

Matěj Bílý

ROMANIA IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES
OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
AT THE TURN OF THE 1960S AND THE 1970S

A complicated relationship with Romania was one of the key inside challenges to the Warsaw Treaty Organization after the military suppression of the Prague Spring. Romanian attitude was an important factor which affected alliance cooperation in the 1970s. However, the most significant features of it were formed at the turn of the previous decade. This process has not been explained in detail yet. Scholars usually put forward a variety of general conclusions which are not based on comprehensive research of archival sources. This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the development of relations between Romania and the rest of the Warsaw Treaty Organization at the turn of the 60's and the 70's. As this issue is very complex, the following analysis focuses on the political framework of the Pact only. After all, since 1969, political and military structures of the alliance worked, in principle, separately.

Disputes between Romania and the Warsaw Pact were hardly new. The issue hailed back to the first half of the 60's, when Romanian leadership on the background of the Sino-Soviet split pragmatically decided to reconsider its approach toward the USSR and the Eastern Bloc in general. In April 1964, the Romanian Worker's Party Central Committee (CC) plenum defined "Romanian national and specific route to socialism". This relatively risky attempt aimed to expand the space in which a Soviet satellite can operate more independently. The so-called April Declaration appealed to the USSR to respect international standards in relation to other communist countries. Those tendencies were augmented after March 1965 when Nicolae Ceaușescu became a head of the Romanian party. Romanian communists gradually created their own dogmatism: a unique nationalist and Marxist doctrine which became the basis for the personal power of Ceaușescu. Despite the fact that full

independency from the Soviet Union was unrealistic, Romanian officials, throughout the next few years, stressed their distance from Moscow.¹

During the 1960s, Romania ventured into a few isolated actions in the international arena which were strongly denounced by Kremlin. In 1967, the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR), regardless of the other Eastern Bloc states and absence of Moscow's permission, established diplomatic ties with the West Germany. On the contrary, after the Six-Day War, it refused to sever relations with Israel. In fact, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP)² also ignored conclusions adopted at the meetings of the International Communist and Worker's Movement. These leanings bothered Moscow on through the beginning of the next decade.³ Romanian absence in the military suppression of the Prague Spring only underlined the specific position of the country within the Eastern Bloc. However, we are reminded that Ceaușescu's regime had, at the same time, no sympathy for the process of reforms in Czechoslovakia.⁴

The Romanian approach towards the Warsaw Treaty Organization was based on the aforementioned policy. As the Pact represented one of the tools which the USSR used to govern and influence its sphere of influence in Europe, the opinions on proper cooperation within the alliance's framework soon became a specific bone of contention between Moscow and Bucharest. After he came to power, Brezhnev strove for Warsaw Pact consolidation in order to make the alliance more effective in regards to Soviet diplomatic and military aims. On the contrary, Ceaușescu's regime, at least on a proclamation level, stressed the article of the Pact's founding charter which appealed for dissolution of political-military blocs after establishing some sort of collective security system.⁵ Until 1968, these contradictions often

¹ Giurescu, D. C. – Fischer-Galati, S., *Romania. A Historic Perspective*, New York 1998, 458–464.

² In July 1965, the Romanian Worker's Party was renamed to Romanian Communist Party at its 9th congress.

³ Národní archiv České republiky (NA), f. 1261/0/6, sv. 12, a.j. 11/info1, *Zpráva o sovětsko-romunských vztazích*, 13. 9. 1971.

⁴ On Romanian policy during 1968, for example Retegan, M., 1968. *Ve stínu pražského jara*, Praha 2002. In late 1968 and 1969, Romanian diplomats in conversations with Czechoslovak officials stressed out that Romania had neither taken part in the talks on the Prague Spring nor got involved in the military intervention. They assured that Bucharest intended to interfere neither in international nor internal issues, which occurred in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Archiv ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky (AMZV), f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 82, sign. 017/112, kr. 2, č.j. 020.500/70-2, *RSR – informace o současném stavu a perspektivách čs.-romunských vztahů*, 3. 6. 1970.

⁵ The Article XI of the Warsaw Pact's founding charter bound the member-states to strive for establishing a collective security system in Europe. The existence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was supposed to end on the day when all-European agreement came into effect.

resulted in tense and apprehensive behaviour from the Romanian desk at the alliance meetings. Using various obstructions, Bucharest especially strove to prevent a reform of both political and military structures within the Warsaw Pact.⁶

The situation slightly changed after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At least for some period, Bucharest considered the Soviet Union as the main threat to its security.⁷ Being afraid of the fact that Romania could be, after Czechoslovakia, the next victim of Soviet aggression,⁸ Ceaușescu calmed down his behaviour for a while. In terms of this strategy, after four years of obstructions, he allowed passing of the Warsaw Pact military statutes reform in March 1969. Thus, at the turn of the 60's and the 70's Romania was aware of two direct threats connected to membership in the alliance: the first came from the Czechoslovak experience and potential usage of the Pact military forces in an intervention against a defiant Ceaușescu regime.⁹ The second was rooted in escalation of tensions on the Sino-Soviet border. Bucharest feared that in case of war between two socialist powers, Moscow could attempt to activate the Warsaw Treaty Organization mechanism in order to involve its European satellites in conflicts in the Far East.¹⁰ Considering sources available today, it must be added that those fears seem to have been exaggerated.

However, Romania could not afford to openly move itself away from the Eastern Bloc and consequently from the Warsaw Pact; not only because of geopolitical reasons,

⁶ On Romanian attitude towards the reform of the Warsaw Pact in the 1960s for example Rinoveanu, C., Rumänien und die Militärreform des Warschauer Paktes, in: *Der Warschauer Pakt: von der Gründung bis zum Zusammenbruch: 1955 bis 1991. Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes*. Ed. T. Dietrich, Berlin 2009, 209–224; Ionescu, M. E., Rumunsko a vojenská reforma Varšavské smlouvy. *Historie a vojenství* (HaV) 2003/3–4, 699–705; Bílý, M., Počátky pokusu o reformu Varšavské smlouvy v 60. letech 20. století. *Dvacáté století/The Twentieth Century* 2011/1, 165–172.

⁷ Nünlist, C., *Cold War Generals: The Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, 1969–90, 2001*. [online: < http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_cmd/introduction.cfm?navinfo=14565>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁸ Regarding the sources which are available today, it can be said that the Western considerations of forthcoming Soviet military intervention in Romania in the second half of 1968 and 1969 were based on irrelevant information. Baev, J., The Warsaw pact and Southern Tier Conflicts, 1959–1969, in: *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts*. Eds. M. N. Heiss – S. V. Papa-cosma, Kent 2008, 202.

⁹ The Romanian top leadership correctly admitted that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had not been officially conducted on behalf the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

¹⁰ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34 RSR, e.č. 42, č.j. 023.383/69-2, *K současnému vývoji vztahů mezi Rumunskou socialistickou republikou a členskými státy Varšavské smlouvy*, 16. 6. 1969.

but also due to its ambitious economic plans.¹¹ Therefore, the official Romanian position towards the Warsaw Treaty Organization was defined largely by the exclusive claim that existence of the Pact was only temporary. Its member-states should have striven for dissolution of all military alliances, in accordance with the founding charter.¹²

The fear of repeating the Czechoslovak scenario was not the only factor which influenced Romania's more accommodating approach towards the Warsaw Pact after August 1968. The question of convening an all-European security conference began to dominate the agenda of the alliance's political meetings. In March 1969, the Political Consultative Committee approved the course in the issue which, at first glance, did not contradict the main principles of Romanian foreign policy. Ceaușescu's regime appreciated the declaration of the Warsaw Pact's supreme body calling for holding the conference without any preconditions. However, Romania stressed that this was only because the document had been worked out collectively by all Warsaw Pact member-states, reflecting Romanian priorities as well. In this regard, Romanian propaganda did not miss the opportunity to announce that the initiative opened a new route to the dissolution of military blocs in Europe.¹³ Indeed, the potential all-European security conference was seen by Bucharest as a forum of the equal, sovereign participant countries. This approach fully corresponded with Romanian effort to continuously weaken Moscow's influence on its policy.¹⁴ Romania also considered the conference as a chance to strengthen relations with the West, as it had been striving to do since the mid-60's.¹⁵ From the Romanian

¹¹ PECH, R., Rumunsko let sedmdesátých – od liberalismu k represi. *Slovanský přehled* 1992/3, 271.

¹² AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 42, č.j. 022.229/69-2, *Ohlas v RSR na budapeštské zasedání PPV VS*, 16. 4. 1969.

¹³ *Ibidem*, č.j. 023.010/69, *Mimořádná politická zpráva k ohlasům na budapeštskou Výzvu členských států Varšavské smlouvy*, 30. 5. 1969. Romanian stance on possible dissolution of the military blocs linked to the all-European security conference did not resonate even among the NATO member-states. Mostly, the small Western countries called it a "perspective option", but absolutely non-actual. In addition, regarding the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there were opinions that this Soviet action had confirmed the legitimacy of NATO existence as a guarantee of the small European countries' independence.

¹⁴ Mastny, V., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact*, New York 2005, 40.

¹⁵ Relations between Romania and West were improving at the turn of 60's and 70's. In August 1969, the U.S. president Nixon visited Bucharest. In December 1970, Ceaușescu made his trip to the United States in return. One year later, Romania joined GATT and in 1972 became the International Monetary Fund and World Bank member. Deletant, D., *Romania and the Warsaw Pact: Documents Highlighting Romania's Gradual Emancipation from the Warsaw Pact, 1956–1989*,

point of view, the strengthening of inter-bloc cooperation was the most important aspect of a prospective security summit. On the contrary, the USSR and some Warsaw Pact member-states, which had unresolved territorial disputes with the West Germany, concentrated primarily on safety guarantees.¹⁶

Political meetings of the Warsaw Pact became more frequent in 1969 because of new international challenges. Romanian participation was not fully conflict-free. As in the past, SRR delegations sought to ensure that sessions would not exceed the scope of non-binding consultations.¹⁷ They rejected to take clear positions on a variety of contentious points, stating they were not authorized by the state and party leadership.¹⁸ Ceaușescu's regime later adopted a similar strategy towards consultations within the International Communist and Worker's Movement. Romania did not oppose consultations, but stipulated conditions of absence of criticism and non-binding character of approved declarations.¹⁹ Bucharest also made it clear that, in the process of convening, the all-European security conference would definitely not act through the Warsaw Treaty Organization exclusively. Romania considered the multilateral political meeting of the alliance to be no more than a forum where member-states inform each other about their talks with Western and neutral countries. It firmly refused to turn the consultations into shaping the unified foreign policy tack of the Eastern Bloc, which the USSR and some of its satellites were pushing for.²⁰ The rest of the Warsaw Pact was leery of this Romanian approach of

Washington 2004. [online: <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_romania/introduction.cfm?navinfo=15342>, cit. 2014-09-22].

¹⁶ Note on the Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, 21. 5. 1969. [online: <http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/17253/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9b7b446c-693b-42d6-92a5-807295820045/en/690521_Note.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22]; Békés, C., *Records of the Meetings of the Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers*, Washington 2005. [online: <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_defomin/intro_bekes.cfm?navinfo=15700>, cit. 2014-09-22].

¹⁷ In May 1969, at the beginning of the meeting of deputy foreign ministers in East Berlin, the Romanian representatives for instance declared that they were authorized by the RCP leadership to non-binding discussion only. They demanded formulation to be recorded that no real obligations would result from the talks. Ibidem.

¹⁸ NA, f. 1261/0/5, sv. 110, a.j. 181/info2, *Zpráva o průběhu a výsledcích pražské porady ministrů zahraničních věcí členských států Varšavské smlouvy a návrhy na další postup v oblasti evropské bezpečnosti*, 14. 11. 1969.

¹⁹ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 61, č.j. 017296/74, *Dosavadní postoje RKS ke svolání Evropské porady komunistických a dělnických stran*, 30. 10. 1974.

²⁰ Wenger, A. – Mastny, V., New perspectives of the origin of the CSCE process, in: *Origins of the European security system: the Helsinki process revisited, 1965–75*. Ed. A. Wenger, Abingdon 2008, 11; Mastny, V., *A Cardboard Castle*, 40.

bilateral diplomacy of its own design without taking into account the strategic priorities of the alliance. Such a situation could have potentially paved the way to superiority of the NATO countries due to their unanimity.²¹

Nevertheless, in comparison to the era preceding the military suppression of the Prague Spring, Romanian representatives behaved much more constructively at Warsaw Pact political meetings.²² They did not construct any serious obstacles, except for vetoing some less important proposals.²³ At the time, Moscow's effort to compile the final documents in a benevolent manner obviously contributed to this. According to official Soviet interpretation, Warsaw Pact declarations were supposed to reflect the priorities of all member-states. Some contradictory Romanian statements at closed meetings were disregarded by the Kremlin, as they did not pose any significant threat.²⁴ Therefore, a scheme of typical future approach towards Bucharest was set up within the Warsaw Pact in 1969. Before almost every alliance session, a few Soviet deputy foreign ministers visited all member-states, except for

²¹ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 42, č.j. 023.938/69-2, *Shrnutí poznatků z rozhovorů v Bukurešti*, 14. 7. 1969; Ibidem, č.j. 023.010/69, *Mimořádná politická zpráva k ohlasům na budapešťskou Výzvu členských států Varšavské smlouvy*, 30. 5. 1969. In fact, even NATO did not act unanimously at the time. Within its structures, French attitude towards negotiation on the basis of blocs was similarly negative to the Romanian stances within the Warsaw Pact.

²² This shift was missed even by the Western press. Ibidem, e.č. 52, č.j. 022.188/71-2, *Ohlas XXIV. sjezdu KSSS v Rumunsku*, 14. 4. 1971.

²³ In May 1969, at the meeting of deputy foreign ministers, Romania blocked reaction to Finnish proposal on the all-European security conference on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, insisting to reply on behalf of individual member-states instead. It also refused to discuss collectively within the Pact's structures the issue of discrimination of GDR at upcoming 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. Four months later, at the meeting of foreign affairs ministries in Prague, Corneliu Mănescu prevented discussion on Polish draft of the European Security treaty. However, he was supported by the East-German representatives. Note on the Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, 21. 5. 1969, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/17253/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9b7b446c-693b-42d6-92a5-807295820045/en/690521_Note.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22];

NA, f. 1261/0/5, sv. 110, a.j. 181/info2, *Zpráva o průběhu a výsledcích pražské porady ministrů zahraničních věcí členských států Varšavské smlouvy a návrhy na další postup v oblasti evropské bezpečnosti*, 14. 11. 1969.

²⁴ In December 1969, at the meeting of Warsaw Pact member-states' party leaders in Moscow, Ceaușescu for instance repeated his well-known, from the Soviet point of view undesirable demands for dismantling all the foreign military bases in Europe, dissolution of military blocs, reduction of armament levels or the nuclear weapons ban. However, the Romanian leader presented his opinions at closed session only. Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), f. PZPR KCW, p. V/89 (2899), *Dokumenty spotkania przywódców partyjnych i państwowych siedmiu krajów socjalistycznych*, 10. 12. 1969.

Romania. *The Six* – the Warsaw Pact countries without SRR²⁵ – unified its positions this way and then put them in front of the Romanian delegation at the meeting. Following non-binding voting often encouraged Romanian representatives either to join the proposal, or to accept some sort of compromise.²⁶

Balancing Policy

The situation changed during the early months of 1970. Bucharest realized that the Soviet opinion of the all-European security conference scheme was very different. Due to suspiciously frequent talks within the Warsaw Pact, Ceaușescu's regime became afraid that Moscow's intention was to hold the conference on the basis of existing blocs.²⁷ In January, at the alliance deputy foreign ministers session in Sofia, Romania unsuccessfully suggested the preliminary meeting of all potential countries to participate at the security conference being held in its capital.²⁸ Instead, Moscow, at the time, began to consider negotiating the conditions of the conference within a working group of three states only: Belgium for NATO, Poland for Warsaw Pact and Finland for neutral countries.²⁹ The USSR planned a following alliance meeting of ministers of foreign affairs to finalize the procedure.

Ceaușescu refused this scenario and decided to dull relations with the Warsaw Pact. He noted that Moscow's intentions contradict the Bucharest Declaration of Political Consultative Committee, which presumed preparation of the security conference on the basis of all involved countries. In consequence, he attempted to

²⁵ In the mid 1970s, *the Six* started to be officially called “closely cooperating member-states” of the Warsaw Pact. Report on the Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, 3. 2. 1975, [online: <http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/17364/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/c7b53278-c977-4e11-94ba-aba66db0896a/en/750129_Report_E.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

²⁶ Békés, C., *Studená válka, détente a sovětský blok. Vývoj koordinace zahraniční politiky sovětského bloku (1953–1975)*. *Soudobé dějiny 2011/I-II*, 81.

²⁷ AMZV, f. TO(ť) 1970–1974, i.č. 89, sign. 020/112, kr. 3, č.j. 057/70, *Záznam o návštěvě I. taj. ZÚ RSR s I. Georgescu u p. Picka dne 27. 3. 1970*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, sign. 017/111, kr. 1, č.j. 020.534/70-2, *Informace o poradě náměstků k Evropské bezpečnosti*, 27. 1. 1970.

²⁹ This concept was soon proven to be impassable and the USSR left it behind in the early months of 1970. *Ibidem*, sign. 020/112, kr. 1, č.j. 021.648/70-1, *Oficiální návštěva ministra zahraničních věcí SSSR p. A. A. Gromyka v ČSSR – materiál pro předsednictvo ÚV KSČ*, 20. 4. 1970; *Ibidem*, sign. 020/311, kr. 8, č.j. 085/70, *Zpráva I. teritoriálního odboru ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČSSR o stanovisku SSSR k celoevropské konferenci o bezpečnosti a spolupráci*, 7. 4. 1970.

prevent upcoming political meetings of the alliance. Romania threatened that it would not participate. Up to this point, the Romanian leader had supported the Warsaw Pact's appeals on the all-European security conference for a single reason: implied negotiations between sovereign states corresponded with Ceaușescu's long-term foreign policy goals. When this assumption proved to be wrong, he started searching for support for his initiatives among neutral countries, e.g. Finland.³⁰ The Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Corneliu Mănescu, justified this move by the fact that NATO, in reaction to a Warsaw Pact session, would certainly hold a similar meeting. In Romanian opinion, this situation would inevitably lead to an all-European security conference on the basis of blocs. The ulterior motive of Romanian obstructive behaviour was an effort to prevent a new round of collective talks on possible reform of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's political structures initiated by Hungary. The preliminary agenda of upcoming meetings included this item.³¹

Moscow quickly assured its satellites that the planned consultations within the alliance would be held regardless of Romanian stance.³² However, the potential absence of Romania brought problems. The USSR intended to connect talks on the issue of an all-European security conference with the celebration of the Warsaw Pact's 15th anniversary. The scope of this propagandistic play was naturally directed by the Kremlin. The ostentatious distance of one alliance member was, from the Soviet point of view, totally undesirable as it disrupted the efforts to outwardly present absolute unity of the Pact.³³

At this point, Ceaușescu visited the Soviet capital on 19th May 1970. In comparison to multilateral meetings, his bilateral talks with highest officials of the USSR concerning Romanian policy within the Warsaw Pact were, to say the least,

³⁰ Ibidem; AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 47, č.j. 022.007/70-2, *Zasedání VNS RSR k zahraniční politice*, 3. 4. 1970.

³¹ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 82, sign. 017/112, kr. 2, č.j. 022.176/70-2, *RSR – zpráva o návštěvě ministra zahraničních věcí RSR C. Manesca v ČSSR ve dnech 8.–11. dubna 1970*.

³² Ibidem, i.č. 89, sign. 020/112, kr. 1, č.j. 021.648/70-1, *Oficiální návštěva ministra zahraničních věcí SSSR p. A.A. Gromyka v ČSSR – materiál pro předsednictvo ÚV KSČ*, 20. 4. 1970.

³³ Ibidem, sign. 020/111, kr.1, č.j. 010.295/70-AP, *Zpráva o situaci na úseku evropské bezpečnosti pro ÚV KSČ – odložení projednání na duben 1970*, 18. 3. 1970; Ibidem, sign. 020/112, kr. 3, č.j. 0109/70, *Záznam o návštěvě p. M. Havláška ve IV. EO MZV SSSR*, 12. 5. 1970. The East-German documentation reveals that a special argumentation for purposes of the Warsaw Pact member-states' ambassadors to Bucharest was prepared. They were supposed to present it during the talks with the Romanian officials in order to assert another alliance's meeting of foreign affairs ministers. BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1269, *Politbüro des ZK Reinschriftenprotokoll nr. 9*, 24. 2. 1970.

tumultuous. The Romanian leader did not hesitate to openly stand up against many Soviet stances. According to testimony of RCP Executive Committee secretary Ștefan Voicu, after some of Ceaușescu's sharp responses the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the leadership members literally turned green.³⁴ Angry Brezhnev then snapped at the Romanian leader about whether his country intended to stay within the Warsaw Pact. "If you do not want to go with us, go straight to hell," he stormed. For the first time, Brezhnev generously offered Ceaușescu to leave the alliance. Otherwise, Romania was urged to make no waves. The bid of the CPSU CC General Secretary definitely did not include the possibility of full abandonment of the Soviet sphere of influence. In fact, he prioritized the urgent approval of a new bilateral Soviet-Romanian allied treaty.³⁵ The Soviet leader was extremely critical. He pointed out Romanian rhetorical warnings against conducting Warsaw Pact manoeuvres near the borders of SRR. He asked whether Ceaușescu considered the allied states as enemies. He also rebuked Romania, stressing the need for dissolution of military-political blocs, absence of Romanian troops on joint military exercises, as well as the blocking of reform of the Pact's political structures. As before, Ceaușescu firmly rejected those accusations with the claim that his country fully adhered to the text of the alliance's founding charter. After all, he liked to refer to its vague articles which allowed various interpretations. He called the question of leaving the alliance senseless. The Romanian leader declared his interest to continue in cooperation with the socialist states. However, he warned the Soviet leadership that Romania would continuously impose a veto on all

³⁴ This happened at the moment when Brezhnev criticized the Romanian demonstrative actions which were not discussed within the Warsaw Pact in advance. In his reply, Ceaușescu provocatively noted that Romania was not the only country which failed to consult its foreign policy. He reminded that the Soviet government had begun talks in Vienna with the United States on strategic arms reduction in the same way. The Romanian leader added that Bucharest had not been informed about the proceeding of the negotiation yet. See Summary No. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP, 20. 5. 1970, [online: <http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16490/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/4ffbc115-d300-43b4-a47a-b21bc4022244/en/700520_summary.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22]. It is good to note that Romanian lack of information about SALT was unique in the scope of the Eastern Bloc. In fact, Kremlin briefed at least its loyal satellites, GDR for instance, on matter of the talks. BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1259, *Politbüro des ZK Reinschriftenprotokoll nr. 51*, 22. 12. 1969.

³⁵ Brezhnev initially planned to personally oversee a ceremonial of signing mutual allied treaty in Bucharest. In the end, he absented. According to the Soviet interpretation, the CPSU CC General Secretary demonstrated his disapproval of Romanian foreign policy in this way. AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 52, č.j. 020.206/71, *Současný politický postoj RSR ve vztahu ke státům Varšavské smlouvy*, 11. 1. 1971.

documents dealing with military, economic and political integration of the Eastern Bloc.³⁶ Brezhnev retroactively complained in a talk with the Polish Unified Worker's Party (PUWP) CC secretary and the politburo member Zenon Kliszko on Ceaușescu's strategy. "He behaved like the true gypsy," the Soviet leader raged.³⁷

Romanian resistance against Moscow's effort to improve cohesion of the Eastern Bloc never grew into an open rift. However, it complicated the Kremlin's policy within its sphere of influence, as well as its approach towards many international issues.³⁸ Regarding the absence of key Soviet documentation, the question why Moscow chose an apparently indecisive solution to the Romanian problem can be hardly answered. In general, one can claim that the USSR had four options: Ostracism, which would almost certainly have led to exclusion of Romania from the Eastern Bloc; military intervention; initiating an internal coup; or a continuous long-term leash affecting Ceaușescu and keeping his policy within the acceptable limits. An episode of rift with Albania poked holes in the first variant. In 1961, the impulsive and not so pre-calculated actions of Khrushchev's leadership caused the defection of this strategically important country from Soviet influence. Moscow considered a recurrence of this scenario undesirable. In situation, when the USSR was extremely interested in easing tensions with the West, any military solution was out of question as well. Western powers did not take any hard steps after invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, the Kremlin recognized that another similar action would either seriously complicate, or immediately terminate the process of détente.³⁹ Removal of Ceaușescu and his replacement by the representatives of pro-Soviet orientation never exceeded the scope of lackadaisical debate. From this point of view, long-term influencing of Romanian policy by diplomatic means seemed to be the most suitable solution.

An approach of Ceaușescu's regime helped this strategy. Romania never took any firm action which straightforwardly led to leaving the Eastern Bloc. Perhaps, it wanted to follow neither the Yugoslavian nor the Albanian path. Moreover, the

³⁶ Summary No. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP, 20. 5. 1970, [online: <http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16490/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/4ffbc115-d300-43b4-a47a-b21bc4022244/en/700520_summary.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

³⁷ According to Brezhnev's retrospective interpretation, Ceaușescu took the floor for a long time at the beginning of the talks in Moscow. However, he spoke in very general terms and tried to avoid any conflict topics. On the contrary, the Romanian leader assured that his policy basically corresponded with the Soviet positions. AAN, f. PZPR KCW, s. XIA/88, *Zapis wypowiedzi tow. L. Breźniewa podczas spotkania z tow. Z. Kliszko w dniu 2 czerwca 1970 roku*.

³⁸ Tejchman, M. – Litera, B., *Moskva a socialistické země na Balkáně 1964–1989*, Praha 2009, 7.

³⁹ Madry, J., Sovětské zájmy v pojetí obrany Československa (1965–1970). *HaV* 1992/5, 126–140.

possibility that Ceaușescu considered Romanian inclusion in the Soviet sphere of influence as a guarantee of the Leninist-Stalinist regime preservation in his country cannot be ruled out. The experience of the years 1956 and 1968 suggested that Moscow would not allow any significant changes to the social-economical system in Warsaw Pact member-states. However, the Romanian leader was well aware of how much his international activity irritated Moscow. He often defused its impact. Although Ceaușescu did not change the essence of his foreign policy at the turn of the 60's and the 70's, he tried to avoid some actions which Moscow considered the most provocative. His approach towards the Eastern Bloc became more flexible. He often informed the Kremlin about his intentions in advance. According to Soviet intelligence, Ceaușescu was advised on this strategy by Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito.⁴⁰

The typical and constant phenomenon of Romanian foreign policy in the 1970's became "balancing" – alternating between leaning towards the Eastern Bloc, China and also the West. The USSR still considered Romania as a part of its sphere of influence. Moscow tolerated this development, inter alia, because of the stable position of the Leninist-Stalinist regime within the country; the Soviet model of socialism remained a cornerstone of Ceaușescu's policy. The RCP maintained full control over all social processes in Romania.⁴¹ In this regard, Moscow even warned against over-strengthening Nicolae Ceaușescu's "cult of personality" during the early 70's. In praxis, the Romanian course caused the most concern to Moscow in propagandistic and ideological spheres. The nationalist rhetoric of the Romanian regime undermined the phrases about "proletarian internationalism". Romania's permanent and ostentatious proclamations of state sovereignty did not correspond with the idea of a unified foreign policy within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However, the USSR at the beginning of the decade assured the other members of the alliance that Romania would not leave the Eastern Bloc and would henceforth participate in its organizations. Nevertheless, Moscow bore in mind that this situation would create many problems in the future. Regarding Ceaușescu's policy straining the unity of the alliance, the Soviet Union even admitted that Romanian membership in the Warsaw Pact was favourable to the West.⁴² In accordance with this, Brezhnev told Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek in the early 70's: "Nationalism twisted

⁴⁰ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 89, sign. 020/311, kr. 8, č.j. 026.083/72-1, *Zpráva o současném vývoji na Balkáně (se zvláštním zřetelem k Rumunsku)*, 23. 10. 1972.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*; AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 54, č.j. 027280/72-2, *Celkový obraz hlavních aspektů vnitřní i zahraniční politiky RKS a RSR za rok 1972*, 19. 12. 1972.

⁴² NA, f. 1261/0/6, sv. 12, a.j. 11/info1, *Zpráva o sovětsko-rumunských vztazích*, 13. 9. 1971.

the mind of the great leader of great Romania, but we are patient. We believe he will finish his song and then will go with us.”⁴³

The very dynamical alteration of Romanian behaviour within the Warsaw Pact was significantly influenced by economic factors.⁴⁴ Plans of Ceaușescu’s leadership on economic development proved to be unrealistic. Economical complications therefore forced Romania to keep correct ties with the Eastern Bloc. Actually, the impact of cooperation with the West did not bring such benefit as Bucharest had expected.⁴⁵ In the mid-1970, Romania, therefore, instrumentally revised its intention to block political meetings of the Warsaw Pact and dampened its rhetoric for a while. There was also a calming effect brought on by a visit of a Soviet governmental delegation in Bucharest in order to sign a new bilateral allied treaty.⁴⁶

At the two following Political Consultative Committee sessions held in the second half of 1970 in Moscow and East Berlin, Romania behaved within acceptable limits. The most conflicting item came from the above mentioned effort of Hungary and the other member-states to give the more frequent political talks within the Warsaw Pact some formal rules. Yet again, the Romanian delegation blocked any discussion on the issue. During an alliance meeting in the Soviet capital in August, Ceaușescu calmly but firmly declared that the position of his country had remained constant since the mid-1960s. However, he agreed that mutual consultations on both European and global challenges at the level of ministers of foreign affairs were necessary. Nevertheless, he repeated the well-known Romanian stance that key competences in the foreign policy issues should have been maintained exclusively by individual state and party leaderships. This slightly confrontational behaviour of the Romanian First Secretary was interpreted by some Eastern diplomats as a result of an isolation of his opinions within the Warsaw Pact. In fact, it was rather part of Bucharest’s temporary tending towards the Eastern Bloc in terms of described policy balancing. Romania remained in the margins, but was not obstructive at that particular moment. It was ready to support some initiatives which, at least, partially corresponded with its foreign policy approach. In December, at the Berlin Political Consultative

⁴³ Durman, K., *Útěk od praporů. Kremľ a krize impéria 1964–1991*, Praha 1998, 117.

⁴⁴ Pech, R., *Rumunsko let sedmdesátých*, 271; Deletant, D., *Romania and the Warsaw Pact*.

⁴⁵ Romania got into troubles mostly because of dwindling of its oil and gas reserves. Bucharest was forced to buy those raw materials from Iran and to pay in U.S. dollars. Country therefore asked Moscow repeatedly for enhancement of Soviet deliveries of both strategic materials. Poor situation occurred also in food supplies; Romania had no choice but to ask the USSR for deliveries of grain again.

⁴⁶ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 52, č.j. 020.206/71, *Současný politický postoj RSR ve vztahu ke státům Varšavské smlouvy*, 11. 1. 1971.

Committee session, Ceaușescu, for the first time, put his signature on the Warsaw Pact's supreme body resolution denouncing the policy of Israel.⁴⁷ The proceeding and outcomes of the meeting was also appreciated by RCP Executive Committee.⁴⁸

Ceaușescu made clear that he was in favour of talks within the Warsaw Pact if they were limited to support for holding a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) based on sovereign states as the participants. He categorically refused joint actions on the behalf of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as they, in praxis, meant nothing more than support for foreign policy tack formulated by Kremlin.⁴⁹ In term of this, Romania insisted that the final documents of the Political Consultative Committee not be presented on behalf of the alliance, but only its individual member-states.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ NA, f. 1261/0/5, sv. 135, a.j. 213/1, *Informace o průběhu diskuse na zasedání Politického poradního výboru Varšavské smlouvy v Moskvě dne 20. srpna 1970*; Minutes of the Hungarian Party Politburo Meeting on the August 1970 PCC Meeting, 25. 8. 1970, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18034/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/89875ee9-6b04-46a4-b06b-9295e3d36f45/en/Minutes_Hungarian_Party_1970_Eng.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22];

AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 52, č.j. 020.206/71, *Současný politický postoj RSR ve vztahu ke státům Varšavské smlouvy*, 11. 1. 1971.

⁴⁸ Circular Letter by George Macovescu, 8. 12. 1970, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16355/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/082ec923-19b4-4ffa-8550-b3cc33d1d28c/en/701208_circular_letter.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁴⁹ Romanian dissentious position affected also activities of the editorial commission of deputy foreign ministers who worked simultaneously with the Political Consultative Committee plenary session. Bucharest's objections against proposed documents on European security, the situation in Africa, Indochina and Middle East resulted in establishing another commission on the level of ministers of foreign affairs. Both commissions then lost almost all day discussing vast number of Romanian remarks. In fact, behaviour of Romanian representatives ominously resembled previous obstructive strategy. Rhetoric of Bucharest did not change – continuously stressed conception of the countries as the international sovereigns. NA, f. 1261/0/5, sv. 146, a.j. 225/1, *Informace o činnosti redakční komise na zasedání politického poradního výboru států Varšavské smlouvy v Berlíně dne 2. prosince 1970*.

⁵⁰ Circular Letter by George Macovescu, 8. 12. 1970, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16355/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/082ec923-19b4-4ffa-8550-b3cc33d1d28c/en/701208_circular_letter.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

Chinese Factor and Balkan Initiatives

In spring 1971, the relations between Romania and the Warsaw Pact deteriorated again. The shift could have been visible at the 24th CPSU congress. In the backrooms, Ceaușescu once more openly criticized military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Romanian press afterwards significantly reduced the transcript of Brezhnev's main speech. Specifically, its foreign policy parts and sections adoring the importance of the Warsaw Pact's existence were not published.⁵¹ The exact reasons can be revealed by analysis of top Romanian leadership documentation only. However, diplomats of the Eastern Bloc countries did not miss the fact that the more positive Romanian stances at recent Warsaw Pact's sessions had been also recorded by the West. Considering this, they suspected that Ceaușescu's current sharper rhetoric was strictly auxiliary and he had only been attempting to demonstrate his continuous specific positions.⁵² Regarding this, Petre Oprea assumes that Romanian opposition within the Warsaw Pact after 1968 was motivated also by an effort to make the country more attractive to Western eyes in order to easily get American and West-European loans and modern technologies.⁵³

In June 1971, the spectacular journey of the Romanian leader to China and other Asian socialist countries marked another provocative moment.⁵⁴ The Warsaw Pact member-states perceived Ceaușescu's actions as a signal for both the West and particularly Beijing that the alliance was not unanimous in its attitude.⁵⁵ At the time,

⁵¹ The shift in attitude of Romanian press was obvious mostly in comparison to the commentaries on the recent Warsaw Pact meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Bucharest, when media in the country had neglected usual stressing the principles of non-interference, sovereignty and state independence. AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 52, č.j. 021.324/71-2, *Ohlas bukurešťské porady ministrů zahraničních věcí členských zemí VS*, 26. 2. 1971.

⁵² AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 52, č.j. 022.188/71-2, *Ohlas XXIV. sjezdu KSSS v Rumunsku*, 14. 4. 1971.

⁵³ Oprea, P., *Die rumänische Armee und die gemeinsamen Manöver des Warschauer Paktes*, in: *Der Warschauer Pakt*, 198.

⁵⁴ Some scholars see a direct connection between the rise of Ceaușescu's megalomania and his journey to the Asian communist countries. He was actually deeply impressed by oriental cult of personality of communist leaders there. It gave him imagination of means and tools to affect the people and methods to maintain a noblesse oblige at the top of political power. Before the end of the 1970s, formation of the cults and rituals and related practices in Romania was finished. Deletant, D., *Romania and the Warsaw Pact*; Tejchman, M. – Litera, B., *Moskva a socialistické země*, 116.

⁵⁵ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 82 RSR, sign. 017/111, kr. 1, č.j. 023.362/71-2, *Informace o návštěvě stranické a vládní delegace RSR v asijských socialistických zemích*, 6. 6. 1971.

Kremlin considered China as a serious threat not only because of mutual disputes and Sino-Western convergence, but also due to its potentially disruptive influence on the Warsaw Treaty Organization.⁵⁶ However, some parts of Ceaușescu's conversation with the Chinese leadership actually concerned the Pact. The Romanian leader said his country was ready to progressively cooperate within the framework of the alliance, but in accordance with the vague founding charter only. He was determined to prevent transformation of the alliance into a supranational organization, and deepening political, economic and military integration of the Soviet sphere of influence as Moscow intended. He accused China of helping to found the Pact, as Beijing had not opposed this step in 1955 and even accepted statute as an observer.⁵⁷ During his visit to Mongolia, Ceaușescu verbally assaulted the Warsaw Pact again. He refused Jumdzgin Cedenbal's claim that this "peaceful" organization strove for the imposition of European security.⁵⁸ Romanian distance from the Warsaw Pact was also demonstrated following Ceaușescu's absence at informal summer talks of party leaders held by Brezhnev on Crimea.⁵⁹

Some Soviet satellites reacted to the situation more vigorously than the USSR itself. The first tendencies to streamline Romanian foreign policy occurred in 1970. A few of the Warsaw Pact member-states were dissatisfied not only by the threats of Romanian withdrawal from alliance political meetings, but mostly by Ceaușescu's Balkan initiatives. In March 1970, Romanian minister of foreign affairs Mănescu formally called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone and significant improvement of mutual cooperation in the region.⁶⁰ The Soviet Union and primarily some of its satellites considered this undesirable. However, the Warsaw Pact member-states' appeals for action against the policy of Bucharest temporally faded-out as Romania dampened its activity in the mid-1970. In the wake of a new worsening of mutual

⁵⁶ Mastny, V., *A Cardboard Castle*, 43.

⁵⁷ The Chinese observers led by Mao Zedong withdrew from the Political Consultative Committee sessions in 1961. Mastny, V., *China, the Warsaw Pact, and Sino-Soviet Relations under Khrushchev*, 2002, [online: <http://php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_china_wapa/intro_mastny.cfm?navinfo=16034>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁵⁸ Minutes of Conversation of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 25. 6. 1971, [online: <http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16347/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/29ce4e90-afa7-4eab-a83d-76928bb1131b/en/710625_minutes.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁵⁹ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 68, sign. 0344/111, kr. 1, č.j. 025495, *Vztahy NDR-RSR - informácia*, 3. 11. 1971.

⁶⁰ Ceaușescu's leadership officially intended to follow up the initiatives presented during the years 1957–1959 by then Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica. However, those proposals had striven for different aims.

relations the next year, Hungary was first to step out against Romanian manoeuvres. In August, Hungarian diplomats were briefed to consistently refuse all attempts at aiming to disrupt either the Warsaw Pact or Comecon unity. This directive had a strictly anti-Romanian subtext.⁶¹ The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia CC General Secretary Gustáv Husák went even further: He accused RCP of leaving Marxist-Leninist positions, and supported Soviet opinions of Romania harming the Warsaw Pact's interests. Unlike the Soviets, he also criticized Romanian standpoint about the need to reduce the Pact's ability to affect its member-states' policy.⁶²

Taking into account geographical factors, the Eastern Bloc states considered Bulgaria – which remained fully loyal to Moscow – as a natural bulwark against Romanian tendencies in the Balkan area.⁶³ In this, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov acted most proactively. During confident diplomatic talks he called for solving the issue of Romania-Eastern Bloc relations. Zhivkov suggested working-out a coherent strategy in order to influence Ceaușescu's policy towards the Warsaw Pact.⁶⁴ Harsh criticism was voiced also from East Berlin.⁶⁵ The German Democratic Republic (GDR) sharply denounced Romanian Balkan initiatives. They were marked as an attempt to establish some sort of “Balkan Pact” after the expected death of Josip

⁶¹ In addition, the directive occurred in time of significant deterioration of Romanian-Hungarian relations which had led to cancelation of planned meeting of Ceaușescu and Kadar in July 1971. AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 58 MLR, sign. 015/311, kr. 5, č.j. 024.374/71-2, *K výsledkům srpnového společného zasedání ÚV MSDS a vlády MLR v oblasti zahraniční politiky*, 26. 8. 1971.

⁶² NA, f. 1261/0/6, sv. 16, a.j. 15/2, *Návrh zprávy ÚV KSČ k mezinárodním otázkám*, 13. 10. 1971.

⁶³ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 12 BLR, sign. 013/311, kr. 7, č.j. 025537, *Politický vývoj vztahů BLR s balkánskými zeměmi*, 8. 10. 1970.

⁶⁴ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 4 BLR, e.č. 3, č.j. 025.263/71-2, *Záznam o rozhovoru p. Jiřího Kučery, velvyslance zdejšího ZÚ se p. Jevgenievem Gromuškinem, velvyslanceckým radou ZÚ SSSR v Sofii*, 22. 10. 1971.

⁶⁵ In the early 1970s, the relations between East Germany and Romania were merely sporadic. This situation was unique within the Warsaw Pact. GDR-SRR liaison was complicated not only by Romanian general approach towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. The main reason was Romanian establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany on the level of ambassadors in February 1969. Also Romanian-East-German economic cooperation remained limited to minimum. Moreover, the countries had no valid bilateral allied treaty; it was an exception within the Eastern Bloc. The document was finalized in September 1970. However, Bucharest postponed the signature for almost two years. This was probably caused also by East-German demands that the “West-German militarism” must be mentioned at least in the preamble of the treaty. Romania, which strove for correct relations with the West, opposed. Not only Romanian obstructions, but undoubtedly also radical positions of Ulbricht's leadership put an obstacle in conclusion of the agreement. BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1223, *Politbüro des ZK Reinschriftenprotokoll nr. 15*, 8. 4. 1969.

Broz Tito; at the moment when Ceaușescu would have no strong competitor in the region. Regarding his visit in China, SED leadership warned against creation of a Beijing-Bucharest-Belgrade-Tirana axis. The East-German stance mostly corresponded with Bulgarian and Soviet positions. The GDR therefore supported Zhivkov's proposal to the Warsaw Pact bodies to start dealing with Romanian policy. East-German diplomats suggested at least holding a deputy foreign ministers' meeting. Simultaneously, the Eastern Bloc countries should have striven for developing bilateral contacts with Romania as much as possible in order to create favourable conditions for general improvement of mutual relations.⁶⁶ During a visit of the Bulgarian prime-minister Stanko Todorov in Hungary, this strategy was also accepted by Janos Kadar's leadership. In late 1971, Zhivkov presented those intentions in person to Brezhnev.⁶⁷

Romanian Balkan initiatives apparently raised concerns in Moscow which considered them as a part of attempts to disintegrate both the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The Soviet leadership could not rule out that Bucharest, according its proclaimed long-term effort to dissolve power blocs, was creating a background for a potential future military-political arrangement on the peninsula. The Kremlin correctly suspected Ceaușescu that the essence of his Balkan policy was to reduce the superpower's influence on processes in the region. Instead of full suppression of Romanian initiatives, the USSR tried to shift them in a more favourable direction from its point of view. Moscow considered the issue as an integral part of ensuring the Warsaw Pact's influence on the Balkans. It was reminded that Romania was the only member of the alliance who had relatively normal relations with all countries of the peninsula.⁶⁸ Romanian activity, therefore, seemed to be a potentially appropriate

⁶⁶ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 68 NDR, sign. 0344/111, kr. 1, č.j. 025495, *Vztahy NDR-RSR – informácia*, 3. 10. 1971. Possibility that the East-German officials presented the stances at the direct order of Kremlin cannot be ruled out. After all, it was typical. At the time, in diplomatic talks with its satellites, the Soviet leadership actually warned against coalition of China, Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania which could have weakened the Warsaw Pact's southern flank and potentially lead to establishing some sort of "Balkan bloc" with a sealing element of Anti-Sovietism. Baev, J., *"The Crimean Meetings" of the Warsaw Pact Countries' Leaders*, 2003. [online: <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/crimea_meetings.cfm?navinfo=16037>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁶⁷ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 4, e.č. 3, č.j. 026.066/71-2, *Záznam o rozhovoru p. Jiřího Kučery, velvyslanceckého rady zdejšího ZÚ se p. Nikolajem Černevem, vedoucím 2.t.o. ministerstva zahraničních věcí BLR*, 2.12. 1971; *Ibidem*, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 12, sign. 013/111, kr. 1, č.j. 026.067/71-2, *BLR-informace o setkání stranických a státních představitelů SSSR a BLR v Moskvě*, 3. 12. 1971.

⁶⁸ In comparison to other Warsaw Pact member-states, Romanian relations with Albania were the least tense. However, they were far to being smooth. Among other things, Enver Hoxha's regime

tool for spreading the Warsaw Pact policy in the area. This was obviously possible only under the condition that *the Six* would be able to affect Bucharest and prompt it to implement a unified course of the alliance.⁶⁹

In the first half of the 70's, Todor Zhivkov formally stood in the frontlines of the effort to shape Bucharest's foreign policy. He was secretly entrusted to this role by Brezhnev himself, who noted that Ceaușescu had crossed the line. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Central Committee first secretary was supposed to act as a "moderator" in attempt to prompt Romanian turnabout.⁷⁰ In the 1970's, Bulgaria was the most loyal and the most dependent satellite of Moscow.⁷¹ This could be clearly seen in Bulgarian foreign policy. The country always acted under the aegis of a unified course of the Warsaw Pact; guidelines of the alliance meetings became axioms to Sofia.⁷² Bulgarian approach towards Romania was not solely determined by more independent orientation of Ceaușescu's leadership. Sofia approved of neither Romanian positive relations with Tito's Yugoslavia, nor its stance on the so-called Macedonian question.⁷³ Regarding Romanian Balkan initiatives, Zhivkov's regime, using ideological-cliché language, warned against the penetration of nationalism, imperialism and Maoism and called for "intended counter-pressure" by the Warsaw Pact.⁷⁴

In January 1972, RCP leadership received information that the rest of the alliance members intended to use the upcoming Political Consultative Committee session in Prague to initiate a harsh assault on Romanian policy. In order to defuse expected criticism, Ceaușescu asked Zhivkov for a regulatory meeting. Bulgaria refused his call. The BCP Central Committee First Secretary insisted that the issue was too serious and therefore had to be dealt with multilaterally at the Warsaw

constantly criticized Bucharest for its continuing membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. NA, f. 1261/0/6, sv. 24, a.j. 25/info3, *Informace o VI. sjezdu Albánské strany práce*, 15. 12. 1971.

⁶⁹ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 52, č.j. 025.188/71, *Rumunsko a balkánská otázka*, 19. 10. 1971; AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 89, sign. 020/112, kr. 2, č.j. 0441/71, *Záznam o návštěvě delegace FMZV vedené I. náměstkem ministra p. Fr. Krajíčkem v Moskvě*, 16. 10. 1971.

⁷⁰ Baev, J., *The Warsaw pact and Southern Tier Conflicts*, 200; Baev, J., *The "Crimean Meetings"*.

⁷¹ Tejchman, M. – Litera, B., *Moskva a socialistické země*, 111.

⁷² AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 12, sign. 013/311, kr. 7, č.j. 021.200/71-2, *Charakteristika postojů BLR k problematice evropské bezpečnosti*, 18. 2. 1971; AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 4, e.č. 10, č.j. 025.229, *Zahraniční politika BLR*, blíže nedatováno 1973.

⁷³ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 12, sign. 013/311, kr. 7, č.j. 020276/70-2, *Vývoj styků BLR s NDR, PLR, MLR a RSR*, 12. 1. 1970.

⁷⁴ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 4, e.č. 7, č.j. 022.859/72-2, *Bulharská zahraniční politika v oblasti Balkánského poloostrova*, 2. 2. 1972.

Pact supreme body meeting.⁷⁵ However, before the summit in the Czechoslovak capital, Romania sent Moscow some signals that this time it would fully cooperate.⁷⁶ At the meeting itself Romanian representatives acted relatively constructively and looked for compromise in order to avoid criticism. They actually did not oppose even a new proposal to intensify political talks within the Warsaw Pact's framework. For the first time, Romania roughly admitted the possibility of formalization of such consultations.⁷⁷ The USSR subsequently appreciated that, unlike the previous year, Ceaușescu also took part in the summer Crimean meeting. His presence was considered by Moscow to be more important than the fact he again stated different positions there.⁷⁸ This new Romanian trend towards the Warsaw Pact was caused, inter alia, by the failure of Ceaușescu's Balkan policy. In early 1972, his attempts to start official multilateral talks on closer cooperation between the countries of peninsula failed.⁷⁹

In the wake of this shift, the Warsaw Treaty Organization did not deal with the Romanian question collectively in 1972.⁸⁰ Very important was the general approach

⁷⁵ Ibidem, e.č. 8, i.č. 020.483/72-2, *Záznam o rozhovoru p. Jiřího Kučery, velvyslaneckého rady zdejšího ZÚ se p. Andrášem Šárdim, velvyslaneckým radou ZÚ MLR v Sofii ze dne 19. ledna 1972.*

⁷⁶ For instance, the Romanian officials were quite unusually interested in preparation of the meeting's agenda. Telegram from Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu to the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow, 10. 1. 1972, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16345/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/3908f529-d54d-46ad-bdf5-8bc766221c9e/en/720110_telegram.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22];

Romanian Ambassador in Moscow to George Macovescu, 11. 1. 1972, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16342/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/cee2b150-e6ee-476d-956c-a8ce7e138386/en/720111_romanian_ambassador_moscow.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁷⁷ Minutes of the Meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Politburo on the January 1972 PCC Meeting, 1. 2. 1972, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18105/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/a19328f7-c508-42f2-8f85-593a871d6293/en/Minutes_Hungarian_Party_1972_en.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

⁷⁸ AAN, f. PZPR KCW, p. XIA/612, *Notatka z przebiegu Spotkania I-szych sekretarzy bratnich partii na Krymie /31 lipca 1972/.*

⁷⁹ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 54, č.j. 023.034/72-2, *Vývoj politiky RSR vůči Balkánu v poslední době*, 12. 5. 1972.

⁸⁰ Even the speech of Zhivkov, who initiated the move, actually remained limited to the unfocused warnings against NATO's efforts to penetrate Balkan area through intensified influencing Yugoslavia and Albania. Speech by the General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 25. 1. 1972, [online:<http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18104/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/21225070-bcb3-464a-86f2-edacf3a23fe3/en/Speech_Zhivkov_1972_en.pdf>, cit. 2014-09-22].

of Moscow. At the time, the Kremlin decided not to use official structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to solve the disputes between its member-states. All such activities were therefore put on a bilateral level. Bulgaria proved its full dependency on actual Soviet course. As the Kremlin was satisfied with the last shift in Romanian policy, Sofia also relented in its engagement of the issue. Hence, criticism resonated mostly from the GDR. East-German officials correctly stated that the essence of Romanian foreign policy remained unchanged. The recent mitigation of Romanian policy and improvement in mutual relations were considered as just a tactical retreat of Ceaușescu's leadership.⁸¹ In fact, Bucharest actually feared isolation within the Eastern Bloc; there were some serious warnings sent by Romanian allies. For instance, the PUWP CC First Secretary Gierek refused to visit SRR as part of his protest against its foreign policy⁸² and Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs Bohuslav Chňoupek was also very critical during his journey to the country. Romania actually reacted and toned down its rhetoric, at least for a while.⁸³

Poland did not suggest influencing Romania through open polemics either. It preferred unofficial personal contacts with Romanian officials. The main aim remained not to expose disputes within the Eastern Bloc publicly.⁸⁴ However, Polish strategy proved to be little effective. For instance, in November 1972 Ceaușescu assured a Polish delegation that he would coordinate his next moves in the CSCE process with the Warsaw Pact. In fact, at the following party plenum, he declared

⁸¹ In 1972, the relations between Romania and East Germany improved. During the visit of East-German party and government delegation in Bucharest, the Romanian officials without any obstacles supported GDR's stances on future of West Berlin and after two years of obstructions they signed the bilateral allied treaty. AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 68, sign. 0344/111, kr. 1, č.j. 023.817/72-4, *K výsledkům návštěvy stranické a vládní delegace NDR v RSR-informace*, 21. 6. 1972; Ibidem, č.j. 022.277/72-4, *Záznam ZÚ Berlín o vztazích NDR-RSR*, 5.4. 1972.

⁸² Cancellation of Gierek-Ceaușescu meeting was initiated by Poland itself, not by Moscow. Warsaw only informed the Kremlin about its intention. Afterwards, the PUWP politburo member Józef Tejchme was sent to Romania in order to explain reasons which had led to revocation of the planned visit. In his reaction, Ceaușescu accused Poland of unacceptable duress on his country; among other things, he protested against the assaults on Romanian policy in Polish press. The incident later resulted in weakening economic cooperation between both countries. AAN, f. PZPR KCW, s. XIB/126, *Tezy do rozmów z towarzyszami radzieckimi*, nedatováno 1973.

⁸³ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 54, č.j. 027280/72-2, *Celkový obraz hlavních aspektů vnitřní i zahraniční politiky RKS a RSR za rok 1972*, 19. 12. 1972; AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 82, sign. 017/112, kr. 2, č.j. 022.038/73-2, *RSR – druhá informace o plnění závěrů kolegia ministra zahr. věcí v relaci s RSR ze 30. prosince 1971*, 3. 4. 1973.

⁸⁴ Ibidem, i.č. 79, sign. 016/111, kr. 2, č.j. 023801, *Informácia k vzťahom PLR – RSR*, 18. 6. 1973.

a separate course of action in order to insert into the agenda of the conference issues of disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops from territories of European countries. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, actually, strongly dismissed those principles.⁸⁵ Despite the fact that Romania invariably supported official alliance resolutions concerning the Helsinki process, its real policy differed in many aspects. The Eastern Bloc countries, therefore, believed that Bucharest intended to use CSCE to further weaken its ties to both the Warsaw Pact and Soviet sphere of influence in general.⁸⁶

In 1973, the relations between Romania and the Warsaw Treaty Organization reached a new low point. Despite some failures, Ceaușescu still maintained his Balkan ambitions. In the first months of the year, in connection with shifts in the CSCE process and upcoming Vienna disarmaments talks⁸⁷ he, once more, tried to mobilize the countries of the peninsula into closer cooperation, regardless of their geopolitical ties. Bulgaria unambiguously stood up against this effort. Sofia refused Romanian calls for consultation and noted that the issues were supposed to be discussed on the level of the Warsaw Pact only.⁸⁸ In fact, Zhivkov's regime intended to support solely Soviet stances. Indeed, Bulgarian activities in the Balkans mainly protected the interests of Moscow. One of these interests was also the elimination of Romanian regional policy impact.⁸⁹ An important clash between both Balkan Warsaw Pact member-states occurred at a Crimean meeting of party leaders in July 1973. Zhivkov decided to plainly criticize Romanian Balkan policy. The Bulgarian leader assigned Romania as pro-China, Maoist and thus an extremely hostile axis. This, together with his other verbal assaults almost resulted in an open rift. In his reaction, Ceaușescu threatened to theatrically leave the session. Situation was calmed down

⁸⁵ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 54, č.j. 027280/72-2, *Celkový obraz hlavních aspektů vnitřní i zahraniční politiky RKS a RSR za rok 1972*, 19. 12. 1972.

⁸⁶ Romanian stances tended not only against the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but against general integration within the Eastern Bloc, as the new demands of the Romanian foreign affairs minister Macovecu showed. In July, during the CSCE negotiations in Helsinki, he proposed dissolution of not only military, but also economic blocs. AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 56, č.j. 022518/73, *Postoj RSR k přípravným jednáním KEBS v Helsinkách*, 13. 4. 1973; *Ibidem*, č.j. 024.505/73, *Ke stanovisku RSR na I. fázi KEBS*, 18. 7. 1973.

⁸⁷ In 1973, Vienna talks on reduction in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe began between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Romania once more tried to prevent negotiations on the basis of blocs.

⁸⁸ AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 4, e.č. 16, č.j. 020.038/73-2, *Záznam o přijetí rady ZÚ BLR p. G. Georgieva vedoucím 2. t.o. J. Hesem dne 3. ledna 1973*.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, e.č. 10, č.j. 025230/73, *Informace o problematice vztahů BLR s balkánskými zeměmi*, 3. 9. 1973.

by Brezhnev's personal intervention. However, he managed to iron the issue out with serious difficulty.⁹⁰

The Crimean incident was crucial for future development. Brezhnev himself also denounced some Romanian stances, either claims of Chinese contribution to détente or appeals to the start of practical moves towards simultaneous dissolution of military blocs.⁹¹ In addition, he suspected that Ceaușescu failed to inform the wider structures of the RCP about the results of the Crimean meeting of party leaders which defined, behind closed doors, the short term international priorities of the Eastern bloc.⁹² Despite those facts, Brezhnev considered aberrations of Romanian foreign policy as no fundamental problem worthy of risking an open clash and a new split within the Eastern Bloc. He believed that collective dealing with the issue at the Warsaw Pact meeting was an unnecessary dangerous move. In terms of this, the Soviet General Secretary altered also the scope of the unofficial Crimean meetings. After the 1973 row, he opted to invite the party leaders individually, never together.⁹³ Remember, at the time official multilateral political meetings under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact were held less frequently as well. This alteration was probably not caused exclusively by the Romanian factor, as it reflected a general shift in Moscow's approach towards interaction with the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence.

In fact, the Soviet leadership ignored all appeals for vigorous solutions. Thus, they were not solely presented by the agile Zhivkov.⁹⁴ Also, Polish leadership assaulted

⁹⁰ Baev, J., *The "Crimean Meetings"*; Tejchman, M. – Litera, B., *Moskva a socialistické země*, 87.

⁹¹ AAN, f. PZPR KCW, s. XIA/613, *Wystąpienie końcowe Tow. Breźniewa*, nedatováno, zřejmě červenec 1973.

⁹² Furthermore, unlike the others party leaders, Ceaușescu in praxis totally ignored the results of the Crimean meeting. AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 34, e.č. 61, č.j. 010.459/74, *Rumunská zahraniční politika ve světle komuniké z krymského jednání 30.–31. července 1973*, 17. 1. 1974; AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 89, sign. 020/311, kr. 9, č.j. 012545, *Zpráva o sovětsko-rumunských vztazích*, 3. 4. 1974.

⁹³ Baev, J., *The "Crimean Meetings"*.

⁹⁴ It happened, for instance, after the visit of Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs Mladenov in Romania when he argued with Ceaușescu on implementation of the recent Political Consultative Committee resolution. At the turn of 1973 and 1974, Zhivkov constantly warned that Romanian nationalist course had reached the level which negatively affected situation within both, Warsaw Pact as well as International Communist and Worker's Movement. From his point of view, some countermeasures were necessary; he suggested at least consulting the issue on the alliance's level. AMZV, f. DTO 1945–1989, i.č. 4, e.č. 11, č.j. 020.516, *Záznam z informace Nikolaje Černěva, ved. 2. t.o. MZV BLR o oficiální návštěvě ministra ZV BLR v RSR*, 22. 12. 1973; *Ibidem*, e.č. 19, č.j. 010177/74, *Záznam o rozhovoru velvyslaneckého rady ZÚ MLR v Sofii A. Šardiho s velvyslaneckým*

Romanian policy harder than Moscow. During his conversation with Brezhnev, Gierek even broached the possibility of establishing closer cooperation with “proletarian internationalism” forces in Romania and deeper integration of the Romanian army into the Warsaw Pact. Although Polish leadership realized that Ceaușescu knew where the limits of his more independent policy were,⁹⁵ they carefully probed whether Moscow would not try to replace him.

Along with its strategy so far, Moscow intended to influence Ceaușescu in backrooms only, even at the Political Consultative Committee session held in Warsaw, April 1974.⁹⁶ However, Edward Gierek and Erich Honecker decided to break the silence on Romania’s approach. After all, a few months before that, both leaders were unanimous both in their criticism of Romania and their bad relations with Ceaușescu’s regime.⁹⁷ Thus, at the alliance supreme body meeting, both leaders openly denounced Bucharest for helping NATO and damaging the interests of socialist countries through its moves in disarmament talks.⁹⁸ Their verbal assault actually failed; Ceaușescu used it to accuse the GDR of exceeding the rules of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Moreover, regardless of such criticism of Romania he continued the presentation of different routes.⁹⁹

radou čs. ZÚ v Sofii J. Kučerou, 4. 1. 1974; Ibidem, e.č. 17, č.j. 011.023/74-2, Podkladové materiály pro návštěvu ministra zahraničních věcí BLR Petra Mladenova v ČSSR, 31. 1. 1974.

⁹⁵ Romania rejected Polish criticism of its Balkan initiatives. Ceaușescu’s regime referred to previous Polish actions and appeals for settlement of Central-European region. AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 79, sign. 016/111, kr. 2, č.j. 023134, *Informácia o některých poznatkoch z návštěvy viceministra p. Trepczynského v Rumunsku, 22. 5. 1973; Ibidem, č.j. 023801, Informácia k vzťahom PLR – RSR, 18. 6. 1973; AAN, f. PZPR KCW, s. XIB/126, Handouts for conversation of the PUWP CC First Secretary E. Gierek with the CPSU CC General Secretary L. Brezhnev, undated, perhaps 1973.*

⁹⁶ AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 89, sign. 020/311, kr. 9, č.j. 012545, *Zpráva o sovětsko-rumunských vztazích, 3. 4. 1974.*

⁹⁷ *Ibidem, i.č. 68, sign. 0344/311, kr. 10, č.j. 024.098/73-4, Návštěva stranické a vládní delegace PLR v NDR, 3. 7. 1973.*

⁹⁸ Especially East Germany was caught by surprise when realized that the Romanian representative at Vienna disarmament talks intended to propose international supervision of involved countries’ territories through a network of the control posts. That would have supposed also clear definition of the areas of no military activity. According to the East-German delegation, Romania in this manner threatened both success of Vienna talks as well as security and sovereignty of the socialist states. BArch, DY 30/2351, Telegram to SED CC on Romanian proposals put forward at Political Consultative Committee session, 18. 4. 1974.

⁹⁹ Not only Romanian proposals on Vienna disarmament talks were unacceptable for the rest of the Warsaw Pact member-states. Ceaușescu also appreciated positive role of China in détente process and declared support for Egypt-Israel treaty. Furthermore, he refused to label Pinochet’s coup in Chile as a fascist putsch. On the contrary, the Romanian leader urged the final communiqué

In the wake of this fail, Soviet strategy of long-term and systematic influence appeared to be much more effective. At the meeting, Romania, in fact, announced its preliminary consent to establishing the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs within the Warsaw Pact. In spite of Bucharest agreeing with this step under the condition of maintaining every party and government right to shape its own foreign policy, Romanian officials admitted that the meetings of the body could be held even thrice a year. Ceaușescu stated that in the current situation, stressing importance of the alliance's political activities rather than its military dimension, was necessary. This opinion essentially corresponded with then-claims of the Soviet leader.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Romania ceased stalling reform of the Pact's political structures after almost ten years without being firmly pushed into it.¹⁰¹ *The Six* actually expected that creation of new bodies would bring increased opportunity to bulwark Romanian divergent tendencies more effectively.¹⁰² As a result of the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw, individual ministries of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member-states were instructed by Moscow to avoid any activity against Romania. The Soviet satellites were supposed to solely analyse Romanian policy towards both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Comecon.¹⁰³

This conciliatory approach of Moscow in the Romanian question was apparently reflected even towards the beginning of the disintegration of the entire Eastern Bloc. In the first half of the 70's, the USSR had forged no methods on how to pacify easily and without serious international complications an undesirable policy of some country within its sphere of influence. However, Kremlin did not realize the severity of the problem until the beginning of the next decade when it was not able to force Polish party leadership to suppress their opposition movement.

to appeal for simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization once more. The Romanian representative in the editorial commission again tried to alter the documents in preparation in terms of Ceaușescu's speech. The situation resulted in failure of Secretariat's work; the texts had to be compiled during separate negotiation of the Soviet and Romanian delegations.

¹⁰⁰NA, f. 1261/0/6, sv. 115, a.j. 117/1, *Zpráva o průběhu a výsledcích zasedání Politického poradního výboru států Varšavské smlouvy*, 24. 4. 1974; *Ibidem*, *stručná charakteristika vystoupení vedoucích jednotlivých delegací na zasedání politického poradního výboru*, 24. 4. 1974.

¹⁰¹After 1970, the USSR instructed its satellites to be patient and not to put the issue in front of Romania in ultimate way. *Ibidem*, sv. 12, a.j. 11/info1, *Zpráva o sovětsko-rumunských vztazích*, 13. 9. 1971.

¹⁰²*Ibidem*, sv. 144, a.j. 149/2, *Zpráva o výsledcích jednání náměstků ministrů zahraničních věcí členských států Varšavské smlouvy*, 5. 2. 1975.

¹⁰³AMZV, f. TO(t) 1970–1974, i.č. 82, sign. 017/112, kr. 2, č.j. 012.472/74-2, *Zpráva o návštěvě ministra zahraničních věcí RSR p. Macovesca v ČSSR*, 2. 5. 1974.

ABSTRACT

Romania in the Political Structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization at the Turn of 1960s and 1970s

Matěj Bílý

The paper analyses a problematic relationship between Romania and the rest of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member-states at the turn of the 1960s and the 1970s. It mostly focuses on the interaction within the alliance's political structures, as well as those aspects of mutual relations which directly concerned the Pact. The analysis is primarily based on wide research in Czech, Polish and German archives, supplemented by already published documents. The paper explains the basic features of dynamic changes of Romanian attitude towards the Warsaw Pact in the period, which resulted from general approach of Nicolae Ceaușescu's authoritarian regime towards the entire Eastern Bloc. The study also suggests why Kremlin tolerated Romanian behaviour and ignored a calling of some Soviet satellites for harsher actions against Bucharest.

Key words: Warsaw Treaty Organization, Eastern Bloc, Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu

АННОТАЦИЯ

Румыния в политических структурах Организации Варшавского Договора на рубеже 1960–1970-х годов

Матей Билы

Статья посвящена проблематике непростых взаимоотношений между Румынией и другими государствами-участниками Организации Варшавского Договора на рубеже 1960–1970-х годов. Основное внимание сосредоточено на взаимодействии внутри политических структур альянса, а также на аспектах взаимоотношений между ними, имеющих непосредственное отношение к договору. В основу анализа положены результаты обширной исследовательской работы в архивах Чехии, Польши и Германии, дополненные ранее опубликованными документами. В статье разъясняются основные особенности

динамических изменений в отношении Румынии к Варшавскому Договору в указанный период, которые обусловлены общей позицией, занимаемой авторитарным режимом Николае Чаушеску во взаимоотношениях с Восточным блоком в целом. В статье также высказывается предположение о том, почему в Кремле мирились с данной ситуацией и игнорировали призывы социалистических стран-сателлитов к более жестким мерам в отношении Бухареста.

Ключевые слова: Организация Варшавского Договора, Восточный блок, Румыния, Николае Чаушеску