Overall, in the 19th century, the relationship between the Greek Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Russians in Palestine was amicable. There were tensions in some moments. A serious problem related to the Bulgarian schism emerged. The Greeks viewed the growing emancipation of the Balkan nations with scepticism because it could entail ecclesial independence from the influence of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Russians supported these emancipatory movements which provided ground for a conflict. In the Bulgarian schism, the Patriarch of Jerusalem Kirill did not sign the document accusing the Bulgarians (therefore supporting the Russian position) and was deposed by his fellow hierarchs in Jerusalem.

The Russian State and the Holy Land

It is not easy to assess of the degree of interest on the part of the Russian state / Tsar in the Middle East, or the Holy Land as such. Apart from the obvious ecclesial aspect and reverence towards the Holy Land, it is difficult to reconstruct the political and economic aspirations of the Russian State in the Holy Land. Some scholars stress that Russian policy on the state level changed towards Palestine during the centuries. Some authors, such as Smolitsch, emphasize that in the 18th century, there was a deterioration in the relations between the Christian East and Russia. That there was no longer such a great interest on the state level in Russia towards Palestine as it was previously. The donations and gifts to the Eastern Christians originated from receipts of the estates of dioceses, defrayed from property of the Russian Church, in contrast to the practice in the 17th century, when aid came from government sources and as personal gifts from Tsars.¹⁵

However, one should not see the situation that simple. The reason why it may appear for authors such as Smolitsch and others, that there was a decreasing interest on the state level in Palestine could lay in the simple fact that they are conflating

Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму, Москва 1979, 15–83 (here 32).

¹⁵ Smolitsch, I., *Zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen der Russischen Kirche und dem Orthodoxen Osten, Ostkirchliche Studien*, 1958, vol. 7, 6; Жигарев, С. А., *Русская политика в восточном вопросе (ее история в XVI–XIX веках, критическая оценка и будущие задачи), Историко-юридические очерки в 2 томах.*, т. I, Москва 1896, 91.

two different historical aspects of state policy. The reason why it appears that the Russian state and Tsars had a greater interest in Palestine before the 18th century could simply lie in the different nature of Russian politics and policy of that period. Earlier, the Russian state / Tsar and Orthodox Church sought to legitimise themselves in Russia and the contacts with the Middle East on the state level could help in this. After the 17th century, Russia was increasingly becoming consolidated and therefore, there was no need to maintain the same type of relationship as before.

On the other hand, there is a new phase, which sees Russia taking an interest outside itself, that is, in playing a role in the Middle East itself. Further, the Tsars seemed to have distinguished state policy from their own personal interest in the Middle East and their support of the Church. Thus, the various Tsars could appear uninterested in the Middle East on the state level, but at the same time, were always personally endowing various individuals and monasteries etc. in the area of the Middle East with lavish gifts; a tradition that continued well until the beginning of the October Revolution.

In any case, it is necessary to emphasise, that in comparison to France and the British Empire, the Russians were much slower in assuming the role “of protectors of Christians in the Middle East”. This is contrary to the mainstream opinion among many scholars, who see Russia as always ready to “protect Orthodox Christians”. The Russians were more interested in military and political influence than in protecting the Church. This goes against the notoriously mistaken view common in scholarship that the Russian state was historically always in a loving relationship with the Orthodox Church and always wanted to protect it and support it. It is more likely that the state decided to play the “Christian card” only when it was politically advantageous for the state and its interests and when it offered an opportunity to give an excuse for Russian involvement in the politics of the Middle East. Peter the Great is an obvious example of a person who did not love the Church unconditionally.¹⁶

The Christian issues were mentioned in legal discussions between the Russians and other powers and were incorporated in a number of treaties. The Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) is an interesting example of the Russians mentioning the Christian issues. The Russian representative in Vienna P. V. Voznitsyn insisted on religious issues being part of the agenda and on returning the Holy Sepulchre to the Greeks. At this time, the Serbs needed protection from the Jesuits, as well.¹⁷ Carlowitz enabled

¹⁶ For an overview see: Nykl, H., *Náboženství v ruské kultuře*, Červený Kostelec 2013; Boček, P., *Stát a církev v Rusku na přelomu XV. a XVI. století*, Brno 1995.

¹⁷ Капгерев, Н. Ф., *Характер отношений России к православному востоку в XVI и XVII столетиях*, 2-е изд., Сергиев Посад 1914, 369.

a treaty between Russia and Turkey in 1700, which confirmed the treaty of 1681 by which Russian clergy and laity received free passage without taxation, to Jerusalem and the Holy Places.¹⁸

The treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji under Catherine the Great (21st July 1774) was another important event, of course.¹⁹ The treaty is important and marks a new phase because it enabled Russia (after previous political and military gains) to use the Christian card much more effectively to meddle into Ottoman politics. In article 7, the Ottomans pledged to protect the Christian faith and churches and Russian ministers are granted the right to protect the interests of the Church “in Constantinople”. Importantly, article 8 offers unhindered travel to the Holy Lands for Russians without taxes etc. Article 14 also offers the Russians (as to other powers) the right to build a “public Greek Orthodox Church” in the Galat district of Constantinople. Russia would now be represented in Constantinople by a minister.²⁰ Another plan, revealed to Joseph II of Austria in 1782, saw the creation of a Byzantine Empire in the Balkans, under the rule of Catherine’s grandson born in 1779, Constantine.²¹ Later, the treaties of Adrianople (14th September 1829) and Unkiar Skelessi (8th July 1833) further elevated the state status in the region and that of Nikolay I (1825–1855). The treaty of Adrianople assured Russian merchants their rights, all of which continued to increase the travel and commerce in the area.²²

In the first half of the 19th century, the European powers were increasingly using the Christian card for political influence in the area of Palestine (this is an irony in some ways, given the secularisation movement in countries such as France). The London conventions of 1840 and 1841 had largely decreased Russia’s role as the protector of Christians in Turkey, awarding this role to the five powers instead. This was coupled by the opening of the doors in the East towards non-Orthodox propaganda.²³

¹⁸ The 1681 agreement of the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, was the first occasion when Holy Places where mentioned in a Russian and Ottoman setting.

¹⁹ Hurewitz, C. J., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record, 1535–1914*, I., New York 1956, 54–61; *Полное собрание законов Российской Империи*, сост. М. М. Сперанский, т. XIX, № 14.164, Санкт-Петербург 1830, 957–967.

²⁰ Hurewitz, J. C., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record, 1535–1914*, I., New York 1956, 56–57; *Imperial Russia A Source book, 1700–1917*, ed. B. Dmytryshyn, New York 1996, 107–113.

²¹ Vernadsky, G., *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia*, Boston 1936.

²² *Imperial Russia A Source book, 1700–1917*, ed. B. Dmytryshyn, New York 1996, 239–245.

²³ Архимандрит Киприан, *Archimandrite Kirprian, Отец Антонин Капустин – начальник Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме (1817–1894 гг.)*, Белград 1934, 114–115.

Again, contrary to common opinion, the Russian state and Tsars in the 19th century were rather clumsy and slow to react to the political and economic possibilities offered to the Russians by playing effectively the Christian card in the Middle East. There was no systematic approach and there was no idealistic rush to protect “Orthodox Christianity” by the state either.

The state progressed step by step and even extraordinarily so, in order not to “antagonise” the French or other European powers. Such a rather strangely cautious and humble approach to asserting political might could be also seen in the issue of Greek independence. Thus, while Russian public opinion was sympathetic to the Greek cause, the Tsarist policy was slow to react and people like the foreign minister Count Karl Robert Nesselrode even called for caution in supporting Greek independence since this would undermine “moral” values.²⁴ Nikolay I seems to have been a pacifist disliking rebellion and war.²⁵

An important initiative in terms of Palestine, was the journey of A. N. Muraviev who travelled to the East in 1838 to find out about the possibilities for Russia there. The tone of Muraviev was humble, advocating a limited role of Russia in the area of the Holy Land. Among other things, he stated, in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the following: “Just as the French Kings had designated themselves as the protectors of all Franks, who abide in the East [...] and all Catholic communities, [...] it would only be fair and beneficial and propitious for Eastern matters, if the Russian Tsar, would see fit to take under his own special patronage and protection the Holy sites, even if only the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Cave of the Mother of God in Gethsemane and the Bethlehem Church. We are speaking here only [...] about the Holy buildings, which is much more humble than the French ambition to protect all Catholics, regardless of their nationality [...]. It is necessary to obtain from the Sultan either as a gift or acquisition a small mosque (the Sion) of the Last Supper and the Descent of the Holy Spirit, which was previously a Christian monastery [...]. As soon as this mosque will be in our hands, it can become the centre for the establishment of the Russian Mission, consisting of an archimandrite, some monks and re-appointed every three years just as the Catholics do [...]. Just as after the visit of Russia by the Archbishop Favorskiy in all our Churches groups were established in which offerings are placed for the Holy Sepulchre, and the

²⁴ Nesselrode circular dispatch, Laibach, Mar. 18, 1831, *VPR* xii (1990): 70–1, quoted in: Frary, L. J., *Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821–1844*, Oxford 2015, 35.

²⁵ For Nikolay I see: Татищев, С. С., *Внешняя политика императора Николая I*, Санкт-Петербург 1887, 137–138; Татищев, С. С., *Император Николай и иностранные дворы*, Санкт-Петербург 1889.

collection reaches every year 40 thousand roubles in remittances, a part of these collections could be used to support the Jerusalem Mission [...]. The Archimandrite would decide how the money would be spent.”²⁶

An interesting report given in June 1842 by the vice-chancellor Count Karl Robert Nesselrode to the Tsar offers some suggestions about the possibilities of action in Palestine. The concern of the report is to protect the Orthodox Christians from non-Orthodox Christians and Muslims and it also shows how the state politicians viewed the Church as an essential instrument for government policy. It remains a question to what extent there is a sympathy to the Orthodox Christians in this report (especially given the fact that Nesselrode was a Protestant himself) and to what extent the Christians are only a cover for other political interests. Nesselrode advocates a covert “ecclesial operation” when he writes about sending a cleric there. He observes: “But it is also important to realise, that if a cleric is sent to Jerusalem and this is manifested publicly, this could represent certain inconveniences, which could partly proceed from various political causes and partially from the suspicious nature and personal opinions of the higher Greek clergy. And therefore, in the first instance, it might be good to limit oneself to a so-to speak educational role. Having this in mind, it would be good to choose a humble, judicious, hopeful priest monk or archimandrite, but not above this rank, and send him to Jerusalem in the capacity of a pilgrim. After he arrived there, he could, after fulfilling all the requirements of a pious person, try to gain the trust of the local priesthood, gradually infiltrating the situation of the Orthodox Church, and to discern on ground, what would be the useful measures to adopt in order to support Orthodoxy, and to convey this to the Russian Government and through the mediation of our consul in Beirut and according to the latter’s advice as required, give some beneficial suggestions to the Greek clergy from his own ‘private’ personal position and in brotherly love, while at the same time, confirming to the clergy the pious solidarity of the most high court with those sharing our faith.”²⁷

The report and other efforts led to action of the Holy Synod and the gradual process of establishing an ecclesial presence in Palestine which culminated in the establishment of the Russian Spiritual Mission there in 1847 (Русская Духовная Миссия в Иерусалиме). However, this did not mean a straightforward development

²⁶ Безобразов, П. В., О сношениях России с Палестиной в XIX веке, in: *Сообщения Императорского Православного Палестинского Общества*, т. XXII, вып. II, Санкт-Петербург 1911, 185–187.

²⁷ Каптерев, Н., Сношения Иерусалимских патриархов в текущем столетии (1815–1844 гг.), in: *Православный Палестинский Сборник*, т. XV, вып. I, Санкт-Петербург 1898, 679–681.

as this Spiritual Mission had to compete with various other institutions and interests supported by the government later.²⁸

Societies, pilgrims and scholars

The Holy Synod of the Russian Church on 26th June 1842 designated Archimandrite Porphyriy Konstantin Alexandrovich Uspenskiy to fulfil the role as envisioned by the report of Nesselrode cited above. On 4th November 1842, there was a meeting of the Holy Synod which dealt with him and his goals: “The present plan of sending the Archimandrite Porfyriy to Jerusalem in the capacity of a pilgrim and with the goal of revealing the current needs of Orthodoxy in Palestine and to establish a liaison between the Greek clergy and the Church leadership in Russia and with the task to oversee that the gifts offered serve the benefits of the Orthodox Church in those areas, is hereby established temporarily, and if it is to become permanent, will depend on the insights and fruits, which will bear from it.”²⁹ The importance of Archimandrite Porphyriy is paramount. His achievements both as an ecclesial figure and a scholar are amazing. His travels around the Middle East resulted in numerous publications, each valuable in itself, not only from a purely scholarly point of view, but due to multiform information contained in them spanning social, political, as well as personal, geographical and other information about the situation and life of the Orthodox Christians in his period.³⁰

²⁸ For further developments in the 20th century see: Anderson, K., Pilgrims, Property and Politics: the Russian Orthodox Church, in: *Eastern Christianity: Studies in Modern History, Religion and Politics*, ed. A. O’Mahony, London 2004, 388–340; Budnitskii, O., “Battling Balfour, White Diplomacy”: The Russian Orthodox Church and the Establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, *East European Jewish Affairs*, 2004, vol. 34, no. 1, 72–90; Gorodetsky, G., The Soviet Union’s Role in the Creation of the State of Israel, *The Journal of Israeli History*, 2003, vol. 22, no. 1, 4–20.

²⁹ Каптерев, Н., Сношения Иерусалимских патриархов в текущем столетии (1815–1844 гг.), in: *Православный Палестинский Сборник*, т. XV, вып. I, Санкт-Петербург 1898, 679–681 (here 681).

³⁰ See: Дмитриевский, А., Епископ Порфирий Успенский как инициатор и организатор первой русской духовной миссии в Иерусалиме и его заслуги в пользу православия и в деле изучения христианского востока, in: *Сообщения Императорского Православного Палестинского Общества*, т. VII, Санкт-Петербург 1905, 339–342. He published much material. His diaries and autobiographical notes were published as a series *Книга бытия моего* (published in a number of volumes, now reprinted numerously in Russia and spanning the period 1841–1885) containing extraordinary information providing a glimpse into the psyche of the period and also of the personal character and struggles of a Russian-cleric scholar. Material published regarding his

He left Sankt Petersburg on 22nd May 1843. The situation in the Middle East with the Orthodox Christians shocked Porphyriy and he formulated some ideas regarding the possibility of establishing a Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem and its activities which would include: “a) To promote visible unity of the Jerusalem, Antiocheane and Russian Churches and with this a mutual exchange of information; b) To control the money and its whereabouts which is sent from Russia; c) To take care of the Russian pilgrims; d) To furnish all the village churches in Syria and Palestine with icons. The Mission should have iconographers and a school of iconography; e) For the acceptance and the sending of gifts from Russia to the places for which they were meant, since this does not take place now; f) To find out where and in which villages there are formerly Christian Arabs who were turned into Muslims and where they commemorate their past Christianity, where they have respect to our saints and holy people, so that it is possible, after the next Orthodox celebration, to start with missionary activity and the conversion into the Christian faith in those villages; g) To give beneficial advice regarding the construction of national schools and seminaries, and Academies in the (Greek) Patriarchate itself.”³¹

In 1844, he writes two treatises on the situation of Orthodoxy in Syria and Palestine. These were: *On the Situation of the Palestinian Church and about the Measures to Uphold it* (О состоянии Палестинской Церкви и о мерах поддержания ее) and *Concerning the Arguments between Greeks, Latins and Armenians in the Holy Places and about the Possibilities of Bringing about Peace* (О спорах греков, латин и армян на святых местах и о способах водворения тут мира).

After travelling extensively and visiting various areas in the Middle East, Porfyriy reaches his homeland in 1846. Later in 1847, with the approval of the Tsar, the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem was established with Porphyriy at its head. The Mission organised development of education, spiritual care for pilgrims, hospitals and was involved in many other activities. It also aimed to counter the situation of decreasing numbers of Orthodox Christians mainly among the Arab population (partly due to traditional tensions with the Greeks), but also due to Uniate and Protestant propaganda.

The period saw increasing infighting between Protestants and Roman Catholics and the Orthodox Christians. Despite not being always united in their aims and goals, the Protestants constantly aimed at “converting someone” including the Jews.

visit to Mt. Athos, Egypt and the Holy Land contains valuable information and descriptions of manuscripts and other antiquities.

³¹ Пребывание преосвященного Порфирия Успенского на Св. Земле, in: *Сообщения Императорского Православного Общества*, т. XV, вып. IV, Санкт-Петербург 1905, 281–282.

In 1846, a year before the official establishment of the Russian Mission, Samuel Gobat became a Protestant bishop in Palestine and adopted an especially aggressive stance in converting other Christians to Protestantism (whereas previously the emphasis was on conversion of the Jews).³²

The almost traditional snobbery and contempt of Western missionaries towards the Orthodox Christians can be seen in the following account when Porphyriy convinced Patriarch Kyrillos to meet with the Protestant German missionary. Gil Kyrillos was prepared to engage him in a civil conversation. On this occasion, Porphyriy writes with sadness about this visit of this German “snob”: “18 (March) Thursday. At two o’clock I introduced to the Patriarch Kyrilos this above mentioned Gil. He appeared silent, as a fish: he sat, (Porphyriy uses the Russian expression *почеченился*), smoked some tobacco, said something behind his teeth about having read the writings of John Damascene, and this much only. He did not ask about the situation of the Orthodox Church in Palestine. His Blessedness upon my advice, was prepared to give him the proper understanding about Eparchies, about monasteries, about educational institutes, and about the preaching of the word on the Greek and Arabic language. One can only burst into anger when one realises that these people, who come from afar, instead of asking us about the situation of the Orthodox Church, ask about it any casual bystander and defiant person and then write personal fantasies.”³³

After the Crimean War, a new chapter begins with the Mission. A decree was sent to the Emperor by the minister for foreign affairs. The minister wrote: “It is necessary to designate the contemporary aim of the Mission, before it is sent, so that it could be valuable for the East, because it cannot continue as before [...]. Our goal, our efforts, consist of establishing peace among the various ethnic groups fighting each other in the East, and this is possible especially since the Russians are loved here equally by the Greeks, Arabs of the same faith, not speaking about the Slavs, and even the Latins of other faith and Armenians, Copts, Syrians, Chaldeans, who all happily share the company with them (with Russians), and who avoid Greeks, as their staunch enemies [...]. We have to create peace with those in animosity, and to uphold the Arabs, in order for them not to be enticed by the union by the actions of the Latins.” The document calls for the establishment of an

³² See: Leest, C. van der, *Conversion and Conflict in Palestine, The Missions of the Church Missionary Society and the Protestant Bishop Samuel Gobat*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Universiteit Leiden 2008.

³³ Епископ Порфирий Успенский, *Книга бытия моего. Дневники и автобиографические записки епископа Порфирия Успенского*, т. III, Санкт-Петербург 1896, 252–253.

episcopacy.³⁴ The document also states that the Mission should found hospitals and engage in philanthropic activity in Palestine. On 23rd March 1857 the document was sanctioned by the Emperor and, in this way, the Mission was established again.

Due to various intrigues, the next head of the Mission was not Porphyriy but Kirill Naumov. From Kirill Naumov's day, the Spiritual Mission continue its work, supporting and expanding schools, building schools and other buildings for the Greek Jerusalem Patriarchate. The Greeks were helped by the Russian Mission and money was raised for the Greek Church and other projects.³⁵ Kirill wanted to build a missionary basis with a school in Damascus and bought a house there. However, it was burnt down by fanatical Muslims but (interestingly) the Turks reimbursed the Mission with all expenses.³⁶ The Mission offered comprehensive care for pilgrims and even organised hospital care and a surgical cabinet.³⁷

The period after the Crimean War witnessed ever increasing numbers of pilgrims to Palestine and the Russian Spiritual Mission faced new competition from new emerging Russian societies with interest in the area. The fact that these other societies were also supported by the government or other individuals, clearly shows that the Spiritual Mission or the Church as such was not of primary concern for the State or other segments of state policy. From the other societies and developments, we can mention the establishment of the Palestinian Committee (1859–1864), the

³⁴ See: АРДМ, дело № 1, Копия доклада Министерства Иностранных Дел императору Александру II, cited by Архимандрит Никодим (Ротов). *История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме*, in: *Богословские Труды Сборник Двадцатый, Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму*, Москва, 1979, 15–83 (here 32). See also: Титов, Ф. И., *Преподобный Кирилл (Наумов), епископ Мелитопольский, бывший настоятель Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме*, Киев 1902, 108, 113.

³⁵ For these activities and donations see: АРДМ, дело № 1013, Переписка с русским консулом в Дамаске по вопросу о различных пожертвованиях Антиохийской Церкви; АРДМ, дело № 1204, Дело о пожертвованиях Антиохийской Церкви; АРДМ, дело № 1205, Дело о посылке митрополиту Тиро-Сидонскому Герасиму архиерейского облачения и митры; cited by Архимандрит Никодим (Ротов). *История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме*, in: *Богословские Труды Сборник Двадцатый, Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму*, Москва 1979, 32.

³⁶ АРДМ, дело № 1695, Переписка по делу миссийского дома в Дамаске; cited by Архимандрит Никодим (Ротов). *История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме*, in: *Богословские Труды Сборник Двадцатый, Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму*, Москва 1979, 32.

³⁷ АРДМ, дело № 1215, О хирургических инструментах; cited by Архимандрит Никодим (Ротов). *История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме*, in: *Богословские Труды Сборник Двадцатый, Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму*, Москва 1979, 32.

Palestinian Commission (1864–1889), and from 1882 the establishment of the influential Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society.

Soon, a conflict of interest emerged and the various rival societies competed among each other, and undoubtedly pilgrim money played a role in the motivation for these conflicts. This included the ongoing tension between the Russian state representatives abroad and the Spiritual Mission. In 1858 the Russian Consulate was established in Jerusalem and also the agency called The Russian Community of (Steam) Shipping and Commerce (Русское Общество Пароходства и Торговли РОПИТ). In St. Peterburg the Palestinian Committee (1859) was established. However, both these organisations (Shipping Group and the Consulate) went against the Spiritual Mission since it was an ecclesial establishment. The situation was even more complex because the head of the Consulate and the Agency of (Steam) Shipping and Commerce was one and the same person Dorgobuzhinov.³⁸

In April 1859, the Grand Prince Constantine Nikolayevich visited Palestine, and at that time, he was the chief of the Palestinian Committee. He clearly indicated that there should be no conflict between the Mission and the Consulate and importantly, more or less gave the Palestinian Committee the responsibility for land acquisition, building, etc.; and in this, the Committee, according to him, would “closely cooperate with the Russian Consulate” in these matters. The Mission was reduced to spiritual care, which is obviously unclear and strange because the work of the Mission was necessarily linked with issues of buildings etc. The other result of the visit of the Grand Prince Constantine Nikolayevich in Jerusalem was the purchase of a large portion of ground towards the west from the Damascus gate close to the Jerusalem walls, that is on the Meydam square.

The Spiritual Mission was completely side tracked from these various activities, and the negative situation was obvious to Kirill Naumov and the representatives of the Church. The Church supported Kirill, when he doubted the reasons for the presence of the The Russian Community of (Steam) Shipping and Commerce in the Holy Land, where there was no commerce or shipping. He asks: “What the Russian Community of (Steam) Shipping and Commerce does or want to do? – Well, it is uncertain what it wants to do. It wants to build a Church, accommodation and a hospital for the pilgrims. But is this not the area of the Spiritual Mission, rather than of The Russian Community of (Steam) Shipping and Commerce. And further, The Russian Community of (Steam) Shipping and Commerce has the money

³⁸ Архимандрит Никодим (Рогов). История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме in: *Богословские Труды Сборник Двадцатый, Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму*, Москва 1979, 15–83 (here 32).

collected for philanthropic institutions in Jerusalem in its hands and occupies itself, as for the future, to gain as much of this money in its hands as possible.”³⁹ Kirill was later removed from his position on uncertain grounds, the influence of the various non-ecclesial players was obviously strong. He was replaced by Archimandrite Antonin Kapustin who came to Jerusalem on 11th September 1865. From now on, the Mission would be headed by an Archimandrite in order not to provoke the various non-ecclesial Russian institutions and also canonically the Greek Church. Kapustin also saw the negative aspects of the Greek Hierarchy and the other non-ecclesial Russian institutions. Kapustin observes, that “in the Jerusalem period of Kirill, we have suffered without deserving it, not one temptation. We were deceived, laughed at by those, who we faithfully fed and gave drink and held on and carried in our hands.”⁴⁰

Nevertheless, it is possible to state that the competition between the various Russian societies and interests produced some positive results. In this regard, the acquisition of land (Palestinian Committee) was positive. However, it was the establishment of the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society in 1882, which elevated efforts to a new higher and scholarly ground. The Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society and its activity reached its peak during the period when the secretary of societies was Alexey Afanasievich Dmitrievsky (March 1856 – August 1929) who is of paramount importance in Byzantology and scholarship linked with Palestine and the Near East.⁴¹ A. A. Dmitrievsky became a secretary of the Society in 1906 (1906–1918). Dmitrievsky was interested in Liturgical scholarship, and his study of the Church Slavonic liturgical tradition naturally led him to an increased interest in the Liturgical traditions of the Middle East. He emphasised the necessity of studying and preserving the manuscripts of the Middle East, especially due to the intimate relationship between the Church Slavonic and Middle East liturgical traditions. This was also highlighted in his thesis.⁴² However, it is important to say that

³⁹ *Собрание мнений и отзывов Филарета, митрополита Московского и Коломенского, по делам Православной Церкви на Востоке*, Санкт-Петербург 1886, 378–379.

⁴⁰ *Церковный Вестник*, 1877, № 41, 8; Cited in Архимандрит Никодим (Ротов). *История Русской Духовной Миссии в Иерусалиме*, in: *Богословские Труды Сборник Двадцатый, Сборник посвящен Митрополиту Ленинградскому и Новгородскому Никодиму*, Москва 1979, 39.

⁴¹ Among the many works available regarding Dmitrievsky one can note: Сове, Б. И., *Русский Гоар и его школа*, in: *Богословские труды*, т. IV, Москва 1968, 39–84; Арранц, М., А. А. Дмитриевский: из рукописного наследия, in: *Архивы русских византинистов в Санкт-Петербурге*, ред. И. П. Медведев, Санкт-Петербург 1995, 120–133.

⁴² Дмитриевский, А. А., *Богослужение в Русской Церкви в XVI в., часть I, Службы круга седмичного и годичного и чинопоследования таинств. С приложением греческих текстов*. Казань 1884,

Dmitrievsky also produced many works which began to reach the masses and in turn stimulated increased interest in the Holy Land among the common folk. These have not lost their appeal even today due to the often lost material they include. He wrote articles for the common believers stimulating interest in Palestine and often showing the liturgical mistakes in the Russian Church created by a misunderstanding of the ancient sources, for example in the *Guide for Village Priests* (*Руководство для сельских пастырей*).⁴³ Dmitrievsky travelled to Athos, Palestine, the Sinai and other places. He collaborated with the nascent study of materials in the library of the Patriarch of Jerusalem. An important scholar working in the library there was Papadopoulos Kerameus who would later publish an important work *Description of the Jerusalem Library* (*Описание Иерусалимской библиотеки*).⁴⁴ Dmitrievsky's travels resulted in a number of valuable works which are considered to be sources for many disciplines until today.⁴⁵ He travelled to Palestine again in 1898. In 1895, the first volume of the work, which Dmitrievsky is best known for, was published: *The Description of Liturgical Manuscripts* (*Описание литургических рукописей*).⁴⁶

Dmitrievsky saw many negative aspects of the Russian presence in Palestine. He mentioned that he was planning to publish one of his speeches *Contemporary Russian Pilgrimage to the Holy Land* (*Современное русское паломничество в Святую Землю*) as a brochure entitled *Types of Contemporary Russian Pilgrims in the Holy Land* (*Типы современных русских паломников в Святой Земле*) where he would mention the dirtiness and filth of the Russian pilgrimage boats, the demoralisation

XVI, 434, 135, XXIV. See also: Дмитриевский, А. А., Способы определения времени написания рукописей без определенных дат вообще и богослужбных рукописей в частности. Речь перед защитой магистерской диссертации: Богослужение в Русской Церкви в XVI веке, *Православный Собеседник*, 1884, № 1, 90–91.

⁴³ For the liturgical mistakes see: Дмитриевский and his articles, *Христианское чтение*, 1888, № 9–10, 561.

⁴⁴ See: Дмитриевский, А. А., А. И. Пападопуло-Керамевс и его сотрудничество в научных изданиях Палестинского Общества. По личным воспоминаниям и по документальным данным, in: *Сообщения Императорского Православного Палестинского Общества*, т. XXIV, вып. IV, III, Санкт-Петербург 1913, 492–523, 379–380.

⁴⁵ Дмитриевский, А. А., *Путешествие по Востоку и его научные результаты. Отчет о заграничной командировке в 1887–1888 г.с прил.*, Киев 1890, 121.

⁴⁶ Which are preserved in the library of the Orthodox East, vol. 1, Typicons, part 1. Works relating to Patriarchal stipulations and ktitor monastic typicons, Kiev 1895, XX, CXLVII, 912, XX; later published other volumes); See: Дмитриевский, А. А., *Описание литургических рукописей, хранящихся в библиотеках православного Востока*, т. I, Типика: Памятники патриарших уставов и ктигорские монастырские Типиконы, Киев 1895; т. II, Евхологии, Киев 1901; т. III (2-я половина), Типика, Петроград 1917.

and exploitation of Russian pilgrims women by the brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, the indifference shown to pilgrims by the Russian Consulate in Jerusalem.⁴⁷ In the period of Dmitrievsky's role as a secretary the Society had eight dependencies (подворий) in Palestine. The state realised the potential of the Society and its works. On 5th July 1912, Nikolay II ratified a law enacted by the Duma about the financing of the Society's schools in Syria (including Lebanon).⁴⁸

For the ideological background of Dmitrievsky and Russian efforts in general, the following speech given by Dmitrievsky on 2nd March 1915 is of a great interest. It was given on the occasion of the declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which declared the idea of annexing Constantinople to Russia in the event of a Russian military victory in the war.⁴⁹ He began his speech by stating that "the fight of Russia and the Entente against the 'Central powers' resembles in many ways the medieval crusades".⁵⁰ This march was prepared by the God-bearing Russian nation, which, in the course of many centuries, peacefully flocked to bow to the Life bearing Tomb of the Lord, and there it cried with tears of emotion, begging the Life giver to be able to see that desired time, when the greatest of Christian sanctuaries – the Tomb of the Lord – will be free from the captivity from the sons of Hagar. And it is the fate of this God carrying nation and Christ loving Tsar, the Emperor Nikolay II, by Providence, together with his valiant companions, to fulfil this high task which was, at some point in time, handled with difficulty by Christian nations of the medieval period."⁵¹

Further, according to Dmitrievsky, the battle of European interests in the Holy Land is something more than just a conflict; is an interreligious and intercivilisational war. The initiative of the Prussian king Friedrich-Wilhelm IV, "who was always unique in his mystical religious disposition", to establish a Protestant bishopric in

⁴⁷ The work, in the academic context, came out as Дмитриевский, А. А., *Современное русское паломничество в Святую Землю*, Труды Киевской Духовной академии, № VI, Киев 1903, 274–319.

⁴⁸ *Полное собрание законов Российской Империи*, серия III, т. XXXII., Санкт-Петербург 1912, 1915, 1117.

⁴⁹ The speech is cited in 'Introductory essay': Лисовой, Н. Н., А. А. Дмитриевский и его труды по истории Русской Палестины, in: *Императорское Православное Палестинское Общество, и его деятельность за истекшую четверть века 1882–1907*, А. А. Дмитриевский, Москва 2008; Абышко, О., *Императорское Православное Палестинское Общество*, Санкт Петербург, 55; Дмитриевский, А. А., *Доклад о необходимости освобождения Иерусалима из-под власти Турции. Автограф и машинопись, 2 марта 1915*, Фонд рукописей Российской национальной библиотеки, ф. 253, оп. I, д. 37, 87 лл.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, л. 1.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, л. 3.

Jerusalem in 1841, was, according to Dmitrievsky, an attempt “to establish a defence system in the Holy Land for future German colonisation which has flowered already with force in our own time”.⁵² According to the author, “the war, which has the freedom of the Bosphorus and Dardanel straits and the gain of Constantinople as its immediate goal in order to placate the Orthodox world, and to exchange the crescent on Saint Sophia with the cross, will undoubtedly also contribute to the freedom of the Holy Land from the hated yoke of the sons of Hagar in the end, which has for such a long period around 400 years, been laid upon it”.⁵³ Further, according to Dmitrievsky, “Russia at the Tomb of the Lord, has the utmost immediate and non-negotiable interests, and its goal is to stand guard at the Tomb of the Lord, with a fierce leg, on the basis of being by law the caretaker, which is lawful and of substance”.⁵⁴ Dmitrievsky further elaborated on the scholarly interests that need to be developed in relation to Palestine. The need to call in scholars, who “would appear in the Holy Land, to work with antiquities in those areas where every inch of land presents a precious shrine, the study of which appears to be of undisputed importance to us Orthodox without any doubt. It is necessary to establish independent archaeological excavations of Orthodox scholars, especially the Orthodox from Russia. Only the God loving Christian Russia, in its strength can open this precious depth, over which our blood and sweat has been spilled”.⁵⁵

The Society published a huge amount of scholarly material, as well as annual reports. To gain an insight on the situation and activities of the Society, we can mention information gathered in one such almanac of the Society dealing with the year 1905.⁵⁶ The almanac shows, for example, which accounts of the Society were regularly monitored. The income of the Society stemmed from membership fees, important collections from *Palm Sunday*, the sale of publications, pilgrims. The Society’s expenditures aimed at running the educational institutions, helping Churches in Palestine, maintaining hospital care.⁵⁷

⁵² Ibidem, л. 7.

⁵³ Ibidem, л. 22.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, л. 16–17.

⁵⁶ Годовое общее собрание Императорского Православного Палестинского Общества 4 декабря 1905 года, in: *Сообщения Императорского Православного Палестинского Общества*, т. XVII, вып. I–IV, ред. И. Соколов, Санкт Петербург 1906, 113–127.

⁵⁷ On 1st March 1903, there were the following remnants: 1) in cash 47 114 roubles, 76 cop.; 2) in untouchable capital 127 304 roubles; 3) turnover capital 289 400 roubles. Altogether 463 818 roubles, 76 cop. For 1st March 1904 the remnants 1) in cash 40 260 roubles, 7 cop.; 2) in

As to some information about the life of the Society in 1904–1905, we hear that the Society had to struggle with members not paying their membership fees. There were concerns about attracting new members. As the report states, the Society's main fundraising activity on *Palm Sunday* has decreased and not produced such a high income as before. The report states that the Society in the end did make ends meet. Donations included those from Her Imperial Highness Princess Elizabet Theodorovna (200 roubles), Her Imperial Highness the Great Princess Alexandra Yosifovna (75 roubles). The Society operated and gained much of its support on the diocesan level on the level of eparchies. The Society continued to organise readings about Palestine in Russia. In the years 1903–1904, these readings were visited by 4 000 000 people.

A certain member priest of the Society S. D. Yachontov, reports about the great success that his lectures for simple peasant folk had in the village in Pronskiy Uyezd. People were interested in the lectures describing Palestine, the pilgrimages, all of which was illustrated by pictures. There was also interest in the various pictures and brochures given out. The Society had sent out 25 360 exemplars of brochures to assist the readings and 962 000 Palestinian papers to be given away with the statement *Voice of the Pastor about the Holy Land*. The average amount of people who studied in the schools of the Society in 1904 was 10 741 people.⁵⁸

In the section *News from the Orthodox East*, we read that, in his speech, the Patriarch Damian thanked the *skevofylax* Euthimius for material support of the school (of the Jerusalem Patriarchate), and also reminded the gathering of the help and support from the sultans Abdul Medzid, Abdul Azis and Abdul Hamid II. The gathering exclaimed “long live” (ζήτω) and sang the hymn Hamidie.⁵⁹

The Annual Report mentioned Roman Catholic and Protestant aggression in order to gain Orthodox religious sites, and the need to gain greater historical and legal knowledge on the part of the Orthodox to counter this.⁶⁰ There was criticism since the school (Patriarchate of Jerusalem School) does not sufficiently teach Arabic, which is of great detriment in the pastoral activity of the Church in Palestine.

untouchable capital 133 904 roubles and 3) turnover capital 217 200 roubles. Altogether 391 364 roubles, 7 cop.; *Ibidem*, 114.

⁵⁸ There were 5 777 male and 4 964 female students. In the Judean schools there were 495 students; in the Galilean 712 students; in the Beirut ones 934, in the Southern Syrian 3 677, in the Northern Syrian 4 923. The staff including the inspectors consisted of 417 people, 25 of which were Russians, the rest locals.

⁵⁹ Вести из православного Востока, in: *Сообщения Императорского Православного Палестинского Общества*, т. XVII, вып. I–IV, ред. И. Соколов, Санкт-Петербург 1906, 114, 128–157, 132.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, 134.

In the years 1904–1905, there were 62 students in the school of the Jerusalem Patriarchate. The Imperial Orthodox Society had to the date 1st June 1905, 24 schools with 1300 students of both sexes. There is frequent complaining that the Protestants are encroaching on the Orthodox facilities stealing students from the Orthodox.⁶¹ It is stated that on one occasion where the Protestant Mission did not have success in establishing a school and stealing students, the Protestants supported feuds among the Christians themselves and even going as far as supporting fanatical Muslims to attack the Christians.⁶²

Conclusions

Our small excursion into the Russian presence in Palestine shows a number of features. Generally, it can be stated that the Russian government, especially in the 19th century, was slow and indecisive in assuming the role of the Protector of Orthodox Christians in the Middle East (in contrast to other European powers). The Tsar and the Russian Government did sanction the establishment of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Palestine as we have seen, but this came relatively late in the 19th century. The fact, that in the second half of the 19th century, there were more societies and organisations from Russia in Palestine and had the support of the Russian Government, clearly demonstrates that there was no particular preference given by the Tsar or the government to the Orthodox Mission. Endless conflicts between the Russian Consulate in Palestine and competition among the Societies, often for pilgrim money, again shows that the Church did not have any special position in the eyes of the government, which, however, did use the Church when opportunity presented itself to enhance Russian policy especially in the Balkans.

On the other hand, the activities of the Russian Spiritual Mission and the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society clearly show the radically different nature of their activities in contrast to Protestant missions and other Roman Catholic missions. The Russian organisations promoted scholarship and were mainly concerned with upholding the rights of the Greek Patriarchate and Arab Christians while building educational and other facilities.

⁶¹ Ibidem, 142.

⁶² Ibidem, 143.

ABSTRACT

**Some Aspects of Russian Ecclesial and
State Policy in Palestine with Particular Reference
to the Nineteenth Century**

Václav Ježek

The study deals with the Russian presence in Palestine especially during the 19th century. It shows that the Russian government did not prefer the Orthodox Church in its policy in Palestine which demonstrates the important role of the Russian ecclesial and other societies in Palestine and their contribution to scholarship and mainly the survival of Orthodox Christianity in Palestine.

Key words: Palestine, Russia, Russian Spiritual Mission.

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Olga Leshkova

THE CONCEPTION OF THE TSAR'S DIVINE
AUTHORITY IN MUSCOVIAN HISTORICAL TEXTS
ON THE TIME OF TROUBLES

At the beginning of the 17th century, the Russian state had to face a deep and severe crisis which is known in historiography as the Time of Troubles or the Troubles (1598–1613). Without any doubt, this crisis, sometimes defined as Russia's first civil war,¹ has had a strong and long-lasting influence on all Russian history since that point up to the present day. The Russian Time of Troubles has been of permanent interest to historians who have studied it from very different points of view. The constant interest in the subject results not only from the numerous mysteries, still hidden over the centuries, but from many other reasons as well. The crisis of the Time of Troubles nearly destroyed the country, having stricken almost all spheres of Russian medieval social life – from the economy to the mentality. It led to the deformation of the social and power hierarchy, the destruction of traditional political order and to social disintegration.

The problem of the national mentality crisis resulting from the political events of the Time of Troubles deserves particular attention as it marks an important step towards the destruction of the old system of religious and philosophical concepts, successfully used in Muscovite Russia for centuries. This system, finally formed by the beginning of the seventeenth century, possessed quite a stable and well-organized structure based on the persuasion of a unique mission of Muscovite Russia to preserve authentic Christianity. This doctrine, provided with a strong religious connotation, penetrated the practices of the Muscovite state and was progressively argued in contemporary literature by means of various historical analogies and biblical allusions, giving more or less appropriate foundation for the idea of Muscovian

¹ Dunning, Ch. S. L., *Russia's First Civil War. The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty*, Pennsylvania 2001.

religious distinctiveness. On the basis of providentialism as a belief that God's will determines all earthly occurrences and applies to all social and historical processes, a Muscovian author assumed the holy role of Muscovy as a necessary continuation of Biblical history. Not surprisingly, such an ambitious conception had a major influence not only on the formation process of the national identity, but also on the state political system and the international relations of Muscovite Russia. It would be no exaggeration to say that the myth of the Muscovite ruler² as the main fighter for the preservation of the Orthodox faith had an important impact on the apology of Russian spiritual dominance in the world, as well as on Muscovian political ambitions, derived from the presumptive right to inherit Byzantine ascendancy.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the perception of the tsar's power in Muscovian texts dating back to the first half of the 17th century in the context of Russian traditional thought. The main question we will try to answer is whether the new social and political reality produced any noticeable effect on Muscovian political thought; and if so, what kind of transformation it underwent. We will also attempt to generalize the perception of the tsar's authority as reflected in contemporary historical works by Ivan Timofeev, Avraamij Palytsin, Ivan Khvorostinin and Ivan Katyrev-Rostovsky.

By the beginning of the Time of Troubles, Muscovite historical thought had successfully developed the idea of Orthodox tsardom, ruled by the Orthodox tsar who was regarded as the essential protector of the authentic Christian faith in the world. The tsar's power possessed uncontestable authority as presumably granted to the ruler directly by God. Due to the fact that the Muscovian ruler, as supposed, executed God's will on earth, his authority could not be questioned, alienated or expropriated in any way and did not allow for any active disobedience. Furthermore, the tsar, being responsible only to God, was subject neither to the will of his people, nor to the will of the aristocracy. Granted by God, the tsar's power achieved an innate and hereditary character. The ruling Rurik dynasty was viewed as god-blessed, which was proved by the fact of its long-lasting and uninterrupted reign. Even though the very idea of the monarch's power divinity does not originate from Russia,³ within Muscovian political context it played a key role without ever being thoroughly

² For the purpose of the present paper, we will use the term "tsar" as the most appropriate. However, the title of tsar was not introduced into official practice until 1547, assumed by Ivan IV (1533–1584). The new title replaced the former "Grand Prince of Moscow".

³ This political and religious doctrine asserting that a monarch is not subject to any earthly authority and is responsible only to God was well-known and quite wide-spread all over medieval Europe (see *the divine right of kings*).

contested or doubted. However, one cannot categorically assume that Russian tradition adopted the idea of absolute power with no limits. The issue of a ruler's power limitations had provoked vivid interest in thinkers since the earliest period of Russian history.⁴ Despite the fact that the political thought of Muscovian Russia did not leave any distinctive political theory, it is possible to reveal a range of questions related to political issues which were of interest for Muscovian thought. The most frequent of them were the question of the "tsar's advisers" and the question of the correlation between secular authority and the Church.⁵ Russia had successfully adopted the Byzantine model of relations between the Church and the ruler, where the latter acted as the main upholder of the Orthodoxy and disposed of the specific spiritual authority in elites and ordinary people. Despite the fact that the Muscovian ruler was not the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, the practice of them interfering with Church affairs was quite wide-spread in medieval Muscovy.⁶ In this context, it would be significant to mention that, for instance, the metropolitan as the head of the Muscovian Orthodox Church could be applied or deposed only with the consent of the Muscovian ruler. The idea of the divine character of the tsar's power was combined with the religious dogma of obedience and resignation, forming a specific providential and relatively passive attitude towards the political system, typical for Russian society. Submission to a sovereign in a wider sense of the word, became one of the required conditions for righteous life. In some way, Muscovian secular and clerical elites had an idea about the symbolic symphony between the Church and political authority, based upon their common mission to preserve the authentic Christian faith.

Thus, by the beginning of the 17th century Muscovite Russia possessed its own "political philosophy", which provided a rather logical and coherent (or at least satisfactory for contemporary Muscovians) explanation of Muscovy predominance in the religious and, consequently, political sphere as the Russian state was predestined to fight for pure Christianity – Orthodoxy – against heretics. The Muscovite tsar – "tsar of all Christians"⁷ – had to play a major role in this holy mission.

⁴ See: Вальденберг, В., *Древнерусские учения о пределах царской власти*, Москва 2006.

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ As a really spectacular example, one could mention the case of the Russian metropolitan Isidor (1385–1463) who supported the reunion at the time of the Council of Florence, but when he arrived in Moscow (1441) and proclaimed the union, Vasily II deposed him. Thus, the reunion was eventually rejected by Muscovy.

⁷ Послание монаха псковского Елеазарова монастыря Филофея дьяку М. Г. Мисюрю Мунехину, in: *Третий Рим. Истоки и эволюция русской средневековой концепции*, Н. В Синицына, Москва 1998, 339–348.

The Time of Troubles, triggered by the extinction of the Muscovian Rurik dynasty in 1598, gave birth to a range of phenomena that were contradictory to the established system of historical and political thought and needed badly a relevant explanation. The election of tsars as a completely new phenomenon of political life conflicted with the idea of the tsar's innateness. Let us recall that Boris Godunov, who was elected to the throne by Zemsky sobor,⁸ had to face the accusation of killing Dmitry, the youngest son of Ivan IV. The tsar could be dethroned even if he was a member of the Rurik dynasty as it was in the case of Vasili Shuysky,⁹ deposed in 1610 by his former adherents. Another new factor was the repeated appearance of imposters, the most successful of whom – False Dmitry I – managed to capture the throne and remained the Tsar of Russia for almost a year (1605–1606). Furthermore, during the Time of Troubles, Muscovy experienced a political agreement that limited the tsar's power in different ways and determined his obligations, which can be regarded as an attempt to regulate the tsar's power in a legal way.¹⁰

Surprisingly, these crucial changes in state practice and the political reality provoked neither a revolutionary transformation of political consciousness, nor a considerable shift of the tsar's power perception, which would have been explicitly recorded in literary texts. As the conducted analysis has shown, nearly all the contemporary authors, who reflected the Troubles in their works, attempt to adopt the old tsar's power conception to the actual historical situation, instead of working out an alternative approach to the problem. Basically, they only make new conclusions out of old ideas, answering questions that did not exist before.¹¹

The first, and probably the most important problem the contemporary authors had to resolve, derives from the extinction of the Rurik dynasty and the ensuing power vacuum, which resulted in new forms of ascension to the throne. The authors raise the problem of the tsar's power legitimacy regarding the rulers who occupied the Russian throne after the Rurik dynasty died out. Nevertheless, they do not offer any unique approach and analyze every single example separately (Godunov, False Dmitry, Shujsky) and mostly in terms of illegal power usurpation.

The authors maintain the old idea of the tsar's power divinity, however, at the same time, they have to deal with an awkward question of whether the power is

⁸ Russian form of parliament of the feudal Estates type, which could be summoned by the tsar, patriarch or the Boyar Duma and was used on an irregular basis in the 16th and 17th centuries. The term can be roughly translated as the "assembly of the land".

⁹ Vasili Ivanovich Shuysky (1552–1612) was the Tsar of Russia in 1606–1610, representing the Suzdal branch of the Rurik dynasty.

¹⁰ See: Ключевский, В. О., *Курс русской истории*, т. III, Петроград 1918, 61.

¹¹ Вальденберг, В., *Древнерусские учения о пределах царской власти*, Москва 2006, 294.

granted by God to any ruler or if it is true only for tsars from the Rurik dynasty. Trying to overcome an evident disharmony between the holy nature of the tsar's power (as a concept) and the fact the throne is occupied by "dishonorable" people, Muscovian authors finally offer a specific idea of "innate and false tsars".¹² Even though the relevant texts do not provide us with a full and coherent explanation, the present conception can be shortly, but not exhaustively, presented in the following way: the innate tsars are the rulers from the Muscovian Rurik dynasty, and they remained lawful even in case of living a sinful life;¹³ unlawful tsars are all who reigned between Fyodor's death and the coronation of Michael Romanov in 1613. Then, this simple binary conception, based on a pure hereditary factor, was supplemented with the idea of the tsar's legal election. According to Ivan Timofeev, a lawful tsar, if elected, shall be elected by all the country. This is why he accuses Vasili Shuysky of being elected "without the consent of the entire land",¹⁴ and consequently ascribes him as an unlawful tsar despite his noble Rurikid origin.

In addition, Ivan Timofeev draws a distinction between the tsar's power as a political institute and its specific implementation in the hand of a ruler. The author suggests that the tsar's crown keeps its purity and divine status even in case of an unworthy and sinful reign.¹⁵ This approach helps the author to deal with the very unpleasant problem of the destruction of the tsar's power prestige in people of all social layers which resulted from the dynastic crisis, incoherent changing of rulers and general political imbalance.¹⁶

Besides, Timofeev raises the question of people's reaction to false tsars usurping the throne. He calls it "speechlessness" referring to the reaction of the nobility and ordinary people to ongoing crimes, and first of all – the killing of Dmitry, the youngest son of Ivan the Terrible, who was supposed to be knifed on Godunov's order in 1591.¹⁷ It is necessary to say here that contemporary authors tend to interpret the Time of Troubles as a punishment for numerous sins committed by rulers and ordinary people. Moreover, this providentialistic approach leads them to assume that the only solution to the crisis – to deserve God's forgiveness – can be achieved solely

¹² *Временник Ивана Тимофеева*, Москва – Ленинград 1951, 276.

¹³ As it was in case of Ivan IV the Terrible. See: *Ibidem*, 281.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, 389.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 281.

¹⁶ *Словеса дней, и царей, и святителей московских*, in: *ПЛДР (Конец XVI – начало XVII веков)*. Москва, 1987, 440.

¹⁷ *Временник Ивана Тимофеева*, Москва – Ленинград 1951, 263.

by means of praying and penitence. Avraamy Palitsyn uses a similar term of “insane silence”¹⁸ talking about people's reaction to Godunov's actions.

Then, Ivan Timofeev talks about the possibility of criticizing the tsar, connecting this problem to the question of the tsar's legitimacy. He assumes that lawful tsars should not be criticized in any way, and one should keep a respectful silence about their sins. For this reason, Timofeev does not provide any “dark” details about Ivan the Terrible's reign. Unlawful tsars who usurped the throne, vice versa, deserve critics and their acts should be openly criticized. However, as for the eventual judgment of tsars, Timofeev does not seem to differentiate between lawful and unlawful tsars – they could not be judged by any earthly authority or deprived of the throne because any crowned person is responsible only to God. In this context, it is necessary to mention the general attitude to False Dimitri who, though having been crowned, was never regarded as a tsar by contemporary authors. Moreover, his image in the texts stands out for its permanent eschatological connotation, connected to the coming of the antichrist. In contrast to the perception of the other unlawful rulers, namely Boris Godunov and Vasili Shuysky, whose characteristics are often quite ambiguous, the image of False Dimitri is consistently negative.¹⁹ However, it is rather notable that the main accusation addressed to him arises from his betrayal of the Orthodox monkhood and conversion to Catholicism.

As mentioned above, contemporary authors' attitude towards the “unlawful” tsars often reveals a certain ambiguity. Among the anti-heroes of the Troubles in the texts of the first half of the 17th century, Boris Godunov stands out as one of the most complex and controversial characters. The first “unlawful” tsar and his incredible political career seems to have been fascinating ordinary people and historians so far. His unusual personality was already attracting extraordinary attention in the 17th century, as reflected by the fact that almost all the authors writing historical texts on the Time of Troubles mention Godunov as one of the key personage who played a major role in the crisis. Godunov was generally viewed as an evil tyrant who had illegally usurped the Muscovite throne and had been largely responsible for the Troubles. Despite the fact that the authors mostly condemn him,²⁰ the texts reflect quite clearly expressed ambivalence.²¹ Timofeev, Palitsyn, Khvorostinin and

¹⁸ *Сказание Авраамия Палицына*, Москва – Ленинград 1955.

¹⁹ *Временник Ивана Тимофеева*, Москва – Ленинград 1951, 83.

²⁰ However, this negative perception can also be partly explained by the period when the mentioned texts were written, as well as, by the common apologia of the new Romanov's dynasty.

²¹ Ivan Khvorostinin characterizes Godunov in the following way: “Although he was treacherous and power-hungry, he was very pious at the same time, he built many churches, he filled the towns with the beauty of splendor, he stopped bride-takers, he eradicated the arrogant ones, he was

Katyrev-Rostovsky show certain dynamics in the development of Godunov's image and emphasize some of his positive qualities, primarily as a brilliant statesman.²² Nevertheless, all these features are finally thrown into the background by the sin of pride and enormous power ambition. I. M. Katyrev-Rostovsky, for instance, describes Boris Godunov as a reasonable man, pious and merciful, who "[...] surpassed the others in his image and actions" and did a lot of good things to make the Russian state prosperous in the days of his reign.²³ However, Katyrev-Rostovsky repeats the idea that after his accession to the throne, Boris grew proud and merely insane, destroying his image of the wise ruler.

Being very critical to "unlawful" tsars and often reluctant to describe the improper actions of "lawful" ones, the authors of the Troubles convey the contemporary ideal of the Orthodox tsar, personalized by Fyodor Ivanovich, whose main advantage was an incredible devotion and piety. The tsar Fyodor spent all his life praying and fasting, having left behind all state obligations.²⁴ According to the medieval authors' opinion, Fyodor was regarded as an ideal Orthodox tsar whose behavior is very close to that of a monk.²⁵ Katyrev-Rostovsky, who provided us with a rather talented description of the outward appearance of historical personages, portrayed Fyodor as a short man, "[...] who's wearing the image of resignation and fasting, praying all the time and who cares solely about saving his soul with no regard to earthly matters".²⁶ For Fyodor's piety, God remunerates Muscovy and gives it years of peaceful and abundant life, with no bloodshed, conflicts or natural disasters.²⁷ It is

feared by foreign countries, and, like a gentle giant, he was full of wisdom in his earthly life, having got the honour and glory from the tsars, but he exasperated his people, and he set son against his father and father against his son, and he filled their homes with hostility, and he inspired the slaves with hatred and them with hatred and treachery, and he roused the dependent against the free, and he humiliated the noblesse in power, and he brought temptation into the world, and he gave birth to hatred, [...] and he grew extremely proud, and made the other treat him as God." See: *Словеса дней, и царей, и святителей московских*, in: *ПЛДР (Конец XVI – начало XVII веков)*, Москва 1987, 435–437.

²² "The tsar Boris took great care in godliness and all state affairs, he cared for the poor and the beggarly and he was very kind to them." See: *Сказание Авраамия Палицына*, Москва – Ленинград 1955, 104.

²³ *Повесть князя Ивана Михайловича Катырева-Ростовского*, in: *РИБ*, т. XIII. Памятники древней русской письменности, относящиеся к Смутному времени, Санкт-Петербург 1891, 563.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, 563.

²⁵ *Временник Ивана Тимофеева*, Москва – Ленинград 1951, 189.

²⁶ *Повесть князя Ивана Михайловича Катырева-Ростовского*, in: *РИБ*, т. XIII. Памятники древней русской письменности, относящиеся к Смутному времени, Санкт-Петербург 1891, 620.

²⁷ *Сказание Авраамия Палицына*, Москва – Ленинград 1955, 101.

also very significant that Muscovian authors take piety and godliness as a prerequisite of the tsar's power legacy as it reflects the religious focus of Muscovian political thought.

On the basis of the conducted analysis, we can conclude that, despite all the considerable political and social changes of the Time of Troubles, Muscovian political thought remained relatively conservative and did not undergo any notable transformation, which would have resulted in a structural shift towards a broad new comprehension of the tsar's authority. Contemporary authors used old concepts consistently, applying them, more or less successfully, to a new political reality. The divinity of the Russian throne and the tsar's authority, based on dominant religiously motivated ideas, remained nearly unaffected by crucial changes in the procedure of throne accession. Moreover, the contemporary authors developed traditional political motives by means of expounding certain Biblical connotations (such as "a new Rome" or "a new Israel") or affirming the ancient origin of Russian tsars dating back to Byzantine and Rome emperors. These motives form a conceptual background for new subjects, originated from the social and political crisis of the Troubles.

The relative inattention to political aspects of the Troubles in contemporary authors can be explained to a considerable degree as a logic consequence of the general rigidity of Muscovian political thought. Obviously, its excessive religiousness presented a serious obstacle to the progressive evolution of political views and attitudes, especially in the matter of the tsar's power limits. On the other hand, the very occurrences of the Troubles gave a real dimension to certain concepts of Muscovian thought, and primarily, to its crucial idea of Russian religious predominance as the last defender of genuine Christianity, based on the idea of spiritual opposition to the Western Church. The Time of Troubles (especially in the context of False Dmitry's reign and foreign military intervention) was seen by many authors as a sort of holy war against Catholic "heretics", who aimed to annihilate the Orthodoxy. Ironically, the largest crisis ever in Muscovian history, which brought to light all the weakness of the traditional Russian state system, contributed in the short-term perspective to the conservation of traditional Muscovian thought, which proved to be rather inert and stagnant on the level achieved by the beginning of the 17th century.

ABSTRACT

**The Conception of the Tsar's Divine Authority
in Muscovian Historical Texts on the Time of Troubles**

Olga Leshkova

The paper focuses on the evolution of Muscovian political thought, especially the comprehension of tsar's authority with regard to political and social changes of the Time of Troubles. The text emphasizes the key motives which characterize historical and political thought in Muscovite Russia (such as the idea of Russian religious predominance as the last defender of genuine Christianity, the belief in a special mission of Russia etc.); it analyzes the reasons for its conservatism and stability under adverse political circumstances and the effect which it produced on subsequent Russian history.

Key words: Russia, Time of Troubles, Tsar, Muscovite, Muscovy, Russian Thought, Tsar's Authority, Limit for Power.

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Volodymyr Okarynskyi

ROCK MUSIC IN EVERYDAY LIFE
OF YOUTH IN WESTERN UKRAINE
UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME (1960 – EARLY 1980S)

Intro.
Soviet post-Stalinist background

Rock music in everyday life of young people in Western Ukraine under the Soviet regime has not been the subject of scientific interest of historians or anthropologists yet. Panorama of everyday life in Lviv after the World War II, has been shown at the popular level by Il'ko Lemko (Illya Semenov), together with co-authors.¹ Hippie subculture that is closely associated with rock culture has been investigated by a historian William Risch.² An attempt to study the development of rock music in the context of Lviv rock bands has been done by former rock activist Yurko Peretyatko.³ Finally, the author has tried to show the space of distribution of rock culture in the life of Western Ukrainian youth using various sources, including memoirs (interviews), articles in the press etc.⁴

Many spheres of public life, including everyday life, were still under control of the state ideology in the post-Stalin Soviet society. The society imposed the standards of behaviour and appearance. There was a cultural dictate – the centralized mass culture was developing, including the style of clothing or popular music. In the

¹ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003; Михалик, М. – Лемко, І., *Львів повсякденний (1939–2009)*, Львів 2009.

² Risch, W. J., Soviet 'Flower Children': Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s L'viv, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2005, vol. 40, no. 3.

³ Перетятко, Ю., *Львівський рок 1962–1992*, Львів 1995; Перетятко, Ю., *Львівський рок: півстоліття боротьби*, Львів 2006.

⁴ All sources will be mentioned later in the study.

USSR there was not much expressing of alternative individuality in the everyday life. However, there have always been people opposing the pressure of society – nonconformists, representatives of subcultures, artistic Avant-garde, ideological and political opposition. More numerous layer of popular culture appeared at the beginning of the 1960s which was in contrast with the dominant official Soviet mass culture.

Pop music which was adopted from the Western culture was a sociocultural phenomenon in the USSR and Ukraine. Its genres in post-war years included jazz, and from the beginning of 1960s also rock music. It is believed by many people that Western pop and rock music, *The Beatles*, *The Rolling Stones* in particular, together with some others, “demolished” the Soviet Union. From this point of view, rock music could be viewed as an example of the “soft” dissident movement, which together with the distribution of the youth subcultures, such as hippies or punks, overcame a sufficient number of the young people during several generations.

Pop in the West of Soviet Ukraine: From jazz to rock'n'roll

Western Ukraine was a very specific region of the Soviet Union and even the Ukrainian SSR. Therefore, the spread of rock music in Ukraine had its own peculiarities. In pre-war year, this region was part of the Polish Republic, Romania and Czechoslovakia, and therefore, the people here were more familiar with the Western pop music. This music penetrated also during the Nazi occupation of the World War II (1941–1944). Due to these circumstances, jazz and its variants, including *swing*, were more common in this region. Obviously, as a dance style, rock'n'roll (at the level of *swing* or *boogie-woogie*) was probably performed in the 1950s. However, we can speak of the rock music only after the replacement of the major orchestras by the ensembles of the small quantity of players and the presence of the electric instruments. This happened only in the early 1960s. Just as in other parts of the Soviet Ukraine, in the beginning, rock and roll was seen as a by-product of American jazz⁵ on the Western periphery of the republic.

At that time, in Ukraine, which was departed from the West by the Iron Curtain, like the rest of the USSR, there were some official academic pop bands and singers,

⁵ Zhuk, S. I., *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dnipropetrovsk, 1960–1985*, Washington – Baltimore 2010, 81.

very few jazz bands, women vocal ensembles singing songs in the style of urban romance with a poor instrumental accompaniment: accordion, clarinet/saxophone, guitar and contrabass. After Stalin's struggle against "rootless" cosmopolitanism and its manifestations as "worshipping alien culture" – meaning Western culture – jazz started to be accepted and tolerated in Western Ukraine only in the late 1950s.

Jazz, which began to be allowed as the "light" music, was an important precondition for the development of the rock music in Western Ukraine. Thus, in 1960, a young physician Ihor Khoma has founded a new jazz band *Rhythm*, later known as the *Medicus*, in which Volodymyr Kit played, a trumpeter, later famous for his performances in *Arnica*, together with the drummer of the same group Ivan Hospodarets.⁶ The ensemble of a young beginner, and now well-known academic composer Myroslav Skoryk *Veseli Skrypky*, founded in 1963 in Lviv, created Ukrainian pop music of that time on the basis of jazz styles and its derivative styles. The repertoire of *Veseli Skrypky* included *boogie-woogie*, *hali-gali*, *rock'n'roll*, *twist*, pop-based Western foreign motives.

The existence of the Soviet urban youth subculture of the *stilyagi*, which existed from the end of the 1940s till the 1950s, was another ground for the spread of the Western pop and rock music. Lviv, as one of the cities with the "European" past, together with Tallinn, Riga, Leningrad and metropolitan Moscow, was one of the centres of the Soviet *stilyagi*.⁷ It was a pro-American jazz subculture. Its representatives were strongly pursued because of their shocking appearance, indifference to Soviet society and love for the American jazz until the end of the 1950s when some liberalization started. Then, the Iron Curtain was lifted slightly, particularly during the 4th World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow in 1957, when the Soviet youth heard not only jazz but also rock'n'roll, saw live beatniks, jeans and sneakers. After the Festival, jazz was no longer considered a bourgeois *music for fat*, and the USSR jazz ensembles began to include into their programs rock'n'roll and rhythm'n'blues motives. At the same time, the subculture of *stilyagi* in the USSR divided into the so-called *shtatniki* and *beatniks*. *Shtatniki* remained jazz subculture, and the Soviet *beatniks*, who significantly differed from the American *beatniks* of the 1950s, actively promoted rock music.⁸ These events initiated free and less inferior generation of the 1960s in the Soviet Union.

⁶ «Медікус»: сорок років українського джазу!, *Поступ*, 2000, № 79 (523).

⁷ Козлов, А., *Козел на саксе*. [online:<http://lib.ru/CULTURE/MUSIC/KOZLOV/kozel_na_saxe.txt>, cit. 2015-06-29].

⁸ *Ibidem*.

Another *stilyagi's* merit was the distribution of music through the alternative channels, including the recording of jazz compositions, later rock and roll songs and generally Western pop music through old gramophone on the old X-rays. People who replicated the music in such way and sold it underground were called *fartsovshchyky*. And the discs were called *music on ribs*.

The peculiarity of Western Ukraine was that *stilyagi* existed there at all in the early 1960s, and on the top of that, were still fought by so-called *druzhynnyky* – volunteer police. The main tool of *druzhynnyky* against *stilyagi* was scissors. Once they captured a *stilyaga* on the street, they could beat them up and cut his/her narrowed down pants (which sometimes reached the width of 16 cm), could also cut off his/her “too long” hair or too bright tie. In addition to that, *druzhynnyky* carefully watched for those who danced in a “wrong” way and showed forbidden dance moves – those that differed from tango and foxtrot on the dance floors. Violators were traced beyond the dance floor. Therefore, the musicians performed their best crown numbers at the end of the party, when young people began to rage together, and *druzhynnyky* did not know whom to seize first.⁹

However, closer to the mid-1960s, the ban on appearance became gradually irrelevant as the dominant style of clothing in the USSR became represented by narrow “economical” pants, instead of large shapeless “official” pants of the 1950s. Another significant fact was that the Soviet *shtatnyky*, as opposed to mass fashion, began to dress up into double-breasted jackets and extended to down pants.¹⁰ Mini-skirts and jeans penetrated into the street style in the mid-1960s, and gradually became mass clothing.¹¹ That is, in times when the rock and roll music became the music of the mass, and in the Soviet pop music, twist became an official and fashionable style.

The epidemic of Big Beat and rock music

Rock music appeared in Western Ukraine approximately in 1962 in Lviv. The term “rock music” was not yet used, instead there was a title *Big Beat*. In Soviet conditions, the rock bands were officially called – *big beat ensembles*. Big beat was an early form

⁹ Михалик, М. – Лемко, І., *Львів повсякденний (1939–2009)*, Львів 2009, 137.

¹⁰ Козлов, А., *Козел на саксе*. [online: <http://lib.ru/CULTURE/MUSIC/KOZLOV/kozel_na_saxe.txt>, cit. 2015-06-29].

¹¹ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 106–108.

of pop music, typical for the UK, which influenced the rock music along with skiffle, rock'n'roll and rhythm'n'blues. As mentioned by one of the first rock musicians Yurii Sharifov: "I was present at the birth of what is now called rock music. But even then, such a term did not exist. During the first years, this music was called the big beat, and in the foreign press, the word 'rock' was not used in those years either. Rock'n'roll was used, but that was the other category. Many years later, big beat was retroactively named rock music [...] Rhythm'n'blues, sung by African-Americans, was also the music, which later became known as 'rock'. All these events occurred in front of my eyes and were not read in books – I went through it." Yurii Sharifov also speaks about the repertoire of the first Western Ukrainian rockers: "We started performing the music 'before The Beatles' – The Shadows, for example, that accompanied Cliff Richard [...] for the bigger part we've copied well known compositions, played music that is now called 'pre-Beatles period': Swinging Blue Jeans, Ventures, Les Paul..."¹² The difference between the big beat music and rock'n'roll was explained in the interviews by Yu. Sharifov – big beat is characterized by the strong bass and drums, whereas rock'n'roll traditionally lacks the beat foundation. Another important part of the rock music which made much bigger impact on it than the big beat was rhythm'n'blues. Blues was the foundation upon which rock music has evolved throughout its existence. Blues also drew together rock of that time and jazz and through blues this link was not interrupted.

The first rock bands performed at dancing evenings in clubs. One of the first groups was *Electron*, led by Yurii Sharifov, who played in the club of the plant *Lvivprylad*. Yurii Sharifov's band was the first one in Ukraine, and maybe even in the Soviet Union, that played electric guitars professionally at parties.¹³ In 1961 the first rock band was formed in the "pro-Western" Latvia. The first big beat group in the neighbouring communist Poland was established in 1959.

In 1963–1964, the Sharifov's band ousted the variety (Estrada) orchestra from the club. Later the band changed its location and was named *Vocal and instrumental ensemble of Lviv radio and television*. At that time bands usually had no names, and were called by the name of their supervisor.¹⁴

¹² Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

¹³ Юрій Шаріфов: *Дивує популярність кітчу в українській музиці*. Спількувалася О. Гутик, 17. 12. 2014, Золотий Фонд української естради. [online: <<http://www.uaestrada.org/archives/20999>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

¹⁴ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

Among the pioneers of the rock music in Lviv of that time were Volodymyr Boyarskyi, Yurii Pavlov, Boris Pivovarov, Yevhen Struts and others. Characteristic features of Lviv musicians through all these years since the early 1960s, were the high skill and technical levels, elegance and the virtuosity of performance. The greatest guitarist of the USSR, according to some estimates, whom BBC called “Soviet Eric Clapton” – Boris Pivovarov – started his career in Lviv. He practised playing the guitar for 12–14 hours a day at home and, as rumoured, even took it to the bathroom with him.¹⁵ Later, he played with the oldest jazz orchestra in the Soviet Union, namely jazz orchestra of O. Lundstrem and with some other bands, mainly from Moscow, from time to time returning to the city, particularly in the 1980s, and playing in clubs there. He died and was buried in Lviv in 1995.¹⁶ Bass guitarist Yurii Pavlov is still performing, nowadays in a jazz band *Tender-blues* (Lviv). Yevhen Struts participated in the recording of the first Soviet rock album by the Tula band *Electron*.¹⁷

The band *Lysy* (*The Foxes*), run by Chugunov, was the first one in Lviv to begin to perform their own works. They were established in the student dormitories of the Polytechnic College on the Chysta street and later – as well as Sharifov’s band – moved to a builders club *Gaz*. Il’ko Lemko (Semenov) calls *The Foxes* the most professional big beat band of the city of the 1960s.¹⁸ The name *The Foxes*, being in plural, is very similar to the names of the Western rhythm’n’blues and big beat bands: *The Searchers*, *The Ventures*, *The Animals*, *The Yardbirds* and the very well known *The Beatles*. Instrumental music dominated in the repertoire of the Western groups. In modern terminology, the main style was the closest to the surf music, there were also some attempts to get closer to hard garage rock. Thus, a group of teenagers from Kremenets of Ternopil region performed a song *Wild Thing* by *The Troggs* at a dance party.¹⁹

“Our first performance was at some school party where we shocked the teachers and cheered classmates by a song *Wild Thing* by an English group *The Troggs*. I did not even know how to adjust my guitar in a proper way, so I invented my own major tuning by pressing down the strings with one finger (the so-called Barre) changing the major guitar accords that way. There were problems with the other

¹⁵ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 124.

¹⁶ *Памяти гитариста Бориса Пивоварова*. Гурин, Сергей. Guitar Hurinmus. [online: <<http://www.guitar-hurinmus.narod.ru/pivovarov.htm>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

¹⁷ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв’ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

¹⁸ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 124.

¹⁹ Interview with Victor Morozov by Volodymyr Okarynskyi, E-mail, 2nd February 2010.

accords though; that is why, the song *Wild Thing* was a real godsend for me because there are only three accords there and all of them majeure! My first rock band included four guitarists who all carefully pinned strings with one finger”, Victor Morozov, later well-known rock musician, mentioned about his first rock band from Kremenets that existed between 1965–1968. Initially, the group was unnamed but later, when they began playing at dance parties in the local House of Culture, V. Morozov invented the name *Quo Vadis?*²⁰ That is how he later named his first Lviv rock band.²¹

In addition to the above mentioned Lviv bands, V. Morozov highlights another one, which was called *Berlin Bubis*, meaning *Berlin boys*. *Berlin Bubis* was formed by German students of one or more Lviv colleges. Ironically, being German, they made their first rock version of a Ukrainian folk song *Ty zh mene pidmanula*. This version, heard during their performances, prompted V. Morozov to create his own big beat arrangements of folk songs that he performed with *Quo Vadis?* and *Arnica* for example, *Yak ya spala na seni* and others.²²

Do It Yourself: musical instruments, amplifiers etc.

Such bands, as mentioned above, started to appear even in the secondary schools. At first, they used acoustic guitars, which cost 5–9 rubles, to which they attached electric pickups. Due to the absence of the access to professional instruments and equipment, they were made by hand. At first, there were hand-made guitars, amplifiers and speakers. Then, more complex instruments were produced after having studied various magazines about radio schemes. One of the first synthesizers was made on the basis of a sound generator scheme.²³ Yurii Sharifov made his first synthesizer from the accordion keyboard at school.²⁴ Electric guitars were made by hand, for example, Victor Morozov and his friends also made such guitars in

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Романенко, М.-А., Віктор Морозов у «Четвертому куті», *Галас*, 1997, № 9–10.

²² Interview with Victor Morozov by Volodymyr Okarynskyi, E-mail, 2nd February 2010.

²³ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 123.

²⁴ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

the mid-1960s in Kremenets secondary school. They hewed guitars by the axes and snatched pickups from the street payphones.²⁵

Since 1966, Lviv rockers, thanks to the musicians from the countries of the communist block, who began to tour there, began to buy Czech guitars *Jolana*, East German guitars *Muzima* and keyboards *Ionika*,²⁶ voice equipment *Regent* and *Vermona*. In the late 1960s, power enhancers *Marshall* appeared in the town. However, the equipment and instruments produced by the local artists, such as Zaiets, John, Zenyk, Miller, Sereda, and many others were much cheaper.²⁷ Yurii Sharifov managed to buy one of the first amplifiers *Marshall* and musicians came to visit him and take a look at it as at a museum showpiece.²⁸

There were many more electronic instruments in Western Ukraine than in the imperial centre of Moscow. In the late 1970s, the leader of one of the first jazz rock bands of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kozlov visited a Chernivtsi musician Gamma Skupinski during his tour where he saw the latest and also expensive instruments even for the contemporary European standards. Kozlov and other Moscow jazz rockers began to buy instruments through their Ukrainian colleagues.²⁹

The main places where young people could listen to contemporary rock music or beat music, and also dance, were clubs. Even in the late 1960s, the demand and the popularity of the clubs was so great, that visiting a club, in which a beat-band was performing, could become a problem. As the halls were overcrowded, people were sometimes standing in a line 3–4 hours in advance near the cashier window of the builders club *Gaz*, where Sharifov's band and *Lysy* performed, in order to get their tickets.³⁰

²⁵ Interview with Victor Morozov by Volodymyr Okarynskyi, E-mail, 2nd February 2010.

²⁶ East German compact electric organ (synthesizer), released in 1959.

²⁷ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 123.

²⁸ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

²⁹ Козлов, А., *Козел на саксе*. [online: <http://lib.ru/CULTURE/MUSIC/KOZLOV/kozel_na_saxe.txt>, cit. 2015-06-29].

³⁰ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів, 2003, 123.

Evolution: Big Beat – blues – fusion

In the late 1960s, the dominant trends which replaced the big beat in the repertoire of rock bands were blues – like the music of British band *Cream*, as well as jazz rock (for example, *Blood, Sweat & Tears* and *Chicago*). The first trend was represented by the band *Oreol* and Trio of Ihor Sulyha, Yurii Sharifov and Yurii Bashmet formed in the late 1960s. Yurii Bashmet (now a world-famous violinist) was a guitarist in the Trio, Ihor Sulyha, who now plays in the famous V. Spivakov's chamber orchestra *Virtuosos of Moscow* now, played the drums, and Yurii Sharifov, as always, played the bass. The band performed works of Jimi Hendrix, Eric Clapton, *Cream*, *Led Zeppelin* at the dance parties. This high quality music was copied and imitated, snatched on the tape recordings.³¹ Although the musicians already had their own repertoire, they still played Western songs as close to the original as it was possible, copying the “brand” sound. For the listeners, this created an illusion of presence at a real concert of Western rock stars, and with them – in the Western “free” world.

Visually, the evolution of the Ukrainian musicians from the big beat and rhythm & blues to jazz can be seen in a Lviv band *Arnica*, which was formed on the basis of groups *Quo Vadis?* and *Eureka* in 1972. Victor Morozov, Victoria Vradii, Volodymyr Kit, Ivan Hospodarets and others (later well-known rock and jazz musicians) performed in *Arnica*. Jazz rock with a strong wind instruments section dominated during the early to mid-1970s. In 1972, the All-Union record company *Melodia* released *Arnica's* album on a vinyl disk, on which jazz, art, progressive and psychedelic rock suite *Vesna (Spring)* was recorded for the first time in the USSR.³²

“Hostile” and “friendly” voices: Rock music on TV and radio

The youth had the opportunity to get acquainted with Western music through radio and television. In Lviv, and later in other areas close to the border, the role of an affordable translator of Western popular musical movements was fulfilled by the

³¹ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

³² Вініловий диск-гігант С 60–05183-4 «Естрадний ансамбль Арніка». Всесоюзна фірма грам-запису *Мелодія* (1972).

Polish Radio – Warsaw – on long waves. With the spread of television, Polish programs could be viewed, including jazz and rock concerts. For example, in 1967, a live concert of the British band *The Rolling Stones* in Warsaw was broadcasted on TV.

The opportunity to hear high-quality Western pop and rock music appeared also on the local Lviv radio. Yurii Sharifov tried himself the role of a radio DJ, and was also the first presenter who broadcasted Western quality “brand” music on the radio. At that time, there was a terrible censorship in the capital of the USSR and in other cities. Live broadcasts were not allowed, lists of songs and even their texts were checked and censored. Such censorship existed on Lviv radio too, however, the editor showed some tolerance and along with the songs of Charles Aznavour or Elvis Presley, *The Rolling Stones* and *The Beatles* were also broadcasted despite not being accepted by the government and the official culture. These were the first DJ programs of the Western music and rock music in Ukraine together with *Music box*, with Martha Kinasevych, broadcasted from 1965 once a week on Saturday, lasting only for 15 minutes. All the texts of all songs had been previously approved by the department of the ideological work of regional Communist party committee.³³

More rock music could be heard from foreign radios, not only socialist and “friendly” countries of Eastern Europe, but also from “capitalist” countries behind the Iron Curtain. These were the so-called *hostile voices* – Western radio stations, which were muted by the special generators of noise by order of the government. Nevertheless, the transfer of some radio stations, often in terrible quality, reached the Ukrainian youth, such as *Radio Luxembourg* from London, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Romanian service *Radio Freedom*, including the Romanian edition *Europa Liberă* with its music editor and radio presenter Radu Teodor Maltopol. Russian Service BBC, *Voice of America* and *Radio Sweden* were also listened to. With the popularity of the radio, there was a fashion for “radio interception” – recording favourite songs from radio to tape. Of course, the sound quality of these recordings was terrible, sometimes it was even hard to guess the name of the song.

Music contraband and foreign magazines. Beatlemania

There were also records, including discs, that were brought from abroad by diplomats, the Communist nomenclature, sailors, athletes, and foreign students. Foreign students

³³ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 121.

were expected after the holidays with a special impatience. In addition, since 1960, parcels from the relatives abroad were allowed in Western Ukraine (mainly from Poland, USA, Canada). Since the mid-1960s, people were allowed to visit the direct relatives in Poland. So, people began to bring brand discs and records of Western artists on discs by the Polish recording company *Muza*. There was a whole layer of enterprising people who illegally traded vinyl records or tape records. Prices on vinyl discs ranged from 40 to 60 rubles, and some albums, like Jimi Hendrix's ones, reached 170 rubles (a salary of a well-paid chief of a shop of Lviv Bus Factory). Therefore, already in July and August 1967, vinyl disk of *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band* by *The Beatles* could be bought for 40–50 rubles in Lviv. Two little vinyl discs (EP) of *Magical Mystery Tour* could be bought cheaper – for 30 rubles. To earn this amount of money, an ordinary young Lviv citizen had to work for 4 days unloading train cars.³⁴

Since vinyl discs were very expensive, they were copied on reels. In the second half of the 1960s, “music on ribs” was gradually replaced by the records on tape. The cost of such a recording was 2 rubles at first and later 3 rubles. People, who recorded them, also compiled the collections of the songs. However, these people were chased by the police and their equipment was often confiscated.³⁵

Other sources of information about Western rock music were the foreign magazines, as the Soviet press published only a very small amount of the information and usually only of critical nature, where rock music was portrayed as a syndrome of decline (or “decay”) of capitalism (“bourgeois”) society. However, there was a bigger amount of information about Western music in the Polish magazine *Kobieta i Życie* and *Panorama*, and the Czech magazine *Melodie*. They could be freely subscribed. The quickest enterprising people copied the covers of the Western magazines and even newspaper photos of *The Beatles*, *The Rolling Stones*, *The Kinks* and other groups. These photos were offered at schools where students could buy them during the school breaks between the lessons for 30–40 cents a piece.³⁶ Later in the 1970s, specialized magazines about popular music from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany became popular, for example – *Džuboks*, *Melody Maker*, *Melodie und Rhythmus* and others.

Sociocultural phenomenon of *Beatlemania* appeared in Western Ukraine in the second half of the 1960s. It started abroad in 1963 – exalted admiration of the music played by *The Beatles* and all the associated with the “Liverpool four”. Thus,

³⁴ Ibidem, 118–119.

³⁵ Михалик, М. – Лемко, І., *Львів повсякденний (1939–2009)*, Львів 2009, 141.

³⁶ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 120–121.

there were fans of the group also in Lviv. In 1965, a fan of *The Beatles* nicknamed *Valet (Jack)*, was the first one in the city to wear long hair and was the object of imitation of youth. This fashion spread even over the schoolchildren. *The Beatles* fans were also haunted because of the long hair like *stilyagi* in the past. In autumn of 1966, the exalted *The Beatles* fans have even paraded the streets, overturned waste bins and sang *Yellow Submarine*. After the release of the album *Sergeant Pepper...*, it became fashionable to wear tunics and army cap and blow into the tube, and the Soviet Army sergeants were stopped on the street and treated with cheap beer or wine, or so-called *ink*.³⁷

Lviv heroes and rock music club boom

Thus, the most rapid development of rock music in Lviv occurred from the late 1960s till early 1970s. In the early 1970s, a number of quality artists and bands increased, allowing some of them to gain nationwide popularity. According to many people, the best Lviv rock band at that time was *Oreol* which performed in the builders club from the early 1970s with its famous lead guitarist Oleksandr Balaban.³⁸ For others, the best was *Arnica*, formed in early 1972 after the merging of the big beat band *Eureka* (leader Yurii Varum) from the Lviv region pharmaceutical department and the band of Lviv Physics and Mechanical Institute *Quo Vadis?*. The latter one, although amateur, was the winner of the *Lviv Spring* in 1971 and teamed with a professional band *Eureka* which was unsuccessful at this festival. The band name *Arnica* appeared before the zoning selection of the All-Union competition in Chernivtsi *Hello, we are looking for the talents!*. It was a symbol of a pharmacy flower, which corresponded to the Accessories group of pharmaceuticals. In addition, the name proposed by the worker of the pharmaceuticals company Volodymyr Zinykha, was accepted by the young musicians also because of the fact that in Ukrainian slang, it had an erotic name *kripkostiy* (implying erection) being a natural aphrodisiac for men and used to prevent pregnancy by women.³⁹

Initially, *Arnica* (in 1972) included Victor Morozov, Viktor Kanaev, Myroslav Tsyupak (all – vocals, guitar), vocalists Volodymyr Vasiliev (also artistic director),

³⁷ Ibidem, 115–117.

³⁸ Энциклопедия украинской поп-музыки: Новая Черемшина. [online: <<http://kmstudio.com.ua/index.php?nma=cherem&fla=index>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

³⁹ Interview with Victor Morozov by Volodymyr Okarynskyi, E-mail, 2nd February 2010.

Olga Shcherbakova and Myroslava Vorko, Ihor Hun'ko (bass guitar), Ivan Hospodarets (drums), Orest Dutko (keyboards), Volodymyr Kit (trumpet, musical director), Bogdan Zaiats' (trombone). Later, in 1974–1975, Kanaev, Tsyupak, Shcherbakova, Vorko, Dutko and Kit left *Arnica*, and Volodymyr Kopot' (trumpet), Victoria Vradii (keyboards, vocals – then only vocals), Valentyn Nesterenko (solo guitar), Valeriy Halycia (keyboards) joined. Victor Morozov became a musical director after Kit's departure.⁴⁰ Victoria Vradii, who began her musical career with *Arnica*, became famous as *Sister Vika* or simply *Vika* in the late 1980s and gained the status of an Ukrainian rock legend. One of the songs that Victoria Vradii wrote before *Arnica* was created and has entered the repertoire of the ensemble was *Lullaby* with lyrics by Ukrainian avant-garde poet and writer Mike Johansen who was executed during the Stalinist terror.

In the 1970s, the agiotage around the band performances was really great, especially those of *Arnica's* and several others: "Our band *Arnica* was super popular. It was the '73 or '74 year. We just played at a police dance club. It was impossible to get there. The real ticket cost was 10 cents, but they were resold for 10 rubles," remembers Victor Morozov.⁴¹

We tried to make a list of the most significant rock bands that existed and legally performed in the 1970s in Lviv, preferably in different "houses of culture", cafes, international clubs and on dancing floors. In Lviv, except for *Arnica* and *Oreol*, there were also such bands like the *Prometheus*, *Lviviany*, *Victoria*, *Blicky*, *Electron*, *Mandry*, *Fregat*, *Labirynt*, some of them were underground bands – as *Super Vuyky*. Rock band *Oreol*, led by guitarist-virtuoso Olexandr Balaban, played in *Gaz*, *Prometheus* – in *Liap*, *Arnica* – in the police club, *Lviviany* with Alec Levinson in *Energio*.⁴² The musicians that played in clubs often introduced the best works of Western rock bands to the young audience. *Mandry* had hits of such groups as *Deep Purple*, *Slade*, *The Sweet*, *Pink Floyd*, *Black Sabbath*, *Blood, Sweat & Tears*, *Chicago* in their repertoire in the 1970s.⁴³ Thus, one may see a range of styles from hard rock, progress rock and jazz rock to glam rock. *Mandry* broke up in 1976. In 1975, the famous *Arnica* (and a rival of the band *Mandry*) performed pieces of such Western blues, hard rock and jazz rockers as *Led Zeppelin*, *Deep Purple* and *The Sweet*, and pop and glam rock

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

⁴¹ Романенко, М.–А., Віктор Морозов у «Четвертому куті», *Галас*, 1997, № 9–10.

⁴² Datsyuk, L., Opening remarks before the re-union concert of the rock band *Super Vuyky* in the club *Picasso*, Lviv, 4. 12. 2011.

⁴³ *Мандри* (Львівські Мандри, Зе Мандри, *The Mandry*). Львівський музичний шпигун. [online: <<http://lvivmusicpsy.livejournal.com/1462.html>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

like *The Rubettes* in addition to their own songs. Communist authorities had to take into account the popularity of rock music among youth. The leader of *Oreol* Oleksandr Balaban says: “Oreol, in spite of the Komsomol, still played contemporary music. Besides, Komsomol often spoiled our work, but later they understood that it was better for them to ‘adjust’ to us. [...] Because we’ve always had enough thankful listeners, and we were liked, so Komsomol changed its mind about whether we were needed.”⁴⁴

Taming: Philharmonic and VIA

Rock music was not an official style, it existed only in the clubs (which also dominated in the 1970s). On radio and television, there existed only the official Soviet music. However, after the defeat of the Prague Spring in 1968, the implementation of the ban on rock music began. In order to get a legal status and thus get rid of possible persecution, some rock bands tried to get an official status. In addition, it enabled bands to have regular performances, the opportunity to purchase equipment and to get salaries. Thus, the so-called *Vocal-instrumental ensembles* (abbreviation VIA) started to appear. Yurii Sharifov says: “VIA emerged when the bands started to be employed in the Philharmonic. It was a purely nomenclature definition, made only ‘for the paper’ – the performer of the vocal and instrumental ensemble played and sang, and received, respectively, more than just an instrumentalist. So, paradoxically, even purely instrumental groups were often called VIA.”⁴⁵

Thus, in the second half of the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, a number of rock bands went to work in the Philharmonic – the government agency to organize concerts. These bands were *Vocal-instrumental ensembles* (VIA) and received a salary. However, wages for official status were restricting freedom for creativity. The repertoire of the VIAs for 80 % consisted of works written by the members of the Union of Soviet Composers who had a remote relationship to rock music. To reduce the harm of this status and to perform fewer songs by the Soviet composers, musicians included some instrumental versions of foreign works of rock music in their repertoire together with rock arrangements of folk songs.

⁴⁴ Корнелюк, І., Блюз для дорослих, *Поступ*, 2006.

⁴⁵ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

A band *Smerichka* from Kitsman of Chernivtsi region, established in 1966, was one of the first bands that played pop and rock music and started to cooperate with the official genres of pop music (*Estrada*) and folklore, combining them with their own music in a kind of a surrogate. This pseudo-folklore, which used pop and rock elements and was proposed by the musical director of *Smerichka* Levko Dutkovskiy became a model for the Philharmonic music genre *VIA*. *Smerichka* got a job in Chernivtsi Philharmonic and it was one of the first VIAs. It was followed by other bands from other regional Philharmonics. *Smerichka* also created a standard for appearance – concert costume based on traditional village Ukrainian clothes. Ensembles often performed together with the folk dance groups.⁴⁶ Elements of rock music dissolved in such a variety and quasi-folk repertoire.

The migration of musicians from the cities of Western Ukraine into the entire Soviet Union started especially from Lviv and a little less from Chernivtsi. Yu. Sharifov, an active member of rock and pop life of that time, described genre *VIA* and its relationship to rock music as followed: “Then began the harassment and later a new generation grew up in towns and villages which did not feel and understand the urban music. At that time, the popularity of Western Ukraine, Chernivtsi in particular, grew – *Ivasiuk*, meaning pop folk music. All this situation has scattered into many years – rock musicians went to Philharmonic because it gave them a status of professionalism, and when they went on tour, they dissipated around the Union. The idea of rock music began to be spoken out. In Ukraine, rock musicians were more forbidden than in Russia – it was impossible to perform, there was no place to perform, and many of the musicians went to Russia. Basically, rock music existed in Russia but not in Ukraine.”⁴⁷

Nevertheless, such tendencies became dominant only in the second half of the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1970s, musicians had illusions about the symbiosis between rock music and the official culture. Rock critics believe that 1971–1972 years were the most flourishing for the rock culture throughout the USSR. Along with the above mentioned rock bands, some *VIA* used elements of rock music, jazz, funk in their songs based on folk and pop fairly well. These were the *Vatra* (*Bonfire*) (Lviv), *Smerichka* (Chernivtsi), *Opryshky* (Ivano-Frankivsk). Stylistically, they developed through: folk-pop with some instrumental excursion into the sphere of jazz rock. Band *Svitiaz* from the Volyn (Lutsk) Philharmonic was oriented on jazz rock, *Zhyva Voda* (*Water of Life*) from Chernivtsi (led by Sharifov) on funk.

⁴⁶ Брицький, П., Левко Дутковський – творець «Смерічки» (Вижницький період – з 25 серпня 1966 р. по 31 березня 1973 р.), *Буковинський журнал*, 2003, № 3–4, 245–257.

⁴⁷ Юрій Шаріфов (два інтерв'ю, 2003): *Львів. Форум Рідного Міста*. [online: <<http://misto.ridne.net/viewthread.php?tid=687>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

Repertoire for *Smerichka* was created by the composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk, and under his influence, other groups also began to take the repertoire of his songs or create their songs similar to his. After a brief rise in the early 70s, this trend was gradually spoiled by the multiple “remakes”/variations. The analogue of acoustic Philharmonic folk rock with the elements of country music appeared at that time, too. For example, trio *Marenych* or *Medobory* from Ternopil. This genre also suffered from some spoiling and became more primitive.⁴⁸

The fight against rock music: prohibitions, persecution, crowding out

However, the authorities began to deliberately displace rock music. This coincided with the persecution of dissidents and various manifestations of dissent, in general and neo-Stalinist Soviet leadership, of course. After the removal from the post of Ukrainian Communist leadership, P. Shelest began the fight against manifestations of national identity in 1972, including the attempts to give Ukrainian colouring to rock music. The official bands, which were dependent on the state, were also involved in this struggle. National elements began to pursue as elements of rock music. National elements were seen as a manifestation of the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”.

The first example of persecution and taking an official band under full control was a case *Vatra*, which worked for the Lviv Philharmonic. Its leader, Mykhailo Manuliak, tried to combine folk and jazz rock. Their repertoire consisted almost exclusively of Ukrainian songs and jazz rock arrangements of Ukrainian folk songs. In 1971, the group successfully toured Soviet republics of the Caucasus, as it had positive reviews in the press. However, after touring, the KGB started to be interested in Mykhailo Manuliak who had contacts with dissidents and nationally oriented intellectuals. They wanted to persuade him to cooperate. After his refusal, Manuliak was removed from the leadership of *Vatra* and fired from the Philharmonic. Some Lviv intellectuals, who themselves were under the supervision of the KGB, wrote an open letter in defence of M. Manuliak and later got to jail, such as Ihor and Iryna Kalynets and Stephania Shabaturo. Manuliak was offered to break the relationship with Kalynets and change his repertoire. The leader of the band tried

⁴⁸ Рок-музыка в СССР. Опыт популярной энциклопедии, сост. А. К. Троицкий, Москва 1990, 345.

to hide the authorship of I. Kalynets and H. Chubai, who were also under the investigation. It did not help either. Mykhailo Manuliak was removed, he was not allowed to go to the Philharmonic and all the recorded songs of the unreliable poets were erased from the tape at the Lviv radio under the special supervision of the Communist Party official Iaremchuk.⁴⁹ After M. Manuliak having been accused of nationalism and his further elimination in the same year together with another leader, Bohdan Kudla, *Vatra* gradually turned into an ordinary Philharmonic *VIA* without any rock and jazz elements.

Songs performed by *Arnica* were also considered to be in the category of the false ideological and nationalistic pieces. Thus, in 1972, *Arnica* debuted and immediately became a winner at the All-Union television contest *Hello, we are looking for the talents!*. Returning from Moscow, musicians hoped for an enthusiastic welcome, but were ordered to immediately disband the team instead. The song-winner *Chorna rillia izorana* of the Ukrainian folk genre, the song of the 14th century as claimed by Ivan Franko, contained harmful nationalistic echoes according to officials of Lviv “culture”. The band was saved by the head of Pharmaceutical Company Vira Vasilieva. She was searching the libraries for the collections of folk songs, showed them to officials and took the musicians on bail. She arranged Victor Morozov as her loader and thus saved him from expulsion from Komsomol.⁵⁰

Instead, Victor Morozov, one semester before graduation of the faculty of the English philology, was excluded from the Lviv National University, together with his friend Oleg Lysheha (now a well-known Ukrainian poet) – their works were published in Hrytsko Chubai’s literary manuscript journal *Skrynia (Chest)*.⁵¹

Some individual songs were prohibited, too. Thus, a song by Victor Morozov on the words of Mykhailo Sachenko, *Metelyk (Butterfly)* was “found” sexually suggestive and banned by the personal instructions of the Central Committee of Communist Party First Secretary V. Shcherbytskyi. Vocalist of the band *Mandry*, Orest Zhukevych, who performed this song, was punished for the performance of this song.⁵²

Some songs on the words of famous poets were prohibited, too. Bohdan-Ihor Antonych, Oleksandr Oles, Vasyl Symonenko and others were on the list of banned authors. Union of Composers of the USSR imposed a ban on recording and

⁴⁹ Панчишин, А., Мало хто знає, що знаменитий «Ватрі» виповнилося 25 років, *Експрес*, 1996, № 2, 10–18.

⁵⁰ Рок-музыка в СССР. Опыт популярной энциклопедии, сост. А. К. Троицкий, Москва 1990, 345.

⁵¹ Малкович, І., «Не від того я помру...», *Україна*, 1988, № 32, 24–25.

⁵² Руднев, Ю., *The Mandrivka у часі (репортаж). Продюсерський центр Jazz in Kiev*. [online: <http://www.jazzinkiev.com/?page=news_id&news_id=177>, cit. 2015-06-29].

broadcasting the Ukrainian folk songs in the rock groups' variations. Editors of TV and radio were instructed not to let anything that had rock colouring in the air. The argument for refusing radio and television broadcasting of any new music (which sometimes was active even in the 1990s) was "unprofessionalism." These measures achieved a goal: the extinction of Ukrainian rock music became a matter of time. In those years, Ukraine had no private studios for recording high-quality rock music, there were no rock clubs and other unifying structures. The only way for recognition remained free concerts in schools and houses of culture on the outskirts of cities.⁵³ So, the government pushed rock music to periphery.

Hippie, underground & hard-rock guerrillas

In addition to the officially controlled VIAs in the second half of the 1970s, there was a layer of independent rock bands. Its main habitats were youth "hangouts" and hippie subculture. The location of Lviv rockers and later hippies was the abandoned monastery of Discalced Carmelite located on Lysenko street and Darwin along with the regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. It was called the *Holy Garden*, and even *the Republic of Holy Garden* was formed there on 12th October 1968. Rockers, hippies, local hooligans, *chuvaky* (dudes), girls – *hnydli*, simply alternative youth were hanging out there. Young nonconformists, some of whom went there for several years, decided to create this kind of commune-free territory, a place to hang out. This place was a parody (banter or *stiob*) over the communist state, instinctive protest against it. Originally, it was called *the Republic of the Underdeveloped Bashkirs*, later renamed simply into the *Republic of the Holy Garden*. The *Garden* was located in the central part, high on the hill, surrounded by neighbourhoods and monastery walls, and therefore hard to be reached by the *druzhyhnyky*. The courtyard of the monastery became a real bastion for all the freedom-loving people.⁵⁴ The slogan-greetings in the *Garden* was *Srav pes!* (*Dog shit!*). And the reply was: *Na KPRS!* (on Communist Party of the Soviet Union). There were different variations of the slogan, such as *Dog pooped on a red clover!* or *Dog pooped! Barbed wire on red clover!* In these obscene slogans, there veiled hints on the communist system and

⁵³ Рок-музыка в СССР. Опыт популярной энциклопедии, сост. А. К. Троицкий, Москва 1990, 342.

⁵⁴ Лемко, І., Республіка Святого Саду, in: *Хіпні у Львові: альманах*, ред. І. Банах, Львів 2011, 56–57.

its repressive policies and the iron curtain could be seen.⁵⁵ One of the *Garden's* members Kazik painted the Carmelite monastery church tower with a white coat of arms against green flag, which was the Ukrainian *trident*. Under the trident, two crossed leaves of a walnut – a sacred plant of the *Holy Garden*, were depicted, with a football between them.⁵⁶ There was also an anthem of the *Holy Garden* written by Il'ko Lemko.

Republic was permeated with the spirit of rock music. It got its name in memory of the abandoned monastery of a *Holy (Sviatyi)* – Serhiy Mardakov who lived near the monastery. He was also a *Prime Minister of the Republic*. The first and the last president was biennium Ilia Semenov – Il'ko Lemko in 1975–1981.⁵⁷ The unofficial position of the *Minister of Culture* was held by Young, who had superiority in knowledge of rock music news.⁵⁸

A band *Super Vuyky* was an important part of this place; it was formed in 1975. It was a Nonconformist underground rock band. Its name *Vuyky (The Uncles)* or *Super Vuyky* implies its meaning. The name “vuyko” was used to call “old-fashioned” (*hillbilly, country bumpkin, hick*) people of Galicia at that time, who were not assimilated into the “progressive” Soviet society. An American historian William Risch sees a form of protest in this name.⁵⁹ Instead, one of the first members of the band *Vuyky* D. Kuzovkin – *Kazik* explains this name as the depiction of the realities of socio-cultural relations, including conflicts in the urban area in Lviv. In the minds of the newcomers occupants, the word “vuyky” was a figurative designation of local Western population.⁶⁰ Soon, the native-born people of Lviv (these were often children of mixed Ukrainian-Polish families) called “vuyky” rural indigenous people whom they disliked a lot. Gradually, the word *vuyko* was replaced by a word *rahul'* (primitive villager). Thus, if the rock band of which we speak existed now, it would be called not *Vuyky* but *Rahuli*.⁶¹

Vuyky played mostly blues and hard rock, partially art rock. In the first period of their existence, they carefully copied Western bands such as *Led Zeppelin*, *Deep*

⁵⁵ Risch, W. J., Soviet 'Flower Children': Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s L'viv, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2005, vol. 40, no. 3, 580–581.

⁵⁶ Лемко, І., *Сни у Святому Саду*, Львів 2010.

⁵⁷ Lemkos – is the Western ethnographic group in Ukraine.

⁵⁸ Олісевич, А., «Peace – Love – Freedom – Rock'n'roll», in: *Хитні у Львові: альманах*, ред. І. Банах, Львів 2011, 54–55; Лемко, І., *Сни у Святому Саду*, Львів 2010.

⁵⁹ Risch, W. J., Soviet 'Flower Children': Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s L'viv, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2005, vol. 40, no. 3, 580.

⁶⁰ In the central and Eastern Ukraine was the same name “zhloby”.

⁶¹ Кузовкін, Д., Уроки «Вуйків», in: *Хитні у Львові*, ред. І. Банах, Львів 2011, 81.

Purple, The Doors, Rainbow and others. Their music director was a student of Lviv National University Il'ko Lemko (solo guitar). The administrator was *Sviatyi*, who was also the rhythm guitarist and partially a vocalist; sound technicians were *Pinochet* (Yurii Rodionov) and his assistant *Kaptar* (Marek Adamovskyi). The first equipment of this band was homemade. Almost all the rockers were self-taught (except *Rozhok* – I. Ryzhok), however, quickly reached a high performance technique thanks to daily rehearsals. They continued (according Lemko): three hours on solo guitar, three hours on piano and three hours together. Actual rehearsals, as well as performances (sessions), took place in the *Holy Garden*. Charismatic leader of the band was the drummer and vocalist, an Argentinian immigrant of Ukrainian descent Juan Carlos Kotsiumbas or *Carlo*. His specific rock vocal was described as one of the greatest in the USSR. Carlos disclosed his voice possibilities in the song *Telegram* of the Scottish rock band *Nazareth*. After the collapse of the *Super Vuyky* band, Carlo started with drugs and died in 1984. After his death, the community of the *Holy Garden* also broke down.

Soon, *Vuyky* gained a cult status among hippies of the USSR, some came specifically to hear this rock band. Although the primary *Vuyky's* audience were the hippies, *heavy* rock played by this band was not very hippie music. During this period, *Vuyky* tried to reproduce the original versions of rock songs as accurately as possible, and by doing so, they achieved technical perfection. Improvised sessions appeared several times in the *Holy Garden* and were visited by young people from different parts of the USSR. Some of sessions grew into mini-festivals and gained a considerable publicity: 10th June 1976 with 100 people who came from different cities of the Soviet Union, two more in 1977: the first involving 300 participants and the second one on 18th September 1977, in the memory of Jimi Hendrix. The last session that was held in the memory of the cult figure of rock guitarist Jimi Hendrix on 18th September 1977 ended with mass arrests (up to 500 people). The point is that on 17th September there was an officially celebrated date of the so-called “reunification” of Western Ukraine from the USSR and the influx of hippies from all over the Soviet Union, according to Party authorities prevented ceremonial activities.⁶²

Later, *Vuyky* created its own repertoire in English and Ukrainian languages. Own songs were: *Bashkirs Rock, To Be Pocket* (1975), *Bad World* (1976), *Hot Shock* (1978), *We all walk in the garden*. This song, as well as *Here I am, a dude, Looser, Plain*,

⁶² Олісевич, О. та ін., «Якщо світові буде потрібно, я віддам своє життя не задумуючись – заради свободи» (інтерв'ю з Олегом Олісевичем), *І: незалежний культурологічний часопис*, 2002, № 24, 151–152.

Statistics, written during 1979–1981 were the main repertoire of the band *Vuyky* – one of the first among the independent rock bands. A song *The Red Clover Blossomed* (1979), which had a satirical anti-Soviet content grew very popular. The slogan *Srav pes!* was borrowed from this song.⁶³ *Vuyky*'s fans drew this slogan all over the walls of the houses in Lviv.

Besides the *Holy Garden*, *Vuyky* could appear only in clubs and on the periphery of the city and in schools on graduation parties. First, their appearance was in May 1975 in a club in Lysynychi in the outskirts of the city, after that, the group became known. In 1976–1978, *Vuyky* performed at the club in Sykhyv, then in the club of the *Glass plant*, club *Energo* at Stryiskyi Park (1979). It was there, when the band played their repertoire to the public for the first time. However, soon after the fight during a performance, the restaurant administration refused their services. The group became popular among urban youth, however, the excitement frightened the staff of the clubs. According to Yu. Peretiatko, a rock connoisseur, *Super Vuyky* was accompanied by the cyclical developments of the script: excitement – full room – provocation – the refusal of the administration of further cooperation.⁶⁴ Even greater success has accompanied *Super Vuyky* in the club *Liapa* at the railway station. There, one of the most famous rock singers of the Soviet era *perestroika* Viacheslav *Nazareth* Sinchuk performed together with the band for the first time.⁶⁵

Vuyky's performances at the prom parties at schools also caused a great excitement. Electricity was often switched off during the performances and some of them ended crackdown by police. Therefore, *Super Vuyky* tried to hide under other official names (*Rhythms of the Carpathians*, a Chilean group *No pasaran!* etc). On 12th November 1981 when the management of secondary school number 60, turned off the electricity during the show of *Vuyky* and called the police, the musicians were arrested and their equipment was confiscated. After that, outraged students – graduates staged a public disorder. In fact, it was a spontaneous demonstration.⁶⁶ After this incident, rock band ceased to exist.

Another hard rock band that gained a cult status in Galicia was *Hutsuly* (*Hutsuls*) from the town Kosiv of Ivano-Frankivsk region. They were founded on the eve of the new 1970. Apparently, it was not a coincidence that the band appeared in such provincial place. Through art educational institution *Kosiv College of Crafts*, in which

⁶³ Перетятко, Ю., *Львівський рок 1962–1992*, Львів 1995, 7–8.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, 11.

⁶⁵ Лемко, І., *Сни у Святому Саду*, Львів 2010.

⁶⁶ Джубокс, «Вуйки більше не засвітять...», in: *Хіпні у Львові: альманах*, ред. І. Банах, Львів 2011, 73.

many future artists studied, the artistic atmosphere was created. Some college students played in the band *Hutsuly*. They performed hard rock and early heavy metal. At that time, this tough music was not performed by anybody else on the periphery yet. They also listened to “hostile voices” – Western radio stations. In addition, their colleague Volodymyr Boyko, who was then studying at Kiev University, got records of the rock bands from the foreign students. *Hutsuly* at first copied the songs of Western rock bands, sometimes replacing the original texts by the texts of their own on the Hutsul dialect. The most famous work was the processing of song *Paranoid* by *Black Sabbath*. They also played instrumental works, then began to do some hard rock style versions of folk songs and then made and carried out their own works.⁶⁷

Hutsuly stubbornly refused to acknowledge the official status; only for a short time they settled down in Khmelnytskyi Philharmonic, which allowed them to get the necessary equipment. This did not prevent *Hutsuly* from performing at any parties and even at weddings in Hutsul region. Sometimes, they had concerts in other cities, including Lviv in 1974–1975 years: first at the Institute of Arts and Crafts, and in the international clubs. The guitarist of *Hutsuly* Iaroslav Ududiak had special success (a.k.a. *Gyeba*). This group combined “heavy” rock with mock-grotesque texts on current issues that were sung in Hutsul dialect, such as *About the Passport*, *About Jeans*, *Limousine “Zhiguli”*, *Teeth*, *My Teeth*. *Hutsuly* managed to perform in the District (*rayon*) House of Culture.

Interestingly, several musicians who later played in professional VIA, performed in this nonconformist group: Valeri ‘*Lenin*’ Tkachenko, Volodymyr Prokopyk. Rock band *Hutsuly* also avoided accusations of nationalism and persecution by the KGB. According to a group member Liubomyr Havrysh, “...there were articles written against us, we were dispersed, summoned to the Communist Party, questioned by the KGB, because then in the 1974, we’ve hung national flags over the district committees of the party, the KGB chief visited and questioned. [...] Well, what about us? We are musicians, not politicians! We loved everything here, because we were born here!”⁶⁸ However, there was a lot of opposition, while in 1978 the band was dispersed until 1988 when was recovered.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Гуцульський рок з Косова, *Галицький кореспондент*, 2009, № 38 (214).

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁹ Роконата, *Червона рута: Вісник фестивалю*, 1989, № 3, 2–3.

Rock music in alternative space: bohemians & hangouts

For the youngsters, rock music was an expression of freedom, an alternative to the dominant Soviet culture. This music was perceived as a breath of freedom. Common listening of the new album or broadcasting was practiced. Thus, after the *White Album of The Beatles* I. Semenov and his friends gathered in the attic of a house, brought electricity there and listened to the entire album, which consisted of two discs. The best song was chosen with the help of a poll.⁷⁰

The audience of rock music was mainly alternative youth, hippies, punks, young intellectuals, Bohemians. Thus, Lviv poet Hrytsko Chubai and his entourage promoted jazz and rock music. To this group, in which Chubai was a leader and senior fellow, well-known Ukrainian intellectuals later belonged to, together with literary Bohemians, including cultural scientist, poet and translator Mykola Riabchuk, his fellow student at the University, rocker and translator Victor Morozov, graphic artists Yurko Kokh and Vlodko Kaufman, poet Oleh Lysheha, writer Yurko Vynnychuk. Perhaps by chance, a son of H. Chubai, Taras, who grew up on rock music and jazz in a family with big audio library, later became a rock musician and a leader of the band *Plach Ieremii* and set many poems of his father to music. His father took him to see *Arnica* rehearsals and other concerts from early age. Significantly, almost all of the surrounding Hrytsko Chubai people were not from Lviv, but provincials. Rock music has influenced not only their individualities but also reflected in their future life.⁷¹

The possibility that legally allowed to listen to the quality rock and pop music were the performances of the musicians from communist bloc countries, such as the concert of the Polish composer, musician and singer Czeslaw Niemen in 1976 in Lviv. Especially popular among the fans of rock music were the Hungarian rock and pop bands *Locomotiv GT*, *Corvina*, *Illés*, *Omega*, *Piramis*.⁷²

In the late 1970s – except blues, fusion and hard rock – psychedelic rock, progressive rock, art rock and heavy metal were spread here. However, at the same time, with the fashion to style disco, in the clubs and dancing floors live performances

⁷⁰ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 122.

⁷¹ Москалець, К., *Гра триває. Літературна критика та есеїстика*. [online: <<http://coollib.com/b/160311/read>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

⁷² Datsyuk, L., Opening remarks before the concert of the rock band *Super Vuyky* in the club *Picasso*, Lviv, 4. 12. 2011.

of rock bands began to become displaced by the magnetic recordings, light shows discos and kind of DJ discos.⁷³

This is not the end, or the decline before the revival (early 80's)

In the worst situation, rock music was, together with the new trends of Western pop music, in 1983–1984. At that time, the prosecution of the rock music around the USSR, even around Moscow became very powerful. *All-Union Scientific-Methodological Centre* of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR recommended to ban any playing of the tape recordings of the Soviet “amateur rock groups in the works of which the distortion of the Soviet reality was depicted and the ideas, alien to our society were propagandized”. Into the list of such bands “that by its activities may harm the ideological and moral and aesthetic education of youth”, some Western and Russian bands and from Ukraine rock bands *Winter Garden* (Kyiv) and *Kord* (Chernivtsi) were included. It was recommended to check the recording studios and the discotheques. The reason for this recommendation and the ban was the fact, that “the interest of the foreign tourists in the works of some amateur Soviet rock groups grew rapidly, and the fact that the radio broadcasts of their works in foreign countries became very popular...”⁷⁴ At that time, a number of bands that had an official Philharmonic status and tried to play rock music were ousted from Ukraine. Among those was the Lviv band *Oreol* with its leader Olexandr Balaban. The group was expelled from Ukraine – into the RSFSR and the Caucasus, and in 1984, it stopped to exist, in general.⁷⁵

Punk rock suffered from a special persecution in the context of persecution of the punks themselves. In the USSR, punks, with their exotic appearance, were accused of sympathizing with the ideology of fascism. The first punks in Lviv appeared in the late 1970s. These were the guys nicknamed Piston, Mustafa, Tykhyi, Banan,

⁷³ Лемко, І., *Львів понад усе*, Львів 2003, 131.

⁷⁴ Список самодеятельных ансамблей и рок-групп, своей деятельностью наносящих вред идейно-нравственному и эстетическому воспитанию молодежи (для проверки студий звукозаписи и дискотек), Всесоюзный научно-методический центр при Министерстве культуры СССР (1 октября 1984).

⁷⁵ *Энциклопедия украинской поп-музыки: Новая Черемшина*. [online: <<http://kmstudio.com.ua/index.php?nma=cherem&fla=index>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

Sadist, Prokop, Zhenia, Dimedrol. The spread of the punk subculture continued in the early 1980s. From 1981 punk was distributed among hippies in the *Holy Garden*. There were attempts to play punk rock in addition to hard rock, for example by Sasha "AC/DC" and his rock group *Baza*.⁷⁶ Another centre of *neformal* (unofficial) life was *Virmenka* – a coffee shop in the city centre, where artists, hippies, punks, and others gathered. When an Estonian rock group *Magnetic Band* came to the city in September 1982 punks were already the main enemies for the police and they have been thoroughly caught out from the crowd. Estonia at the time was the legislator of the punk style throughout the USSR. In addition, *heavy metal* started to spread all around the country. The works of rock music idols of the contemporary young people were associated with this style – for example *AC/DC*, *Magnetic Band*, *Black Sabbath* and others.

Thus, as written by K. Stetsenko, the history of rock music in Ukraine to the mid-80s, was a history of disease and extinction. Cultural, psychological and, especially, the political conditions of the 1970s – the early 1980s did not contribute to the birth and the development of original rock bands, competitions and festivals.⁷⁷ There were only several attempts to modernize the style of the philharmonic VIAs. These innovators were the musicians of the band *Zhivir*. Around 1985 three members of the band, R. Shtyn', Yu. Saienko and V. Prasolenko, wrote first Ukrainian rock opera *Stina* (on a poem by Lithuanian poet Justinas Marcinkevičius). Video version of this rock opera was even recorded on TV in Lviv. However, the group was constantly controlled by the institutions, subordinated to the Ministry of Culture and Ukrconcert, which did not give the musicians with different views freedom for creativity. Regular admissions, removals of tours did the trick: after short existence in Ternopil and Rivne Philharmonic, the band moved to Russia.⁷⁸

Cultivating new styles became visible in an industrial town Novoiavorivsk of the Lviv region close to the Polish border which became a powerful centre of alternatives in the 1980s. The city gave birth to New Wave band *Skryabin*. The constant leader of this group Andrii Kuzmenko, together with Ihor Iatsyshyn, created the group *Lantsiuhova Reaktsiya* in 1983, which played punk and hardcore

⁷⁶ Олісевич, А., Peace – Love – Freedom – Rock'n'roll, in: *Хіпні у Львові*, ред. І. Банах, Львів 2011, 218–220.

⁷⁷ *Рок-музыка в СССР. Опыт популярной энциклопедии*, сост. А. К. Троицкий, Москва 1990, 345.

⁷⁸ *Енциклопедія української поп-музики: Нова Черемшина*. [online: <<http://kmstudio.com.ua/index.php?nma=cherem&fla=index>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

at school parties in Novoiavorivsk. The speakers were hung on the polls. Both guitar and vocals were connected to such speakers.⁷⁹

However, before the legalization of rock music during the *perestroika*, a number of rock groups remained, mostly in Lviv and its surroundings. In the middle of the 1980s there were such rock bands as: *Stezhky*, *Rokirovka*, *KooP*, *Sobacha Radist'*, *Gryzayl'*, *Levy*, *Skify*, *Povtornyi Karantyn*, *Pershe Prychastia*, *Stalker* and others.⁸⁰ In Ternopil, from the 1970s until 1986, there was a blues and hard rock group *T-34*. Ihor Sazonov, a musician-virtuoso, played drums in this band. A new renaissance of rock music which took place in the second half of the 1980s, was associated with half-legal rock groups of the previous time that got a chance to leave the *underground* and spread the new styles.

ABSTRACT

Rock Music in Everyday Life of Youth in Western Ukraine under the Soviet Regime (1960 – early 1980s)

Volodymyr Okarynskyi

The article covers the phenomenon of rock music in the lives of young residents of the Western regions of Soviet Ukraine, which differed significantly from the rest of the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the entire USSR. The article demonstrates the peculiarities among which this music was mastered, its existence in the youth society – from fashionable dance music to the core of nonconformism to the Soviet system. It was reflected in the names officially and unofficially used for rock music and its performers (Big beat, vocal instrumental ensemble, etc.), as well as in relation to official factors (from tolerance to the prohibition). Consumers of rock music did not necessarily have to be opposed to the Soviet regime. However, the active “immersion” in rock music, and the related counterculture spheres (from the late 1960s onwards, and more and more), contributed to the formation of an alternative life style, which manifested itself in particular: listening to banned radio stations, the style of clothing that was associated with rock music, space for free performance / listening to rock music

⁷⁹ Історія. Скрыбін – офіційний сайт шанувальників гурту. [online: <<http://skryabin.at.ua/index/0-50>>, cit. 2015-06-29].

⁸⁰ Перетятко, Ю., *Львівський рок: півстоліття боротьби*, Львів 2006, 25–30.

and exchanging information and impressions (“tusovka”). Rock music was associated with such manifestations of alternative life in the realities of closed Soviet society as youth subcultures (hippies) or literary and artistic avant-garde. Rock music influenced the dominant mass culture in the Ukrainian SSR. Rock culture modernized the Western Ukrainian youth in the post-war society and brought it closer to their peers in the West.

Key words: Rock Music, Rock’n’roll, Big Beat, Rhythm and Blues, Rock Band, VIA (Vocal Instrumental Ensemble), Counterculture, Subculture.

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REPORTS

Olga Leshkova

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
IDENTITY IN THE EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN
EUROPE BETWEEN REGIONAL AND (SUPRA-)
NATIONAL MODEL

The international conference *Identity in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe between Regional and (Supra-) National Model* took place in Prague, The Czech Republic, from 10th to 11th December 2015. The event, which was organized jointly by the Department, East European Studies and the Department of South Slavonic and Balkan Studies, Faculty of Arts (Charles University in Prague), brought together about 20 professional historians and literary historians from the Czech Republic, Germany, Ukraine, Poland and Russia. The main two-day-program of the conference featured 16 papers including the large keynote lecture by a Russian historian Andrey Zubov, an ex-professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) who became world-renowned for his active and consistent critics of modern Russian international politics after the Crimea conflict in March 2014. Beside the official agenda, the conference had an important side event the presentation of *Oriens Aliter* – the project of a new scientific periodical on cultural and historical heritage of the Central and Eastern Europe issued jointly by the Department of Central European Studies and the Department of East European Studies in co-operation with the Precarpathian National University of Vasyl Stefanyk in Ivano-Frankivsk (<http://oa.ff.cuni.cz/en/frontpage>).

The conference was held in two working languages, English and Russian. The first day opened with welcoming words from Dr. Jan Bičovský, the vice-dean for admission procedure and external relations at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, Dr. Marek Příhoda, the head of the Department of East European Studies, and Dr. Stanislav Tumis, lecturer at the Department of East European Studies. The program of the first day was divided into two sections according to language and thematic criteria. The first one, *Identities in the Eastern Europe in Culture and Literature*, included four papers in Russian covering some controversial aspects of

Russian national identity, its duality and ambivalence, reflection in literature and philosophy.

Vladimír Svatoň (the Czech Republic) presented his view on double identity in Europe and Russia. The author proceeds from the assumption that the roots of European identical duality lie into the Modern period when the ideas of cultural differences and cultural opposition were philosophically shaped. Thus, German classical idealism based its historical and philosophical conception on contrasting the ancient and modern history. According to the author, the ideas of cultural oppositions, which were often critical towards modernism, played a major role in historical, political and cultural processes in Europe in the 19th century, including the so-called national revivals. The trends in Germany and Russia can be interpreted within the same context. The author puts an emphasis on the critical attitude towards western rationalism and individualism among Russian Slavophiles, namely Ivan Kireyevsky and Alexey Khomyakov, as well as among Russian symbolists (Vyacheslav Ivanov), and briefly dwelt on Russian conception of Eurasianism.

Marek Příhoda (the Czech Republic) focused his attention on fundamental concepts of Russian thinking and view of the world during two major periods of Russian history – before and after Peter the Great. The author analyses three key problems: (1) the forming of Russian identity at the level of historical consciousness and political thinking, (2) differences and connections between Muscovite and imperial periods in Russian history, (3) the roots and reasons for contradictory perception of the Old Russia during the Modern period. Talking about the spiritual world in Muscovite Russia, the author underlines its religious orientation when Orthodoxy as such or certain religiously motivated ideas dominated merely all spheres of people's life including state politics. The situation dramatically changed during Peter's rule when the persuasion of special religious mission was substituted by the secular idea of a Great Russian Empire.

Helena Ulbrechtová (the Czech Republic) analyzed the literary semantisation of space in Russian literature with regard to Russian national identity. According to the author, the concept of space in Russian literature is much more important than the concept of time which can be partly explained as a result of certain territorial ambitions. The literary correlation between the concepts of water and ground in Russian literature represents a particular interest as well. Surprisingly, Russian literature did not develop much the poetics of the sea, water as a concept does not play the role of a bridge between the opposite shores; on the contrary it is considered to be a hostile element. The author also analyzes the semantisation of the Caucasus and Crimea and provides numerous examples from Russian literature to prove the particular importance of these concepts for Russian mentality.

Hanuš Nykl (the Czech Republic) devoted his paper to the large-scale projects of comprehensive world transformation which were produced by Russian philosophers in the 19th – early 20th centuries. Despite the fact that social and political matters, which were broadly discussed in Russian political thinking, did not evaluate into a coherent political theory, Russian political thinking gave birth to several ambitious projects, though mostly unrealistic or even utopian. The author reviews, in chronological order, the most important of these projects, such as (1) the debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles in the 1840s; (2) the pan-Slavic ideas of Nikolay Danilevskiy who developed the theory of cultural-historical types; (3) the project by Konstantin Leontyev who offered the idea of an Eastern Union which was supposed to be a unity of Orthodox peoples; (4) and finally, the global world-transforming conception by Vladimir Solovyov who elaborated the idea of the union of Churches which would lead to the reunion of the world, and eventually, to the reunion of the World and God.

The second section, *National and Supranational Identities in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: Origins and Transformations*, was conducted fully in English. The five papers presented, focused on identity and minority policies, different patterns of national and supranational building in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Miroslav Hroch (the Czech Republic) brought up a question of nation formation processes under conditions of the Ottoman Empire. The author argues that all national formation processes in the Balkans, under conditions of the Ottoman Empire, should be interpreted in the frame of correlation between their specific and common features, not as a series of isolated events. Using the comparative approach, the author defines the object of comparison – large units in multinational empires and conditions for their development from ethnic communities towards modern nations. He compares the situations in three major European Empires (Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg) on the basis of clearly formulated criteria, such as: the origins of these empires; the role of Church and religion in national movements; educational system and its impact on national formation processes; social structure of ethnic communities; framework of national organization; definition of national enemy; historical arguments, role of myths and oral tradition; external influence and so on. In conclusion, the author asserts that there is a specific type of South-Eastern nation formation even though every single national movement, undoubtedly, has its own specificity.

Petr Stehlík (the Czech Republic) analyzed the nature and the role of the ideology of Yugoslavism in the formation of national identities in South Europe from the 19th century up to the year 1914, including its cultural, social and political impact. The author starts with the definition of the very term of Yugoslavism, and

then provides a rather detailed comment on its historical forms and their evolution to start with the Illyrian movement. Having analyzed the role of particular South Slavic peoples in the national forming processes, the author comes to conclusion that, due to certain historical and political reasons, Croats had contributed to the elaboration of Yugoslavism considerably more than other Balkan ethnic groups.

The concept of Yugoslavian nationality during 1945–1991 was in the focus of the presentation by **Jaroslav Otčenášek** (the Czech Republic). The author considers the concept of Yugoslavian nationality representing an unsuccessful example of supraethnicity. He deals with the terms of ethnicity and supraethnicity, emphasizing the difference between them in contemporary understanding. According to the author, Yugoslavian supraethnicity represented a typical example of supraethnicity which had been created “from above”, by governing authorities. The author describes its fundamental features and confirms his assertions with statistics reflecting the dynamics in people’s perception of themselves as Yugoslavians, as members of the united Yugoslavian nation. In the end, the author concludes that nowadays, the phenomenon of Yugoslavian supraethnicity has no future, as the state, from which it originated, does not exist any longer.

Thomas Wünsch (Germany) dealt with different modes of identity politics and their impact on the making of collective mentality. Identity politics represent an essential component of the composition of the human community and effect directly both historical and present times. The constructs, which are usually defined as the national consciousness, are rooting to great extent back to the intervention from the outside. In other words, collective identity does not simply grow by itself, but it is connected with some influence of different groups or forces. Identities are not monolithic; they represent a dynamic complex phenomenon which is composed of various elements and change in time. The author describes four modes of identity politics illustrating them with particular historical examples: (1) pervasive indoctrination as the most dominant form, including all kinds of obstruction of ruling government towards the autochthone population (ex. politics of Turkey towards Kurds); (2) recreation and protection of exclusive political rights in the situation of permanent battle of cultures when certain historical events or cultural phenomena are emphasized to create national identity (e.g. a Czech-German conflict initiated by national emancipation in the 19th century, situation in the Ukraine after 1991); (3) central position dealing with changes within the living environment including mentality (e.g. politics of Krakow bishop Zbigniew Oleśnicki, the 15th century, or politics of Frederik II of Prussia, the 18th century, in Silesia); (4) the weakest mode, superficial social harmonization which aims to find equilibrium between new and old structures (ex. Habsburg identity politics after 1780s).

Stanislav Tumis (the Czech Republic) conducted an analysis of two mainstream approaches to the interpretation of the Ukrainian history: the Ukrainian national scheme and the Soviet approach. He argues that relevant comprehension of such a complicated phenomenon as the Ukrainian history is possible only under condition of unbiased analysis of both schemes, although these approaches exclude each other and it is almost impossible to reconcile them. The Ukrainian national scheme tends to interpret the Ukrainian history mostly within colonial and post-colonial constructs, as a victim of the Soviet empire, or, earlier, of the Russian Empire. The fundamental premise for the range of these theories is the distinction between “self” and “other”. According to the author, the Ukrainian national discourses actively use the populist historiography which was formed by mid-nineteenth century and emphasis the distinctiveness of Ukrainians among other Slavs. The Soviet scheme represents the opposite pole, considering the Ukrainian history in the context of long-term Ukrainian striving to reunite with its “old-sister” Russia and marginalizing all attempts to establish an independent state. By the example of key narratives in Ukrainian history, the author draws attention to the importance of collective memory and historical myths with regard to political and social manipulations with public consciousness and forming of national identity.

The final event of the day was a public lecture by Professor **Andrey Zubov**. His lecture, the *History of Russian Imperial Consciousness and Its Prospects*, which was dedicated to the formation of imperial idea in Russia and its role in Russian and world history, took place in a big lecture-hall in the main building of the Faculty of Arts and attracted a considerable number of listeners.

The author highlighted the problem of imperial idea as a historical phenomenon in general, and in Russia in particular. He drew attention to the genesis of the imperial idea in Russia, its special features and role in the formation of political and historical consciousness of Russian people, arguing that imperial ideas as such were not created by politicians, but had their roots in social consciousness. According to the author, imperial ambitions can be interpreted with regards to basic human need for possession, though realized at a higher political and state level. This is the reason, why empires tend to expand their borders. The imperial idea is not an exclusively Russian phenomenon which can be easily proved by other examples from world history, for instance German Third Reich or the Ottoman Empire. According to Andrey Zubov, the imperial idea usually fulfills a certain compulsory function as it recompenses people’s misery and lack of freedom with a delusive feeling of being part of a great powerful state. The authorities give people a useless phantom of abstract imperial dream. At the same time, people who are deprived of opportunity to act independently both in economics and law, remain infantile and immature,

and as a result, they are susceptible to such dreams. As the empire keeps its parts together mostly by force or by means of various incentives, including different forms of economic motivation, it is not beneficial for its own titular nation or for people living on its central territories. Expenses of the Russian Empire on its outer regions largely exceeded the expenses on its central part; the same is true for the USSR. The roots of Russian imperial idea lie deep in the history. The first more or less coherent Russian conception which affirmed the idea of Russian distinctiveness towards other peoples was the conception of the Third Rome which considered the Russian ruler and people as the ultimate fighters for the true faith – the Orthodox Christianity – while other countries were supposed to be following the wrong impious traditions. Despite the fact that after the Great Moscow Synod in 1666 the above-mentioned idea was buried, it provided the necessary ground for developing of the imperial idea when the feeling of national greatness substituted religious aspect. Nevertheless, nearly 90 % of Russian population remained slaves up to 1861, when Russian tsar Alexander II attempted to carry out liberal reforms which unfortunately failed. The October Revolution in 1917 gave birth to a new empire, the Soviet Union, built on the ruin of the collapsed tsarist Russia. Soviet power ambitions extended to the world ideological dominance, but it proved to be completely unrealistic. Another failed attempt to build a liberal market economy in 1990s turned into a deep frustration in Russian people, as instead of fair liberal economy and democratic society, they got oligarchic capitalism and corrupted structures. Russian president Putin adverted for the first time to the idea of imperial greatness after the terrorist attack on Beslan in 2005. Then it has been gradually developing and strengthening up to the Crimea annexing in March 2014. So, it is rather reasonable to conclude that nowadays we deal with the 4th Russian Empire – Putin's one. The author raises the question whether it is possible to stop the Empire. He is convinced that external forces are not able to prevent an Empire from further expansion. The most efficient way to stop it is to transform the Empire into a Commonwealth where all subjects would benefit from being a part of a bigger construct but keep their identity and independence at the same time. To fulfill this goal it is necessary to resolve two major issues: (1) economic factor (to eliminate the problem of people's poverty by means of property redistribution – the author inclines to the restitution as it was carried out in Europe); (2) creation of a mature civil democratic society.

The second conference day logically continued the scientific debate and exchange of opinions. Despite being shorter (the agenda included six papers), the program was not less interesting than the day before, focusing on the identity conflicts and ethnic contradictions with regards to their history, origins and contemporary state.

Jan Rychlík (the Czech Republic) brought up a question of dissolution of multinational states in the Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The author assumes that, at a certain phase, every ethnic entity attempts to create its own national state. Taking into account the actual number of nations and other ethnic groups, it would be reasonable to assume that conflicts on national or ethnical basis cannot be avoided. According to the author, the only solution is to observe them and to try to reduce their negative consequences. In his paper, the author analyzed most significant examples of collapsed multinational empires (Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg) emphasizing the fundamental aspects of their national and ethnical policy. He compared the attitude to minorities and their rights in the above-mentioned states and revealed their strengths and weaknesses. The author considers that mistaken minority policies represent one of the most important factors which eventually led to the dissolution of all these states. The 20th century gives us numerous examples of inefficient national and ethnical policies neglecting minority rights as well. Neither economic factor, nor linguistic and cultural proximity provide a substantial ground to unify the consciousness, and consequently no universal solution can be offered.

Michaylo Nahornyak (Ukraine) talked about the nature of ethical contradictions and conflicts in modern Ukraine, trying to define special features of the Ukraine and Ukrainians, with regard to their political and social activity. He argues that, contrary to a rather widespread opinion, anarchism is not an innate Ukrainian national mentality feature, which makes people more inclined to revolutionary actions and disobedience. The author insists that the modern ethnical contradictions should be explained in terms of Ukrainian double identity that resulted from dramatically different historical development of two parts of the modern Ukraine, i.e. its Europe-oriented Western part with the idea of an independent national state and the Eastern one (and more or less Central and South), earlier called Little Russia, which used to be an integral part of the Russian Empire and suffered, and is still suffering, a large influence of Russian imperial idea. The author interprets the “Little Russia complex” in the Ukraine in terms of postcolonial syndromes. Nevertheless, the nature of the ethnic conflict in the Ukraine is much more complicated and can be interesting for the rest of Europe.

The paper by **Ihor Hurak** (Ukraine) was dedicated to the analysis of the conception of Russian world as an instrument of Russian foreign policy, its history and real application. The idea of Russian world dates back to the 1990s when it emerged within social and cultural discourse and was referred to as a certain cultural community which united Russian speakers and people interested in Russia all over the world. Despite the fact that the theoretical background of the concept is rather vague and disputable, it has been put into political and state practice since the

beginning of the 21st century. The real implementation of the conception emphasizes the idea of the protection of Russian compatriots living abroad. To illustrate the above-mentioned assumption, the author uses the Crimea conflict in March 2014. However, the author is sceptic about possible success of this conception.

Alenka Jensterle-Doležalová (the Czech Republic) talked about the situation within Slovene intellectual and literary milieu before World War I with regards to the ideas for a union of the Southern Slavs – New Illyrism and Yugoslavism. According to the author, New Illyrism as the project of fusion between Slovene and Croat cultures and languages was a kind of common conviction among Slovene intellectuals of that time and was generally accepted by Slovene writers. On the contrary, Ivan Cankar, the key figure of Slovene modernism, consistently rejected the New Illyrism. In his public lectures and interviews, he proclaimed that the practical realization of this idea would mean the end of Slovene language and culture. Ivan Cankar remained very critical of Slovene intellectuals who were ready to sacrifice their national identity in the name of uncertain political goals. His public activities were crucial for the Slovene society as eventually he managed to persuade Slovene public opinion and political stage of necessity to preserve Slovene national culture and language.

In her paper *Identity and Statehood. Bosnia and Herzegovina Twenty Years of Independence*, **Malgorzata Podolak** (Poland) emphasized peculiar identity problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina and revealed the special features of national identity in this post-Yugoslav country in comparison to similar aspects in other Balkan states. The problem of national identity is considered to be a key issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is linked to a concept of nation. Due to historical, cultural and ethnic factors, people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have trouble with identifying themselves as a single nation and prefer keeping strong connection to a certain ethnic group, such as Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, which could be rather alarming as the ethnisation of almost all sectors of society contributes to ethnical division of the country.

Marek Junek (the Czech Republic) talked about the Czechoslovak relationship before World War I based upon Anton Štefánek's ideas. Štefánek belonged to major Slovak personalities who promoted Czechoslovak unity in the field of culture, education, language, politics and economy. After 1918 he became one of the most important ideologists of Czechoslovakism. The author describes in his paper Štefánek's vision of Czechoslovakism both on theoretical and practical levels including Štefánek's interpretation of Czechoslovak linguistic problems which were connected to determining of the Slovak language status and its correlation with the Czech language; the issue of common origin of Czechs and Slovaks, their

common culture and history; the question of education and support of Slovak students at Czech schools and universities carried out by Czechoslovak unity (Československá jednota); political and economic cooperation and so on. The author eventually argues that all theoretical ideas of cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks became reality during the World War I.

It is also necessary to address special thanks to the organizing team for their effort and an extraordinary job contributing to the success of the conference, which provided a great platform for professional meetings, research presentations and exchange of opinions.

